Romans 3:7

Rom 3:7-8. For — Or but (the objector may reply) if the truth of God hath more abounded — Has been more abundantly shown; through my lie — If my lie, that is, practice contrary to truth, conduces to the glory of God, by making his truth shine with superior advantage; why am I yet judged as a sinner — And arraigned for that which is attended with such happy consequences? Can my conduct be said to be sinful at all? Ought I not to do what would otherwise be evil, that so much good may come? To this the apostle does not deign to give a direct answer, adding, whose damnation, or condemnation, is just. The condemnation of all, who either speak or act in this manner. Here the apostle teaches expressly the unlawfulness of doing evil, any evil, on the pretence of promoting what is good. Such a pretence, if allowed, would justify the greatest crimes. This, however, the apostle here signifies they were slanderously reported as teaching; probably on a misinterpretation of their doctrine, that the greatness of the sins of which the Gentiles were guilty, rendered God’s goodness in sending Christ to die for them the more illustrious.

Joseph Benson's Commentary on the Old and New Testaments (1811–1818) — public domain. Text from a community e-Sword module.

Rom 3:7. Εἰ γὰρ, for if) An Ætiologia[34] [a sentiment, with the grounds on which it rests subjoined] set forth in the form of a dialogue, for the purpose of strengthening the objection which was introduced at the beginning of Rom 3:5. ψεύσματι, through my lie) The things which God says are true, and he who does not believe these, makes God a liar, being in reality himself the liar.—τί) that is, why do I even still excuse myself, as if I had some reason to fear? Comp. τί ἔτι, ch. Rom 9:19; Gal 5:11.—κᾀγὼ) I also, to whom the truth of God has been revealed; not merely the heathen.—κρίνομαι) corresponds to κρίνεσθαι, Rom 3:4; Rom 3:6, LXX.; Job 2:9 (Job 40:4) τί ἔτι ἐγὼ κρίνομαι;

[34] See Appendix.

Bengel's Gnomon of the New Testament — English translation (T&T Clark, Edinburgh, 1860) — public domain. Text from a community e-Sword module.

Rom_3:7 f. The ἐπεὶ πῶς κρινεῖ ὁ Θεὸς τ. κόσμ. receives its illustrative confirmation; for as to the case of God, who would thus be unrighteous and nevertheless is to judge the world, every ground for judging man as a sinner must be superseded by the circumstance already discussed, viz. that His truth has been glorified by mans falsehood (Rom_3:4 f.); and (Rom_3:8) as to the case of man himself, there would result the principle directly worthy of condemnation, that he should do evil in order that good might come. Comp Th. Schott, and in substance also Hofmann and Morison. The argument accordingly rests on the basis, that in the case put (ἘΠΕΊ from Rom_3:6) the relation of God to the judgment of the world would yield two absurd consequences. (See this, as early as Chrysostom.) Another view is that of Calvin, Beza, Grotius, Wolf, and many others, including Rückert, Kollner, Tholuck, Philippi and Umbreit, that the objection of Rom_3:5 is here amplified. But it is quite as arbitrary and in fact impossible (hence Philippi resorts to the violent expedient of putting in a parenthesis not only ΚΑΤᾺ ἌΝΘΡ. ΛΈΓΩ, but also ΜῊ ΓΈΝΟΙΤΟ.… ΚΌΣΜΟΝ), with the reference of ΓΆΡ, to overleap entirely Rom_3:6, as it is strange to make the discourse so completely abrupt and to represent the Apostle as making no reply at all to the first part of the alleged amplification of the objection (to Rom_3:7), and as replying to the second part (Rom_3:8) only by an anathema, sit! (ὧν τ. κρ. ἔνδ. ἔ.). Against the view of Reiche, who, following Koppe, Rosenmüller, and Flatt, thinks that the Gentile is introduced as speaking in Rom_3:7 (compare Olshausen), we may decisively urge the close connection therewith of Rom_3:8, where Paul includes himself also, but does not take speech in hand again (Reiche). See besides on τὸν κόσμον, Rom_3:6.

ἈΛΉΘΕΙΑ and ΨΕΎΣΜΑΤΙ are terms chosen in reference to Rom_3:4, because the question proposed in Rom_3:5 was in fact suggested by that verse; but they represent, as Rom_3:5 proves, the ideas of ΔΙΚΑΙΟΣΎΝΗ and ἈΔΙΚΊΑ; hence: the moral truth, i.e. the holy righteousness of God (see on Joh_3:21; Eph_5:9; Php_4:8), and the moral falsehood, i.e. the immorality (Rev_22:15), wickedness of man.[756]

ἐπερίσσευσεν εἰς τ. δόξ. αὐτοῦ] has abounded richly to His glory, that is, has shown itself in superabundant measure, which redounds to His glory. The stress of this protasis lies on ἐν τῷ ἐμῷ ψεύσματι.

The aorist denotes the result of the having abounded, which subsists at the day of judgment (realised as present by τί.… κρίνομαι) as up to that point accomplished fact.

ἔτι] namely, after that assumed result has occurred.

κἀγώ] emphasising the contradictory relation to the contents of the protasis, according to which this ἐγώ seems actually to have deserved something of God: even I (Baeumlein, Partik. p. 150) who have notwithstanding glorified God through my ψεύσμα. So in substance (just I according to Hermann, a[757] Viger. p. 837) also Tholuck and Morison; compare Philippi: even I still. There lies in the expression something of boldness and defiance; but it is not equivalent to καὶ αὐτός, or αὐτός ἐγώ, to the meaning of which Th. Schott and Hofmann ultimately bring it (even personally still). We may add that this first person, individualising just like the preceding one (ἐν τ. ἐμῷ ψ.), of course represents the sinner in general (with an intended application to the Jews, see on Rom_3:5 f), and not the Apostle himself, as Schrader and Fritzsche think. Against this latter theory it is decisive that κρίνομαι after Rom_3:6 must indicate, not the judgment of enemies, but necessarily the divine act of judging.

ὡς ἁμαρτ.] as a sinner, not as a Gentile (Reiche, Mehring), and others.

Rom_3:8. καὶ μή] Before μή we must again supply τί: and why should we not, etc. Respecting τί μή, quidni, see Hartung, Partikell. II. p. 162. Accordingly, as καί continues the question, only a comma is to be placed after κρίνομαι.

As regards the construction, Paul has dropped the plan of the sentence begun with καὶ μή (and why should we not do evil, etc.), being led away from it by the inserted remark, and has joined ὅτι ποιήσωμεν in direct address (let us do) to the λέγειν, so that ὅτι is recitative. But on account of this very blending there is no necessity either to make a parenthesis or to supply anything. For similar attractions (compare especially Xen. Anab. vi. 4, 18) in which the discourse is interrupted by an intervening clause, and then continued in a regimen dependent on the latter and no longer suitable to the beginning, see Hermann a[758] Viger. p. 745, 894; Bernhardy, p. 464; Dissen, a[759] Dem. de cor. p. 346, 418; Krüger, gramm. Unters. p. 457 ff. Many erroneous attempts have been made by commentators (see the various explanations in Morison) to bring out an unbroken construction, as e.g. the supplying of ἐροῦμεν or some such word after μή (Erasmus, Calvin, Wolf, Koppe, Benecke, and others, also van Hengel). Even the expedient of Matthias is untenable.[760] The same may be said of that of Hofmann, who supplies an ἐστίν after καὶ μή, and renders: Why does it not happen to me according to that, as (καθώς) we are slandered, etc. But if it is quite gratuitous to supply ἐστί, it is still more so to make this ἐστί equivalent to γίνεται μοι. Besides the negation, which, according to our construction, harmonises with the deliberative sense, would necessarily be not μή but οὐ, since it would negative the reality of the εἶναι understood (1Co_6:7; Luk_19:23; Luk_20:5 al[761]). The correct view is held also by Winer and Buttmann (p. 235, 211), Philippi and Morison.

καθὼς βλασφημ.] as we (Christians) are calumniated, namely, as if we did evil in order that, etc. Then the following καὶ καθὼς.… λέγειν contains the accusation, current possibly in Rome also, that the Christians were in the habit of repeating this maxim even as a doctrinal proposition. As to the distinction between φημί (to assert) and λέγω, compare on 1Co_10:15. What may have occasioned such slanders against the Christians? Certainly their non-observance of the Mosaic law, to which they ventured to deem themselves not bound, in order to gain eternal life by the grace of God through faith in the redemptive work of Christ, which was an offence to the Jews. The plural is not to be referred to Paul alone, which would be arbitrary on account of the preceding singular; the Christians are conceived as Pauline (comp Act_21:21); and on the part of Jews and Judaizers (τινές, certain people, as in 1Co_15:12) are slanderously and falsely (for see Rom_5:20, Rom_6:1; Rom_6:15 ff.) accused of doing evil that good might come (might ensue as result). Under this general category, namely, the calumniators reduced the bearing of the Christians, so far as the latter, without regulating their conduct by the Mosaic law, were nevertheless assured, and professed, that they should through faith in Christ obtain the divine blessings of salvation. That general accusation was an injurious abstract inference thence deduced.

ὧν] i.e. of those, who follow this principle destructive of the whole moral order of God. They form the nearest logical subject. With just indignation the Apostle himself, having a deep sense of morality, makes us feel in conclusion by ὧν τὸ κρῖμα κ.τ.λ[763] how deserving of punishment is the consequence, which, if God be regarded as an unrighteous judge of the world, must ensue for moral conduct from the premiss that God is glorified by the sin of men. The reference of ὧν to the slanderers (Theodoret, Grotius, Tholuck, Mehring, Hofmann) is unsuitable, because it separates the weighty closing sentence from the argumentation itself, and makes it merely an accessory thought.

τὸ κρῖμα] The definite judicial sentence, decree of punishment at the last judgment.

ἜΝΔΙΚΟΝ] accordant with justice, rightful. Compare Heb_2:2. Frequently used in classic writers.

[756] Those who take ver. 7 f. as spoken in the person of the Gentile (see especially Reiche) explain the ἀλήθεια Θεοῦ of the true religion (how entirely opposed to ver. 4!), ψεύσματι of idolatry, and ἁμαρτωλός as Gentile.

[757] d refers to the note of the commentator or editor named on the particular passage.

[758] d refers to the note of the commentator or editor named on the particular passage.

[759] d refers to the note of the commentator or editor named on the particular passage.

[760] He brings forward the modal definition: ὡς ἁμαρτωλός as the main element; then the modality of the κρίνομαι opposed to this is καὶ μὴ καθὼς βλασφημ. κ.τ.λ.: Why then am even I still judged like a sinner, and not rather according to that, which we are slanderously reported of, and which some affirm that we say: namely, according to this, Let us do evil, that good may come? Instead of saying: καὶ μὴ ὡς ποιήσας τὰ ἀγαθά, Paul, in the indignation of excited feeling, gives to the thought which he had begun the different turn which it presents in the text. With this artificial interpretation, we must remember that Paul would have written καὶ οὐ instead of καὶ μή, since it is an objective relation that is here in question (compare Col_2:8 al.); that instead of καθώς we should have expected the repetition of the ὡς; and that the notion of κρίνειν, as it prevails in the connection (compare also the following τὸ κρῖμα), does not suit the assumed thought, ὡς ποιήσας τὰ ἀγαθά. Comp. also Morison, p. 79.

[761] l. and others; and other passages; and other editions.

[763] .τ.λ. καὶ τὰ λοιπά.

Meyer — Critical and Exegetical Commentary on the New Testament — English translation by Peter Christie, edited by Frederick Crombie (T&T Clark, 1880) — public domain. Text from a community e-Sword module.

Rom 3:7 f. These verses are extremely difficult, and are interpreted variously according to the force assigned to the τί ἔτι κἀγὼ of Rom 3:7 . Who or what supplies the contrast to this emphatic “I also”? Some commentators, Gifford, for instance, find it in God, and God’s interest in the judgment. If my lie sets in relief the truth of God, and so magnifies His glory, is not that enough? Why, after God has had this satisfaction from my sin, “why further am I also on my side brought to judgment as a sinner?” It is a serious, if not a final objection to this, that it merely repeats the argument of Rom 3:5 , which the Apostle has already refuted. Its very generality, too for any man, as Gifford himself says, may thus protest against being judged, lessens its relevance: for Paul is discussing not human evasions of God’s judgment, but Jewish objections to his previous arguments. Lipsius finds the contrast to κἀγὼ in the Gentile world. A Jew is the speaker, or at all events the Apostle speaks in the character of one: “if my unbelief does magnify His faithfulness, is not that all that is required? Why am I, too, like the rest of the world, whose relation to God is so different, and whose judgment is so necessary, still brought into judgment?” This would be legitimate enough, probably, if it were not for what follows. But the slander of Rom 3:8 , which forms part of the same question as τί ἔτι κἀγὼ κ . τ . λ ., and to which reference is made again in chap. Rom 6:1 ; Rom 6:15 , had not the Jews, but the Apostle in his Christian character, for its object; hence it seems preferable to take the κἀγὼ as referring strictly to himself. That Paul would come into judgment, in spite of the fact that his faithlessness in becoming a Christian had only set off the faithfulness of God to Israel, no unbelieving Jew questioned: and Paul turns this conviction of theirs (with which, of course, he agrees, so far as it asserts that he will be judged) against themselves. If he, for his part, cannot evade judgment, on the ground that his sin (as they think it) has been a foil to God’s righteousness, no more can they on their part: they and he are in one position, and must be judged together: to condemn him is to expose themselves to condemnation; that is his point. The argument of Rom 3:7 is both an argumentum ad hominem and an argumentum ad rem: Paul borrows from his opponents the premises that he himself is to be judged as a sinner, and that his lie has set off God’s truth: there is enough in these premises to serve his purpose, which is to show that these two propositions which do not exclude each other in his case do not do so in their case either. But, of course, he would interpret the second in a very different way from them. The question is continued in Rom 3:8 , though the construction is changed by the introduction of the parentheses with καθὼς and the attachment to λέγειν ὅτι of the clause which would naturally have gone with τί μή ; If judgment could be evaded by sinning to the glory of God, so Paul argues, he and other Christians like him might naturally act on the principle which slander imputed to them that of doing evil that good might come. No doubt the slander was of Jewish origin. The doctrine that righteousness is a gift of God, not to be won by works of law, but by faith in Jesus Christ, can always be misrepresented as immoral: “sin the more, it will only the more magnify grace” Paul does not stoop to discuss it. The judgment that comes on those who by such perversions of reason and conscience seek to evade all judgment is just. This is all he has to say.

The Expositor's Greek Testament, edited by W. Robertson Nicoll (1897–1910) — public domain. Text from a community e-Sword module.

Vv. 7, 8. “For if the truth of God hath abounded through my lie unto His glory; why yet am I also judged as a sinner? And not, Let us do evil—as we are accused of doing, and as some falsely pretend that we teach—that good may come? whose condemnation is just.”

Many commentators (Calvin, Grotius, Philippi) have fallen into a strange error in regard to Rom 3:7. They imagine that this verse reproduces once more the objection of Rom 3:5. The for serves, they say, to justify the question: “Is not God unrighteous?” In reality the apostle is made to add: after the advantage which He has derived from my lie for His glory, how does He still judge me? But for what reason should the for relate to Rom 3:5 rather than Rom 3:6, which immediately precedes? This would be to forget the answer given in Rom 3:6, and so to confess its weakness! In this case we should require rather to adopt the reading εἰ δέ, but if, of the Sinaït. and Vatic., and to make Rom 3:7 an objection to the answer given in Rom 3:6. But this reading is inadmissible, because this new objection raised would remain without answer in the sequel. This same reason tells also against the explanation which makes Rom 3:7 a simple reaffirmation of the objection of Rom 3:5. How could an objection, reproduced so forcibly, possibly be left without any other answer than the relegating of those who dare to raise it to the judgment of God (Rom 3:8)? For a mind like Paul’s this would be a strange mode of arguing! Rom 3:7 is simply, as the for indicates, the confirmation of the answer given in Rom 3:6 : “How would God judge the world? In reality (for) every sinner might come before the judge and say to Him, on his own behalf: And I too by my lie, I have contributed to Thy glory. And he must be acquitted.”

By the phrase truth of God Paul returns to the beginning of the discussion (Rom 3:3-4). What is in question is the moral uprightness of God; in like manner the term lie brings us back to the every man a liar (Rom 3:4). This lie consists in voluntary ignorance of goodness, to escape the obligation of doing it. The verb ἐπερίσσευσεν, has abounded, strictly: flowed over, denotes the surplus of glory which God’s moral perfection extracts from human wickedness in each case. ῎Ετι, yet, signifies: even after so profitable a result has accrued from my sins. Κἀγώ, I also: “I who, as well as all the rest, have contributed to Thy glory.” It is as if one saw the whole multitude of sinners appearing before the judgment-seat one after the other, and throwing this identical answer in God’s face; the judgment is therefore brought to nothing. Thus is confirmed the answer of Rom 3:6 to the objection of Rom 3:5.

This so suitable meaning appears to us preferable to a more special sense which might present itself to the mind, especially if one were tempted to apply the term the world (Rom 3:6) to the Gentile, in opposition to the Jewish world (Rom 3:5). The sense would be: “For the judgment comes to nought for me Gentile, as well as for thee Jew, since I can plead the same excuse as thou, my Gentilehood contributing to glorify God’s truth as much as thy unbelief to exalt His righteousness.” For the application to the Gentiles of the two expressions: God’s truth, and lie, see Rom 1:25. But to make this meaning probable, Paul would require to have brought out in chap. 1 the idea that idolatry had contributed to God’s glory; and as to the restricted meaning of τὸν κόσμον, the world, see at p. 137.

The apostle pushes his refutation to the utmost (Rom 3:8): Why even not go further? Why, after annihilating the judgment, not say further, to be thoroughly consequent: “And even let us furnish God, by sinning more freely, with richer opportunities of doing good! Will not every sin be a material which He will transform into the pure gold of His glory?” The words καὶ μή, and not, should properly be followed by the verb: let us do evil? ποιήσωμεν τὰ κακά, as we have translated it. But in Greek the sentence is interrupted by the insertion of a parenthesis, intended to remind the reader that such is precisely the odious principle which Paul and his brethren are accused by their calumniators of practising and teaching. And when, after this parenthesis, he returns in Rom 3:8 to his principal idea: ποιήσωμεν, let us do, instead of connecting it with the conjunction, and (that) not, he makes it depend directly on the last verb of the parenthesis, teach: “As we are accused of teaching, let us do evil.” The ὁτι, that, is the ὁτι recitative so common in Greek (transition from the indirect to the direct form of discourse). The construction which we have just indicated is a form of anacolouthon, of which numerous examples are found in classic authors.

The verb we are accused has for its object the understood clause: of doing so, of practising this principle. If we understood: “Accused of teaching,” the following words would be a mere superfluous repetition. The term βλασφημεῖσθαι seems deliberately chosen to suggest the idea that the principle calumniously imputed to him is itself blasphemous in its nature. The second part of the parenthesis adds the idea of professing (λάλειν) to that of practising. The words form a climax, for it is graver to lay down a blasphemous maxim as a principle than to put it into practice in a few isolated cases. Hofmann has proposed another construction; he understands ἐστιν after καὶ μή, and makes the following καθώς dependent on it: “And it is not the case with me, as we are accused of practising and teaching, that it only remains to do evil that”...But it is harsh to make the καθώς depend on ἐστί; and Meyer rightly observes that Paul would have required to say καὶ οὐ, and not καὶ μή; comp. the interrogations, 1Co 6:7; Luk 19:23, etc.

The sort of malediction which closes the verse is applied by most commentators to those who really practise and teach the maxim which is falsely applied to Paul. But the apostle would not have confined himself in that case to the use of the simple relative pronoun ὧν, whose; he would necessarily have required to indicate, and even characterize, the antecedent of the pronoun, which cannot refer to any substantive expressed or understood in the preceding proposition. It must have for its antecedent the preceding τινές, some, and we must apply this severe denunciation to the calumniators of the apostle’s life and teaching. Those who raise such accusations wrongly and maliciously against his person and doctrine themselves deserve the condemnation which they call down on the head of Paul. But it should be well observed that the apostle does not express himself thus till he has satisfied all the demands of logical discussion.

Observations on the passage, Rom 3:1-8.

Notwithstanding its temporary application to the Jewish people, this passage, which will find its complete explanation in chap. 11, has a real permanent value. It has always been sought to justify the greatest crimes in history by representing the advantages in which they have resulted to the cause of humanity. There is not a Robespierre who has not been transformed into a saint in the name of utilitarianism. But to make such a canonization valid, one would require to begin by proving that the useful result sprang from the evil committed as its principle. Such is the teaching of Pantheism. Living Theism, on the contrary, teaches that this transformation of the bad deed into a means of progress, is the miracle of God’s wisdom and power continually laying hold of human sin to derive from it a result contrary to its nature. On the first view, all human responsibility is at an end, and the judgment becomes a nullity. On the second, man remains fully responsible to God for the bad deed as an expression of the evil will of its author, and despite the good which God is pleased to extract from it. Such is scriptural optimism, which alone reconciles man’s moral responsibility with the doctrine of providential progress. The apostle has laid the foundations of this true theodicée in the remarkable piece which we have just been studying.

It is curious to see how Holsten seeks to explain this passage, the meaning of which has, as we think, been made so clear, by a polemical intention against the alleged Jewish-Christianity of the Christians of Rome. We do not waste time in giving a refutation which seems to us to arise of itself from the preceding.

The apostle has drawn in two great pictures the reign of God’s wrath—(1) over the Gentile world (chap. 1); (2) over the Jewish people (chap. 2); and by way of appendix he has added a passage to this second picture, intended to sweep away the objections which, from the ordinary Jewish point of view, seemed opposed to the statement that this elect people could possibly become, notwithstanding their unbelief, the object of divine animadversion. Now, to the judgment which follows from the preceding context with respect to the whole of mankind, he affixes the seal of Scripture sanction, without which he regards no proof as finally valid.

Frédéric Louis Godet — Commentaries on Luke, John, Romans, and 1 Corinthians — English translation (T&T Clark, Edinburgh, 1870s–1890s) — public domain. Text from a community e-Sword module.

Rom_3:7, Rom_3:8

These verses are the amplification and confirmation of the answer given in the sixth to the objection of the Jews. These verses are designed to show that if the ground assumed by them was valid, not only may every sinner claim exemption, but it would follow that it is right to do evil that good may come. The connection by γάρ is therefore with the sixth verse: God could not judge the world, for any sinner may say, If the truth of God more abounds through my lie, to his glory, why am I yet judged as a sinner? The truth of God. As ἀλήθεια is not unfrequently opposed to ἀδικία, it may have here the sense of δικαιοσύνη, and designate the divine excellence; then ψεῦσμα, in the following clause, must mean falsehood towards God, wickedness: If the excellence of God is rendered more conspicuous by my wickedness. But as it was on the truth or veracity of God, his adherence to his promises, that the false confidence of the Jews was placed, it is probable that the apostle intended the words to be taken in their more limited sense. Hath more abounded unto his glory. Περισσεύειν, to be abundant, rich, or great; and by implication, in a comparative sense, to be more abundant, or conspicuous, Mat_5:20; 1Co_15:58. The latter is the sense here, If the truth of God has been made the more conspicuous; εἰς τὴν δόξαν αὐτοῦ, so that he is glorified. Why am I also still judged as a sinner? Κᾀγώ, either even I, or I also; I as well as others; or even I, a Jew; or, according to another view of the context, even I a Gentile: ἔτι, yet, i.e. notwithstanding my falsehood is the means of displaying the glory of God. According to the view now given, the use of the first person is sufficiently explained by saying, as has often been done, suam personam ponit pro quâvis aliâ. I, therefore, stands for any one: Any one may say, Why am I also judged as a sinner? Those however who understand κόσμος, in the preceding verse, to mean the Gentiles, suppose that the apostle here personates a heathen, who is made to ask, If the divine majesty is the more displayed by my idolatry, why am even I judged as a sinner? This interpretation gives a very good sense, because the Jews readily admitted that the Gentiles were exposed to condemnation, and therefore any principle which was shown to exculpate them, the Jews must acknowledge to be false. The objections to this view of the passage are the unnecessary limitation which it imposes on the word κόσμος, Rom_3:6, and the unusual, if not unauthorized sense, which it requires to be given to the words ἀλήθεια and ψεῦσμα the latter not being elsewhere used for idolatry, and the former, in this connection at least, not admitting of the version, truth concerning God; i.e., the true God.

Charles Hodge — Commentary on Romans (1835), First Corinthians (1857), and Ephesians (1856) — public domain. Text from a community e-Sword module.

The truth and constancy.

A third objection which addeth somewhat to the former, If sins do turn to the glory of God, they are not only not to be punished, but we ought rather to give ourselves to them: which blasphemy Paul contending himself to curse and detest, pronounceth just punishment against such blasphemers.

Geneva Bible (1599) marginal notes — public domain. Text via Bolls.life.

For if the truth of God, &c.--A further illustration of the same sentiment: that is, "Such reasoning amounts to this--which indeed we who preach salvation by free grace are slanderously accused of teaching--that the more evil we do, the more glory will redound to God; a damnable principle." (Thus the apostle, instead of refuting this principle, thinks it enough to hold it up to execration, as one that shocks the moral sense).

On this brief section, Note (1) Mark the place here assigned to the Scriptures. In answer to the question, "What advantage hath the Jew?" or, "What profit is there of circumcision?" (Rom 3:1) those holding Romish views would undoubtedly have laid the stress upon the priesthood, as the glory of the Jewish economy. But in the apostle's esteem, "the oracles of God" were the jewel of the ancient Church (Rom 3:1-2). (2) God's eternal purposes and man's free agency, as also the doctrine of salvation by grace and the unchanging obligations of God's law, have ever been subjected to the charge of inconsistency by those who will bow to no truth which their own reason cannot fathom. But amidst all the clouds and darkness which in this present state envelop the divine administration and many of the truths of the Bible, such broad and deep principles as are here laid down, and which shine in their own luster, will be found the sheet-anchor of our faith. "Let God be true, and every man a liar" (Rom 3:4); and as many advocates of salvation by grace as say, "Let us do evil that good may come," "their damnation is just" (Rom 3:8).

Jamieson, Fausset & Brown — Commentary Critical and Explanatory on the Whole Bible (1871) — public domain (CC PDM 1.0). Text via the HelloAO Bible API.

Verse 7. JEW. For if the truth of God, &c.] But to resume my reasoning (Ro 3:5:) If the faithfulness of God in keeping his promise made to our fathers is, through our unfaithfulness, made far more glorious than it otherwise would have been, why should we then be blamed for that which must redound so much to the honour of God?

Adam Clarke's Commentary on the Bible (1810–1826) — public domain. Text from a community e-Sword/MySword module.

7. If indeed the truth of God, etc. This objection, I have no doubt, is adduced in the person of the ungodly; for it is a sort of an explanation of the former verse, and would have been connected with it, had not the Apostle, moved with indignation, broken off the sentence in the middle. The meaning of the objection is — “If by our unfaithfulness the truth of God becomes more conspicuous, and in a manner confirmed, and hence more glory redounds to him, it is by no means just, that he, who serves to display God’s glory, should be punished as a sinner.”

John Calvin's Commentaries (1540-1563) — public domain. Text from the Calvin Translation Society English edition (1840s-50s) via the Christian Classics Ethereal Library (ccel.org). Calvin's coverage is partial (roughly two-thirds of the Bible); uncommented books and verses are honest gaps, never fabricated. The 19th-century editor's footnotes and remarks are omitted so the notes are faithfully Calvin's own voice.

(7) The truth of God.—In the first instance His veracity as involved in His threats and promises, and then those other attributes, especially justice, that are intimately connected with this. “Truth” is leaning towards its moral sense. (See Note on Rom_2:8.)

My lie.—The Apostle puts his supposed case in the first person. “Lie,” suggested as an antithesis to the word “truth,” just used, has also a moral signification. It is the moral deflection that follows upon unbelief.

A Bible Commentary for English Readers, edited by Charles John Ellicott (1878–1897) — public domain. Text from a community e-Sword module.

7. For if, &c.] Here St Paul takes up the Opponent on his own ground; speaking as a human being whose sin (e.g. a falsehood) serves to make God’s truth “abound to His glory;” i.e. be more largely manifest in a way to win Him fresh praise:—in such a case is not Paul, is not A, B, or C, equally entitled with the Jewish opponent to be excused penalty?—In the Gr. of the clause “why am I yet, &c.,” the word “I” is strongly emphatic; I also; i.e. “I, as well as my opponent.”—“Why am I yet, &c.:”—i.e. “after the recognition of the effect of my sin on the advancement of God’s glory.”—“By my lie;” lit. in my lie; i.e. “on occasion of it, in connexion with it.”

The Cambridge Bible for Schools and Colleges (gen. ed. J. J. S. Perowne; Cambridge University Press, 1878–1918) — public domain. Text from a community e-Sword module.

And not rather, as we be slanderously reported,.... These are the apostle's own words, in answer to the objector he represented; and it is as if he should say, why do not you go on? why do you stop here? "and not rather" say, as we are evil spoken of, and our doctrine is blasphemed:

and as some affirm; ignorantly and audaciously enough:

that we say; and teach:

let us do evil that good may come; a slander cast upon the apostle's doctrine of unconditional election, free justification, and of God's overruling the sins of men for good; and is the same which is cast on ours now, and is no small proof of the likeness and sameness of doctrines:

whose damnation is just; whose judgment would have been right, and their censure of our doctrines just, had it been true that we held such a principle, taught such a doctrine, or encouraged such a practice: or their condemnation is just, for aspersing our principles and practices in so vile a manner; and all such persons are deserving of damnation, who teach such things, or practise after this sort.

John Gill's Exposition of the Whole Bible (1746–1763) — public domain (CC PDM 1.0). Text via the HelloAO Bible API.

7 For if the truth of God hath more abounded through my lie unto his glory; why yet am I also judged as a sinner?

Ver. 7. For if the truth of God] Here the former objection is repeated, explicated, and more fully answered, that every mouth might be stopped. Ferunt ranas lampade supra lacum, in quo tumultuantur, appensa, illius fulgore repercussas conticescere. (Lomelius.) So gainsayers are silenced, when the truth is thoroughly cleared.

John Trapp, A Commentary or Exposition upon All the Books of the Old and New Testament (1647–1656) — public domain. Text from a community e-Sword module.

For if ... - This is an objection similar to the former. It is indeed but another form of the same.

The truth of God - His truth or faithfulness in adhering to his threatenings. God threatened to punish the guilty. By their guilt he will take occasion to show his own truth; or their crime will furnish occasion for such an exhibition.

Hath more abounded - Has been more striking, or more manifest. His “truth” will be shown by the fulfillment of all his promises to his people, and of all his predictions. But it will also be shown by fulfilling his threatenings on the guilty. It will, therefore, more abound by their condemnation; that is, their condemnation will furnish new and striking instances or his truth. Every lost sinner will be, therefore, an eternal monument of the truth of God.

Through my lie - By means of my lie, or as one of the results of my falsehood. The word “lie” here means falsehood, deceitfulness, “unfaithfulness.” If by the unfaithfulness of the Jewish people to the covenant, occasion should be given to God to glorify himself, how could they be condemned for it?

Unto his glory - To his praise, or so as to show his character in such a way as to excite the praise and admiration of his intelligent creation.

Why yet am I ... - How can that act be regarded as evil, which tends to promote the glory of God? The fault in the reasoning of the objector is this, that he takes for granted that the direct tendency of his conduct is to promote God’s glory, whereas it is just the reverse; and it is by God’s reversing that tendency, or overruling it, that he obtains his glory. The tendency of murder is not to honor the Law, or to promote the security of society, but just the reverse. Still, his execution shall avert the direct tendency of his crime, and do honor to the law and the judge, and promote the peace and security of the community by restraining others.

Albert Barnes' Notes on the Bible (1834–1885) — public domain. Text from a community e-Sword/MySword module.

By truth he means the faithfulness and veracity of God; as by lie, the perfidiousness and inconstancy of man; ut supra et alibi.

Why yet am I also judged as a sinner? q.d. If more glory accrues to the name of God by my wickedness, what reason is there that I should be punished, and proceeded against as an offender, who have occasioned this further glory to God? The apostle doth plainly personate in this place a wicked objector, or he speaks in the name and person of such a one. This way of speaking and writing is very frequent among all authors; and it is found sometimes with the penmen of the Holy Scriptures: see Ecc 3:19-22; 1Co 15:32. The apostle tells the Corinthians, 1Co 4:6, that in a figure he transferred some things to himself and to Apollos for their sakes, that they might not be puffed up; he, counted such schemes and figures as these to be most profitable and efficacious to the reader.

Matthew Poole's English Annotations on the Holy Bible (1683–1685) — public domain. Text from a community e-Sword/MySword module.

7. For—The apostle now states in the first person singular what every man in the world might argue as well as the Jew.

Truth… lie—Faithfulness or falseness to the divine covenant, or the divine law of right. All sin is lie.

Judged—If clearly illustrating the divine righteousness transforms sin to holiness for the Jew, then it also makes every sinner to be no sinner, and makes it impossible for him to be judged.

Daniel D. Whedon (gen. ed.), Commentary on the Old and New Testaments (1874–1909) — public domain. Text from a community e-Sword module.

For if the truth of God in my lie abounded to his glory, why am I also still judged as a sinner? One view is that this is a continuation or resumption of the question of ver. 5 on the part of the Jew, its drift being the same. But the word kagw , as well as the position of the verse after twv krinei , etc., suggests rather its being intended to express that any one throughout the world, as well as the Jew, might plead against" deserved judgment, if the Jew"s supposed plea were valid. Nay, in that case, the apostle goes on to say, he, or any of us, might justify all wrongdoing for a supposed good end. Why not?

The Pulpit Commentary (1880–1919), ed. H.D.M. Spence-Jones & Joseph S. Exell — public domain. Text from a community e-Sword module.

But, may the objector reply, if the truth of God hath abounded - Has been more abundantly shown. Through my lie - If my lie, that is, practice contrary to truth, conduces to the glory of God, by making his truth shine with superior advantage. Why am I still judged as a sinner - Can this be said to be any sin at all? Ought I not to do what would otherwise be evil, that so much "good may come?" To this the apostle does not deign to give a direct answer, but cuts the objector short with a severe reproof.

John Wesley, Explanatory Notes Upon the Whole Bible (1754–1765) — public domain. Text via the GEBible commentary corpus.

sinner

(See Scofield "Rom 3:23").

The Scofield Reference Bible (1917 edition), notes by C. I. Scofield — public domain. Text from a community e-Sword module.

We must by no means understand these words as spoken by the apostle himself in his own name, as if he had told lies for upholding of the truth; and that the truth of God had abounded to the glory of God through his lies; but he speaks in the person of a profane objector. Thus some man (as if the aposlte had said) may possibly plead for his sin: "The truth of God hath gained by my lie, the faithfulness of God is made more manifest by the unfaithfulness of men; therefore, why should I be judged and condemned as a sinner, when the glory of God will shine more bright upon the occasion of my sin?

The free grace of God discovered in the gospel, will be manifested, say some and magnified in the pardoning of our sin; let us therefore sin our fill, that the immeasurableness of divine goodness may appear, and the abundance of pardoning mercy may abound." The apostle rejects this doctrine and practice, of doing evil that good may come, with the greatest abhorrency and utmost detestation, affirming, that their damnation is just, who either fasten this doctrine upon the apostles, or affirm it themselves.

Learn hence, That no person must venture to do the least of evils; no, not for the sake of the greatest good. True, Almighty God can bring good out of evil, by the same word of his power, by which he brought light out of darkness, and something out of nothing; but to do anything really evil for obtaining the greatest good, is dangerous and damnable. Sin, or that which is sinful, ought not to be chosen, whatever we chuse.

Learn, 2. That nothing is more just and righteous than their damnation, who will adventure to do evil, that good may come: A good intention will not excuse, never justify a bad action in the sight of God: He will condemn evil-doers, though they do evil, that good may come.

Learn, 3. That the apostle pronounces their damnation just, who laid these slanders to the apostles charge, as if their doctrine did allow of this damnable practice, to do evil that good might come: Their damnation is just, who thus slanderously report and affirm, that we say, Let us do evil, that good may come.

Whence note, That it is a just thing with God to damn those men that raise or spread abroad reparts of his ministers doctrine, as giving liberty to licentious practices: Verily, the slander of a minister’s regular doctrine is more than ordinary slander. The original word here rendered slander, signifies blasphemy; the word which God makes use of to set forth his own reproaches by. Behold God’s resentment of his minister’s wrongs. The slander and contempt cast upon our office and doctrine, is esteemed blasphemy in God’s account: As we be slanderously reported or blasphemed; and as some affirm that we say, Let us do evil, that good may come: whose damnation is just.

William Burkitt's Expository Notes on the New Testament (1700–1703) — public domain. Text from a community e-Sword module.

7. “But if the truth of God abounded through my life unto his glory, why am I still condemned as a sinner?” He here answers the argument of the fatalist: “Since the immutable God is neither changed nor in the least deflected from the perfect integrity of His administration, neither His veracity suffering the slightest impeachment by my perversity and falsehood; as I am utterly incompetent to contravene the divine purpose or tarnish the infallible glory of the Almighty, then why am I condemned as a sinner?” It is the hackneyed pleading of irresponsibility which we daily meet, offered as an apology on the part of the ungodly.

William B. Godbey, Commentary on the New Testament (1896–1900) — public domain. Text from a community e-Sword module.

But if the truth of God through my lie abounded unto his glory, why am I also still judged as a sinner?

J. W. McGarvey (with Philip Y. Pendleton), Commentaries on the New Testament (The Fourfold Gospel, 1914; Acts; and the epistles) — public domain. Text from a community e-Sword/MySword module.

7. Why yet am I also judged as a sinner? Here the Jew is supposed to repeat the last objection in another form. “God's truth is shown by our lie. His threatenings are demonstrated to be absolutely true by his rejection of the Jewish nation. If our lie, our false life, has thus shown forth his glory, why should we be individually condemned?”

B. W. Johnson's The People's New Testament with Notes (1889–1891) — public domain. Electronic text from the Christian Classics Ethereal Library (CCEL) ThML edition.

But if the truth of God through my lie provides abundant praise for him, why am I still being judged as a sinner?

Here Paul imagines someone continuing to reject the Christian gospel. That adversary argues, because his sin shows the righteousness of God, then God should not declare that he is a sinner on judgment day if, for example, he tells lies. (See: Rhetorical Question)

Why not say ... come"?

Here Paul raises a question of his own, to show how ridiculous the argument of his imaginary adversary is. AT: "I might as well be saying ... come!" (See: Rhetorical Question)

as we are falsely reported to say

"some lie to tell others that this is what we are saying"

The judgment on them is just

It will be only fair when God condemns these enemies of Paul, for telling lies about what Paul has been teaching.

translationWords

true

God

praise

judge

sin

evil

good

judge

just

unfoldingWord translationNotes — © Distant Shores Media and the Door43 World Missions Community, licensed CC BY-SA 4.0. Source: git.door43.org/Door43/en_tn.

7. εἰ δὲ. The difficulty is restated more fully and is shown to imply the principle that ‘the end justifies the means’; and that is a reductio ad absurdum of the argument.

ἐν τῷ ἐ. ψ. = in the fact of, or by, my lie.

ψεῦσμα. Only here = acted lie, falseness to trust, etc.

ἐπερίσσευσεν. The aor. used for a single typical case.

ἔτι, after that result. κἀγὼ, just I, whose conduct has led to that result.

Cambridge Greek Testament for Schools and Colleges (Cambridge University Press, 1896; 21 vols, various authors incl. Carr, Maclear, Plummer, Farrar, Lumby, Moule, M. R. James, Simcox) — public domain. Text from a community e-Sword module.

7.] This follows (connected by γάρ) upon ver. 6, and shews that the supposition if carried out, would overthrow all God’s judgment, and (ver. 8) the whole moral life of man. How shall God judge the world? For, if the truth (faithfulness) of God abounded (was manifested, more clearly established) by means of my falsehood (unfaithfulness), to His glory (so that the result has been the setting forth of His glory), why any longer (ἔτι, this being so,—assuming the premises) am I also (i.e. as well as others,—am I to be involved in a judgment from which I ought to be exempt) judged (to be judged,—the pres. expressing the rule or habit of God’s proceeding) as a sinner? And (why should we) not (in this case rather say) as we (I Paul, or we Christians) are slanderously reported, and as some give out that we (do) say (ὅτι recitantis), “Let us do evil that good may come?” whose condemnation (not that of our slanderers (Grot., Tholuck), but that of those who so say and act) is according to justice (not only by the preceding argument, but by the common detestation of all men, for such a maxim as doing evil that good may come).

The way adopted generally (Calv., Beza, Grot., Bengel, Wolf, Rückert, Köllner, Tholuck) is to connect ver. 7 by γάρ with ver. 5, and to regard κατὰ ἄνθρ.… κόσμον as a series of parentheses; but I very much prefer that given above, which, in the main, is De Wette’s. Fritzsche and Schrader strangely enough regard κἀγώ as bona fide the individual Paul, and κρίνομαι as the judgment passed by his adversaries (“nam si Dei veracitas meo peccatoris mendacio abunde in Dei laudem cessit, cur adhuc ego quoque, Paulus, tanquam facinorosus ab hominibus reus agor,” &c.): Reiche, Olsh., &c. put ver. 7 into the mouth of a Gentile: Bengel, into that of a Jew. Doubtless the main reference of this part of the argument is to Jews: but the reasoning from the introduction of the words τὸν κόσμον (see above) is general, applying both to Jew and Gentile, and shewing the untenableness of any such view as that of the Jewish objection of ver. 5.

Henry Alford, The Greek Testament (1849–1861) — public domain. Text from a community e-Sword module.

7. The position laid down in ver. 5 is now discussed from the side of man, as it had just been discussed from the side of God.

εἰ δε א A minusc. pauc., Vulg. cod. Boh., Jo.-Damasc., Tisch. WH. text. RV. text.; εἰ γάρ B D E G K L P &c., Vulg. Syrr., Orig.-lat. Chrys. al., WH. marg. RV. marg. The second reading may be in its origin Western.

ἀλήθεια: the truthfulness of God in keeping His promises; ψεῦσμα, the falsehood of man in denying their fulfilment (as in ver. 4).

κἀγώ: ‘I too,’ as well as others, though my falsehood thus redounds to God’s glory. St. Paul uses the first person from motives of delicacy, just as in 1Co 4:6 he ‘transfers by a fiction’ (Dr. Field’s elegant rendering of μετεσχημάτισα) to himself and his friend Apollos what really applied to his opponents.

International Critical Commentary — older volumes (1896–1929), various authors — public domain. Text from a community e-Sword module.

Lie [ψευσματι] . Only here in the New Testament. The expression carries us back to ver. 4, and is general for moral falsehood, unfaithfulness to the claims of conscience and of God, especially with reference to the proffer of salvation through Christ.

Marvin R. Vincent, Word Studies in the New Testament (1887–1900) — public domain. Text from a community e-Sword/MySword module.