Romans 9:19

Rom_9:19-20

Thou wilt say then unto me, why doth He yet find fault?

The proper attitude of man towards Divine mysteries

The full spirit of this part of Pauls reply may be brought out by considering it as addressed to the objector--

I. As a man. Considering the appeal in this light, it impresses a lesson of great practical importance, namely, to beware of arraigning, with irreverent rashness and self-sufficiency, the procedure of the Divine Being, as represented to us by Himself. Nothing, surely, can be more unbecoming in any creature. Nothing can mere strikingly display the sad predominance in the human heart of that aspiring pride which was originally infused by the tempting assurance, Ye shall be as God, knowing good and evil. The folly, indeed, of refusing to admit whatever does not come within the limit of our comprehension, can be equalled only by its impiety. There must be parts of the Divine procedure whose principles and reasons are beyond the depth of even archangelic intellects. It is a maxim of essential importance, on all such subjects, that we should not allow that which we do know to be displaced from our confidence by that which we do not know. We have the fullest assurance of the righteousness of the Supreme Ruler. Surely, then, we ought not to allow ourselves to be startled into scepticism because, in His revealed procedure, we may find particulars, the secret of which we are unable fully to penetrate. Shall we, then, on the one hand, question the prescience of God, because we may be at a loss fully to discern its consistency with the freedom and accountableness of man?--or, on the other hand, shall we loose men from their moral responsibility, and convert them into mere irresponsible pieces of machinery, because we may not perfectly discern the link of harmony between mans accountableness and Gods foreknowledge? And especially when we recollect that the mystery of mysteries is not a doctrine, but a fact--not a discovery of revelation, but an event independent of revelation altogether--which revelation does not originate, but which it finds, and on which it proceeds--the existence of moral evil itself under the government of the infinitely Holy and Good! There is no denying the fact; but the mystery of the fact has baffled the wits of the wisest from the beginning till now. Shall we, then, refuse the remedy, because we cannot fully explain why the evil itself was permitted to exist?

II. As a sinner. Who art thou?--not only a creature, short-sighted, and ignorant, but a guilty, condemned creature. How unspeakably unreasonable and presumptuous is the language of the objector when regarded in this light? And here we might introduce anew, with augmented force, the proper terms for such a creature in presenting himself before the God with whom he has to do. Of whom ought he, then, to think? Should it not be of himself? Of what ought he to think? Should it not be of his own transgressions and his own deserts? He has an account of his own--what to him are the accounts of others? Is he to stand out against the justice of God in his own sentence, till he sees whether God deals with others exactly as He does with him? What has he to do with others? As a sinner, he stands at the bar of heaven, charged with his own guilt, and has to answer for himself. If there be any ground on which he can impeach the righteousness of the Judge in his own sentence, let him advance his plea. But if he himself, as a sinner, is justly condemned, is not the posture that becomes him that of a suppliant for mercy? Oh, if instead of replying against God, by presuming to pick faults in His general administration, each sinner would but look to himself--ponder his own guilt--and in the name of the one Divine Mediator, cast himself at the feet of his Judge with the brief petition of the publican, all then would be well. He should find mercy, as sure as God delighteth in it; and, because He delighteth in it, has provided for its honourable exercise. (R. Wardlaw, D.D.)

Truth not to be tampered with

No man has any right to make that which he believes to be the truth of God any less exacting, less sharp or clear, because he thinks his fellow-men will not accept it if he states it in its blankest and baldest form. I read an incident in a newspaper the other day that seems to illustrate this point. A tired and dusty traveller was leaning against a lamp-post in the city of Rochester, and he turned and looked around him and said, How far is it to Farmington? and a boy in the crowd said, Eight miles. Do you think it is so far as that? said the poor tired traveller. Well, seeing that you are so tired, I will call it seven miles. The boy, with his heart overflowing with the milk of human kindness, pitied the exhausted traveller, and chose to call it seven miles. I know that I have seen statements of the truth that have dictated the same answer. Never make the road from Rochester to Farmington seven miles when you know it is eight. Do not do a wrong to truth out of regard for men. (H. W. Beecher.)

Nay but, O man, who art thou that repliest against God?--

Presumption rebuked

Observe--

I. The temerity of man. He arraigns--

1. Gods perfections.

2. Procedure.

3. Government.

II. Its merited reproof. Such conduct is--

1. Impertinent.

2. Wicked.

3. Foolish. (J. Lyth, D.D.)

Pride--in dictating to God

The petty sovereign of an insignificant tribe in North America every morning stalks out of his hovel, bids the sun good-morrow, and points out to him with his finger the course he is to take for the day. Is this arrogance more contemptible than ours when we would dictate to God the course of His providence, and summon Him to our bar for His dealings with us? How ridiculous does man appear when he attempts to argue with his God! (C. H. Spurgeon.)

God does not reason

A gentleman examining some deaf and dumb children wrote up the question, Does God reason? One of the children immediately wrote underneath. God knows and sees everything. Reasoning implies doubt and uncertainty; therefore God does not reason.

The Biblical Illustrator, edited by Joseph S. Exell (c. 1880s–1900s) — public domain. Text from a community e-Sword module.

Rom 9:19. Thou wilt say then unto me, Why doth he yet find fault — As if he had said, Because I affirm concerning God, that whom he will he hardeneth, thou wilt say, Why then doth he yet find fault with, or complain of, such persons, that they continue disobedient! For who hath resisted his will — Who hath been, is, or ever will be, able to hinder that from coming to pass which God willeth shall come to pass? Here it must be observed, that when the apostle saith, Whom he will he hardeneth, he doth not suppose any purpose or decree to be formed by God to harden any man, without his having previously committed those sins which he might not have committed: and having resisted the strivings of God’s Spirit, and abused the light and grace whereby he might both have known and complied with the divine will; but, at the most, only a purpose to harden those who first voluntarily harden themselves. Nor do his words suppose that they, who are actually hardened by God, have no capacity or possibility left them, by means of that grace which is yet vouchsafed to them, of recovering themselves from the state of hardness in which they are, and yet of turning to God in true repentance and reformation of life. Although then the will of God be, in a sense, irresistible, yet if this will be, 1st, To harden none but those who first voluntarily harden themselves, by known and wilful sin; and, 2d, To leave those whom he doth harden in a capacity of relenting and returning to him, being furnished with sufficient helps for that purpose, so that if they do it not, it becomes a high aggravation of their former sins; certainly he hath reason to reprove and complain of those who are, at any time, thus hardened by it.

Joseph Benson's Commentary on the Old and New Testaments (1811–1818) — public domain. Text from a community e-Sword module.

Rom 9:19. Ἔτι, as yet) even still. This particle well expresses the peevish outcry. To the objection here put, Paul answers in two ways. I. The power of God over men is greater than the power of the potter over the clay, Rom 9:20-21. Then II. He answers more mildly: God has not exercised His power, not even over the vessels of wrath, Rom 9:22.—αὐτοῦ, His) It is put for, of God, and expresses the feeling, by which objectors of this description show their aversion from God.

Bengel's Gnomon of the New Testament — English translation (T&T Clark, Edinburgh, 1860) — public domain. Text from a community e-Sword module.

Rom_9:19. An objection supposed by the apostle (comp. Rom_11:19) which might be raised against Rom_9:18, not merely by a Jew, but generally.

οὖν] in pursuance of the ὃν δὲ θέλει σκληρύνει.

ἔτι] logical, as in Rom_3:7, and frequently: If He hardens out of His own determination of will, why does He still find fault? That fact surely takes away all warrant from the reproaches which God makes against hardened sinners, since they have been hardened by the divine will itself, to which no one yet offers opposition (with success).

τῷ γὰρ βουλ. κ.τ.λ.] ground assigned for the question, τί ἔτι μέμφ.

ἀνθέστηκε] Who withstands? whereby, concretely, the irresistibility of the divine decree is set forth. The divine decree is exalted above any ones opposition. According to the present opinion of Hofmann (it was otherwise in the Schriftbew. I. p. 246 f.), the opponent wishes to establish that, if the words ὃν θέλει, σκληρύνει be correct, no one may offer opposition to that which God wills, and therefore God can in no one have anything to censure. But thus the thought of the question τίς ἀνθέστηκε would be one so irrational and impious (as though, forsooth, no sinner would be opposed to God), that Paul would not even have had ground or warrant to have invented it as an objection. That question is not impious, but tragic, the expression of human weakness in presence of the divine decree of hardening.

On the classical βούλημα (more frequently βούλευμα), the thing willed, i.e. captum consilium (only here in Paul), see van Hengel, Lobeck, ad Aj. 44. Comp., as to the distinction between βούλομαι and θέλω (Eph_1:11), on Mat_1:19.

Rom_9:19-21. Third part of the Theodicée: But man is not entitled to dispute with God, why He should still find fault. For his relation to God is as that of the thing formed to its former, or of the vessel to the potter, who has power to fashion out of a single lump vessels to honour and dishonour.

Meyer — Critical and Exegetical Commentary on the New Testament — English translation by Peter Christie, edited by Frederick Crombie (T&T Clark, 1880) — public domain. Text from a community e-Sword module.

Rom 9:19 ff. But human nature is not so easily silenced. This interpretation of all human life, with all its diversities of character and experience, through the will of God alone, as if that will by itself explained everything, is not adequate to the facts. If Moses and Pharaoh alike are to be explained by reference to that will that is, are to be explained in precisely the same way then the difference between Moses and Pharaoh disappears. The moral interpretation of the world is annulled by the religious one. If God is equally behind the most opposite moral phenomena, then it is open to any one to say, what Paul here anticipates will be said, τί ἔτι μέμφεται ; why does he still find fault? For who withstands his resolve? To this objection there is really no answer, and it ought to be frankly admitted that the Apostle does not answer it. The attempt to understand the relation between the human will and the Divine seems to lead of necessity to an antinomy which thought has not as yet succeeded in transcending. To assert the absoluteness of God in the unexplained unqualified sense of Rom 9:18 makes the moral life unintelligible; but to explain the moral life by ascribing to man a freedom which makes him stand in independence over against God reduces the universe to anarchy. Up to this point Paul has been insisting on the former point of view, and he insists on it still as against the human presumption which would plead its rights against God; but in the very act of doing so he passes over (in Rom 9:22 ) to an intermediate standpoint, showing that God has not in point of fact acted arbitrarily, in a freedom uncontrolled by moral law; and from that again he advances in the following chapter to do full justice to the other side of the antinomy the liberty and responsibility of man. The act of Israel, as well as the will of God, lies behind the painful situation he is trying to understand.

The Expositor's Greek Testament, edited by W. Robertson Nicoll (1897–1910) — public domain. Text from a community e-Sword module.

Rom_9:19

Thou wilt then say unto me, why doth he yet find fault? for who hath resisted his will? This is the second leading objection to the apostles doctrine. If it be true, as he had just taught, that the destiny of men is in the hands of God, if it is not of him who willeth, or of him that runneth, but of God that showeth mercy, what can we do? If the fact that one believes and is saved, and another remains impenitent and is lost, depends on God, how can we be blamed? Can we resist his will? It will at once be perceived that this plausible and formidable objection to the apostles doctrine is precisely the one which is commonly and confidently urged against the doctrine of election. There would be no room either for this objection, or for that contained in the 14th verse, if Paul had merely said that God chooses those whom he foresees would repent and believe; or that the ground of distinction was in the different conduct of men. It is very evident, therefore, that he taught no such doctrine. How easy and obvious an answer to the charge of injustice would it have been to say, God chooses one and rejects another according to their works. But teaching as he does the sovereignty of God in the selection of the subjects of his grace and of the objects of his wrath, declaring as he does so plainly, that the destiny of men is determined by his sovereign pleasure, the objection (how can he yet find fault?) is plausible and natural. To this objection the apostle gives two answers;

1. That it springs from ignorance of the true relation between God and men as Creator and creatures, and of the nature and extent of the divine authority over us, Rom_9:20, Rom_9:21;

2. That there is nothing in his doctrine inconsistent with the divine perfections; since he does not make men wicked, but from the mass of wicked men, he pardons one and punishes another, for the wisest and most benevolent reasons, Rom_9:22, Rom_9:23.

Why doth he yet find fault? If God hardens us, why does he blame us for being hard. Gross as is this perversion of the apostles doctrine on the part of the objector, Paul at first rebukes the spirit in which it is made, before he shows it to be unfounded. It is not the doctrine of the Bible, that God first makes men wicked, and then punishes them for their wickedness. The Scriptures only assert, what we see and know to be true, that God permits men, in the exercise of their own free agency, to sin, and then punishes them for their sins, and in proportion to their guilt. He acts towards them as a perfectly righteous judge, so that no one can justly complain of his dealings. This strictness in the administration of justice, is, however, perfectly consistent with the sovereignty of God in determining whom he will save, and whom he will permit to suffer the just recompense of their deeds. Who hath resisted, rather, who resists, i.e. who can resist. The perfect ἀνθέστηκε (as ἕστηκεν) is present; see Rom_13:2. His will, i.e. his purpose, βούλημα.

Charles Hodge — Commentary on Romans (1835), First Corinthians (1857), and Ephesians (1856) — public domain. Text from a community e-Sword module.

Another objection but only for the reprobate, rising upon the former answer. If God do appoint to everlasting destruction, such as he listeth, and if that cannot be hindered notwithstanded that he hath once decreed, how doth he justly condemn them, which perish by his will?

Geneva Bible (1599) marginal notes — public domain. Text via Bolls.life.

Thou shalt say then unto me, Why--"Why then" is the true reading.

doth he yet find fault? for who hath resisted--"Who resisteth"

his will?--that is, "This doctrine is incompatible with human responsibility"; If God chooses and rejects, pardons and punishes, whom He pleases, why are those blamed who, if rejected by Him, cannot help sinning and perishing? This objection shows quite as conclusively as the former the real nature of the doctrine objected to--that it is Election and Non-election to eternal salvation prior to any difference of personal character; this is the only doctrine that could suggest the objection here stated, and to this doctrine the objection is plausible. What now is the apostle's answer? It is twofold. First: "It is irreverence and presumption in the creature to arraign the Creator."

Jamieson, Fausset & Brown — Commentary Critical and Explanatory on the Whole Bible (1871) — public domain (CC PDM 1.0). Text via the HelloAO Bible API.

Verse 19. Why doth he yet find fault?] The apostle here introduces the Jew making an objection similar to that in Ro 3:7: If the truth of God hath more abounded through my lie unto his glory, that is, if God's faithfulness is glorified by my wickedness, why yet am I also judged as a sinner? Why am I condemned for that which brings so much glory to him? The question here is: If God's glory be so highly promoted and manifested by our obstinacy, and he suffers us to proceed in our hardness and infidelity, why does he find fault with us, or punish us for that which is according to his good pleasure?

Adam Clarke's Commentary on the Bible (1810–1826) — public domain. Text from a community e-Sword/MySword module.

19. Thou wilt then say, etc. Here indeed the flesh especially storms, that is, when it hears that they who perish have been destined by the will of God to destruction. Hence the Apostle adopts again the words of an opponent; for he saw that the mouths of the ungodly could not be restrained from boldly clamouring against the righteousness of God: and he very fitly expresses their mind; for being not content with defending themselves, they make God guilty instead of themselves; and then, after having devolved on him the blame of their own condemnation, they become indignant against his great power. They are indeed constrained to yield; but they storm, because they cannot resist; and ascribing dominion to him, they in a manner charge him with tyranny. In the same manner the Sophists in their schools foolishly dispute on what they call his absolute justice, as though forgetful of his own righteousness, he would try the power of his authority by throwing all things into confusion. Thus then speak the ungodly in this passage, — “What cause has he to be angry with us? Since he has formed us such as we are, since he leads us at his will where he pleases, what else does he in destroying us but punish his own work in us? For it is not in our power to contend with him; how much soever we may resist, he will yet have the upper hand. Then unjust will be his judgment, if he condemns us; and unrestrainable is the power which he now employs towards us.” What does Paul say to these things?

John Calvin's Commentaries (1540-1563) — public domain. Text from the Calvin Translation Society English edition (1840s-50s) via the Christian Classics Ethereal Library (ccel.org). Calvin's coverage is partial (roughly two-thirds of the Bible); uncommented books and verses are honest gaps, never fabricated. The 19th-century editor's footnotes and remarks are omitted so the notes are faithfully Calvin's own voice.

(19-21) These verses contain the third part of the vindication, which is based upon a possible extension of the objection. Not only might it seem as if this absolute choice and rejection was unjust in itself, but also unjust in its consequences. How can a man be blamed or punished, when his actions are determined for him? The Apostle meets this by a simple but emphatic assertion of the absolute and unquestionable prerogative of God over His creatures.

A Bible Commentary for English Readers, edited by Charles John Ellicott (1878–1897) — public domain. Text from a community e-Sword module.

(B) Is Man responsible?

19. Thou wilt say then] St Paul is still, as so often before, writing as if an opponent were at his side. How vividly this suggests that he had himself experienced the conflicts of thought which indeed every earnest mind more or less encounters! But conflicts do not always end in further doubts. Difficulties, often most distressing ones, must meet us in any theory of religion that is not merely evolved from our own likings; and difficulties are not necessarily impossibilities. At one point or another we must be prepared to submit to fact and mystery.

yet] Q. d., “why, after such statements of His sovereignty, does He go on to treat us as free agents?” Here is the second head of objection. God’s justice was the first; now it is man’s accountability.

who hath resisted] This is not the place to discuss the profound problem here suggested. It must be enough to point out (1) that St Paul makes no attempt to solve it. He rests upon the facts (a) that God declares Himself sovereign in His mercy; (b) that He treats man’s will as a reality: and he bids us accept those facts, and trust, and act. (2) The contradiction to the hint that “no man hath resisted” lies, not in abstruse theory, but in our innermost consciousness. We know the fact of our will; we know the reality of moral differences; we know that we can “resist the Holy Ghost.” On the other hand, the truth of God’s foreknowledge is alone sufficient, on reflection, to assure us that every movement of will, as being foreseen, could not be otherwise than in fact it is. And this is exactly as true of the simplest acts and tenderest affections of common life, as of things eternal: in each emotion of pity or joy we move along the line of prescience, a line which thus may be regarded as, for us, irrevocably fixed beforehand. But meanwhile in these things we feel and act without a moment’s misgiving (except artificial misgiving) about our freedom. Just so in matters of religion; but the special relations of sinful man to God compel these plain and even stern statements of the truth of God’s action in the matter, even in the midst of arguments and pleadings which all assume the reality of our will.

The Cambridge Bible for Schools and Colleges (gen. ed. J. J. S. Perowne; Cambridge University Press, 1878–1918) — public domain. Text from a community e-Sword module.

Nay, but O man, who art thou that repliest against God?.... Or "answerest again to God": some have been so weak and wicked as to suggest, that the apostle met with an objection he could not answer, or give a fair solution of, and therefore takes the method he does: but when the several things returned in answer by the apostle are considered, it will appear that he has taken the wisest method to silence such an audacious objector, and that he abundantly clears God from the charge of cruelty and unmercifulness. And he answers "first", by putting the insolent creature in mind of what he was; "nay, but O man, who art thou?" &c. Thou art man, and not God; a creature, and not the Creator; and must not expect that he, thy Creator, will give an account of his matters to thee, or a reason why he does, this or the other thing. Thou art but a man, who in his best estate was vanity, being mutable; thou art a fallen sinful creature, and obnoxious to the wrath and displeasure of God for thy sins, and darest thou to open thy mouth against him? thou art a poor, foolish, and ignorant man, born like a wild ass's colt, without understanding, and wilt thou take upon thee to confront, direct, or counsel the Most High, or tell him what is fitting to be done, or not done? "next" the apostle answers, by pointing out his folly and madness, in replying to God. To speak to God in behalf of a man's self at the throne of grace, in the most submissive manner, for any mercy or favour wanted, is an high privilege, and it is a wonderful condescension in God to admit of; and when a man, a good man takes upon him to plead with God on the behalf of others, of a wicked people, a sinful nation, he ought to set before him the example and conduct of Abraham, who in a like case acknowledged himself to be but dust and ashes, and more than once entreated, that the Lord would not be angry at his importunity; but for a man to answer again to God, which a servant ought not to do to his master, to litigate a point with God, to dispute a matter with him, is the highest instance of arrogance and impudence: "woe unto him that striveth with his Maker, let the potsherd strive with the potsherds of the earth", Isa 45:9, with their equals, with men like themselves, but let no man dare to "contend with God"; if he should, "he cannot answer him one of a thousand", Job 9:3; for "he is wise in heart", in forming all his counsels, purposes, and decrees; "and mighty in strength", to execute them; "who hath hardened himself against him and hath prospered?" Job 9:4. Another way the apostle takes in answering the objection is, by showing the absurdity of a creature's wrangling with God about his make, and the circumstances in which he is made:

shall the thing formed, say unto him that formed it, why hast thou made me thus? reference is had to Isa 45:9; Now as it would be a most absurd thing for the clay, was it capable of speaking, to say to the fashioner of it, why dost thou put me into such or such a shape and form? or for any piece of workmanship to say to the maker of it, he has no hands, no head, no judgment and skill; or for a child to say to its parents, what begettest thou, or what hast thou brought forth? so absurd and unreasonable is it, for any to say to God, why hast thou appointed me to such and such ends and purposes, and has brought me into being in such a manner, and under such circumstances? There is a story in the Talmud (n), which may be pertinently produced here;

"it happened to R. Eleazar ben Simeon, of Migdal Gedur, that he went from his master's house, and he was riding on an ass, and travelling by the sea side, and as he rejoiced exceedingly, and his heart was lifted up because he had learnt much of the law, there was joined to him a certain man that was very much deformed, and says to him, peace be upon thee Rabbi; but he did not return the salutation to him, but says to him "Raca", how deformed is that man! perhaps all thy townsmen are as deformed as thee; he replied to him, I do not know, but go and say, , "to the workman that made me", how ugly is this vessel thou hast made, when he knew in himself that he has sinned; upon this the Rabbi dismounted his ass, and fell down before him, and said unto him, I entreat of thee forgive me; he said unto him, I cannot forgive thee, till thou goest "to the workman that made me", and say, how ugly is this vessel which thou hast made.''

(n) T. Bab. Taanith, fol. 20. 2. Massechet Derech Eretz, c. 4. fol. 18. 1.

John Gill's Exposition of the Whole Bible (1746–1763) — public domain (CC PDM 1.0). Text via the HelloAO Bible API.

19 Thou wilt say then unto me, Why doth he yet find fault? For who hath resisted his will?

Ver. 19. Why doth he yet find fault] Queritur, Complain, saith the Vulgate; which interpretation deceived Aquinas, as if it had been written Quaeritur. Be sought for. Luk 15:8. Gregory the Great and others, for Everrit, swept away, read Evertit; destroyed, which mistake produced many groundless glosses.

John Trapp, A Commentary or Exposition upon All the Books of the Old and New Testament (1647–1656) — public domain. Text from a community e-Sword module.

Thou wilt say then unto me - The apostle here refers to an objection that might be made to his argument. If the position which he had been endeavoring to establish were true; if God had a purpose in all his dealings with people; if all the revolutions among people happened according to his decree, so that he was not disappointed, or his plan frustrated; and if his own glory was secured in all this, why could he blame people?

Why doth he yet find fault? - Why does he blame people, since their conduct is in accordance with his purpose, and since he bestows mercy according to his sovereign will? This objection has been made by sinners in all ages. It is the standing objection against the doctrines of grace. The objection is founded,

On the difficulty of reconciling the purposes of God with the free agency of man.

(2)It assumes, what cannot be proved, that a plan or purpose of God must destroy the freedom of man.

(3)It is said that if the plan of God is accomplished, then what is best to be done is done, and, of course, man cannot be blamed. These objections are met by the apostle in the following argument.

Who hath resisted his will? - That is, who has “successfully opposed” his will, or frustrated his plan? The word translated “resist” is commonly used to denote the resistance offered by soldiers or armed men. Thus, Eph 6:13, “Take unto you the whole armor of God, that ye may be able to withstand (resist or successfully oppose) in the evil day:” see Luk 21:15, “I will give you a mouth and wisdom which all your adversaries shall not be able to gainsay or resist;” see also Act 7:10; Act 13:8, “But Elymas ...withstood them, etc.” The same Greek word, Rom 13:2; Gal 2:11. This does not mean that no one has offered resistance or opposition to God, but that no one has done it successfully. God had accomplished his purposes “in spite of” their opposition. This was an established point in the sacred writings, and one of the admitted doctrines of the Jews. To establish it had even been a part of the apostle’s design; and the difficulty now was to see how, this being admitted, people could be held chargeable with crime. That it was the doctrine of the Scriptures, see 2Ch 20:6, “In thine hand “is there not” power and might, so that none is able to withstand thee?” Dan 4:35, “he doeth according to his will in the army of heaven, and among the inhabitants of the earth, and none can stay his hand, or say unto him, What doest thou?” See also the case of Joseph and his brethren, Gen 50:20, “As for you, ye thought evil against me, but God meant it unto good.”

Albert Barnes' Notes on the Bible (1834–1885) — public domain. Text from a community e-Sword/MySword module.

Thou wilt say, therefore, to me, &c. The apostle makes objection, that if God call some and harden, or even permit others to be hardened, and no one resisteth, or can hinder his absolute will, why should God complain that men are not converted? St. Paul first puts such rash and profane men in mind, that is unreasonable and impertinent for creatures to murmur and dispute against God their Creator, when they do not comprehend the ways of his providence. --- O man, [4] who art thou that repliest against God? This might stop the mouths, and quiet the minds of every man, when he cannot comprehend the mysteries of predestination, of God’s foreknowledge, his decrees and graces, or the manner of reconciling them with human liberty. He may cry out with St. Paul again, (chap. xi. 33.) O the riches of the wisdom, and of the knowledge of God! how incomprehensible are his judgments, and how unsearchable his ways! --- Shall the thing formed, &c. Hath not the potter power, &c.[5] To teach men that they ought not to complain against God and his providence, when they cannot comprehend his works, he puts them in mind of their origin. Every one may say to God, with the prophet Isaias, (vi. 48.) Lord, thou art our Father, and we are but clay; thou art our Maker who framed us, and we are all of us the work of thy hands. Hath not the potter power as he pleaseth, out of the same lump of clay to make some vessels for honourable uses, and some for less honourable. St. John Chrysostom observes very well, that this comparison must not be extended further than the apostle designed; which was to teach us, how submissive we ought to be to God, in what we do not understand; but we must not pretend from hence, nor from any expression in this chapter, as divers heretics have done, that as vessels of clay are destitute of free will and liberty, so are men. This is against the doctrine of the Catholic Church, and against the Scriptures, in many places. (Witham) --- The potter. This similitude is used, only to shew that we are not to dispute with our Maker: nor to reason with him why he does not give as much grace to one as to another: for since the whole lump of our clay is vitiated by sin, it is owing to his goodness and mercy that he makes out of it so many vessels of honour; and it is no more than just that others, in punishment of their unrepented sins, should be given up to be vessels of dishonour. (Challoner)

George Leo Haydock (1774–1849), Haydock's Catholic Family Bible and Commentary, 1859 edition — public domain. Excludes Psalms (Douay-Rheims chapter numbering differs from Protestant) and Deuterocanonical books (Catholic canon only).

Here he obviates a third objection or cavil. The first was, that God is unfaithful, Rom 9:6; the second, that God is unjust, Rom 9:14; now the third is, that God is severe and cruel. Some might object and say, If God, in those courses which he takes with men and sinners, doth follow only his own will and pleasure, and all things are done thereafter; why then doth he complain of sinners, and find fault with them? It seems it is his will to reject them; and who hath resisted, or can make resistance thereunto? It seems to be a common saying amongst the Hebrews, that None can withstand God: Rom 9:2; 2Ch 20:6, and elsewhere.

Matthew Poole's English Annotations on the Holy Bible (1683–1685) — public domain. Text from a community e-Sword/MySword module.

4. No reply can be made against God for all this; for it accords with the universal principle of an equitable Free Probation, (19-23.)

For it accords with the law of a responsible probationary free-agency that, as a potter may, according to the temper shown by the clay, prepare the vessel for honour or for dishonour, so God, according to the temper and showing of a free-agent, may assign him to mercy or wrath.

19. Thou… me—The Jew and the apostle are now face to face.

Why… find fault?—The Jew’s question, divested of its petulant words, is this: Since in our downfall, typified thus by Pharaoh’s overthrow, God, as you say, has it all his own way, why does he hold us Jews responsible?

Calvinists often tell us (as Barnes on the passage) that this is the very objection that Arminians make against Calvinism. Very true, we reply, and it is to a false Calvinistic view of the matter that the Jew objects. He understands that Paul is a predestinarian in his putting of the case, and against that putting his query is perfectly just. And Paul will reply, not by denying the validity of the objection to the fatalistic view, but by denying that the fatalistic view is the one he puts. So, after reproving the petulance of the phrase and spirit of the Jew, he proceeds to show that he himself maintains a doctrine of true equitable free-agency.

Really, the Jew assumes that by Paul’s view his own rejection was willed by God, and his sins as condition to his rejection. Had the apostle, indeed, said, “God has decreed your downfall, and foreordained your sins as the means to it,” the Jew’s question would have been just. But Paul, quite the reverse, maintained the non-necessity of any fall at all. He defends God’s right to establish a system of broad unlineal free-agency and of salvation conditioned upon faith in Christ, in which, as Israel himself is potentially included, there is no necessity for Israel to fall. Apostacy is Israel’s own free, undecreed, unforeordained, unwilled act; and Paul is writing this epistle to prevent that act.

Who… resisted… will?—The Jew’s premises are, God willed my sin and downfall; my sin and downfall fulfil his will; the question then is, How I am to blame? If the premises are true, his question is irresistible.

Daniel D. Whedon (gen. ed.), Commentary on the Old and New Testaments (1874–1909) — public domain. Text from a community e-Sword module.

Thou wilt say then unto me, Why doth he yet find fault? For who resisteth his will? Having shown that injustice cannot be imputed to God in hardening as well as having mercy on whom he will, the apostle now meets the supposed difficulty of understanding why men should be held guilty before God for but being as he wills them to be. It is immediately suggested by Pharaoh"s case, which led to the conclusion, on yelei sklhrunei ; but the apostle foresees that an objection might be raised on this ground to his finding fault with the Jews for rejecting Christ, and them he especially has in view in what follows. It may be observed here that there is undoubtedly a difficulty to the human mind in reconciling theoretically Divine omnipotence with human free-will and responsibility. (On the general question, see notes on Ro 8) St. Paul here, after his manner, does not attempt to solve the general problem, confining himself for the present to the Divine side of it. His answer, in vers. 20, 21, is simply to the effect that God has the absolute right as well as power to deal with his own creation as he pleases, and that man is in no position to "contend with the Almighty". (see Job_40:2) He brings in from the prophets the illustration of the potter"s power and right over the clay, which he fashions and deals with as he chooses. It will be seen, however, as we go on, that this illustration by no means involves, as by some it has been supposed to do, the idea of rejection and condemnation irrespectively of desert.

Vers. 19-29. The rebuke of presumption.

The objectors might say If God overrules all the conduct of men by such sovereign power, why does he reprobate any? Is not the very idea of the reprobation inconsistent with itself? He sets himself against some that he may glorify his Name; but if this tends to the working of his will, and they cannot resist, why does he set himself against them? The apostle, in reply, will indeed vindicate to them the reasons which enter into the working of the all-righteous God; but, first, he will question their competency to object to the working of such a One as God. They ask in a spirit of self-complacent Pharisaism; he will ask them how they dare presume to sit in judgment on their Maker. He shows, then, the unreasonableness and the unscripturalness of such presumptuous questioning of the ways of God.

I AS UNREASONABLE PRESUMPTION. If it be regarded on the ground of mere right, has not God a right to do what he will with his own? It is certain that his will is wise, righteous, and merciful; but the question now is one of prerogative. And God, the Absolute One of the universe, is surely not to come to the tribunal of creaturely judgment? It is even as though the clay were to judge the action of the man that fashions it, and say, "Why didst thou make me thus?" The potter has a right over the clay; he may do as he will. He may make the vessels, some for meaner use, some for nobler; and the clay cannot question his deeds. So cannot man question God. He deals with mankind for historical purposes as the potter with the clay. God takes clay, begins to fashion it for purposes of honour, casts it aside, takes other clay and puts it to the use for which the former portion was first it)tended: are we in a position to say, "Why?" God knows best! The race of mankind is dealt with by God according to his own wisdom, and there are vessels of mercy unto glory, and vessels of wrath unto destruction. Egypt was a vessel of wrath, while Israel was taken for fashioning into a vessel of mercy; by-and-by Israel, as a nation, becomes a vessel of wrath, and a new people, of Jews and Gentiles, is the vessel unto honour. God knows what he is doing best. But all shall subserve his glory. Just as Pharaoh"s stubbornness was made by God the occasion for a greater display of delivering power, so the stubbornness of the Jews, and their wickedness even unto the crucifixion of their Lord, were made subservient to the world"s salvation. And while the wrath towards some was for mercy towards others, yet towards the children of wrath long-suffering was shown, not merely that the purpose of mercy towards others might be more conspicuously and effectually fulfilled, but that they, had they repented, might have mercy shown them. The very wrath is in love.

II AN UNSCRIPTURAL PRESUMPTION. The presumption was not only unreasonable in itself, but according to their own Scriptures it was altogether unwarranted. Hosea (Hos_2:23 Hos_1:10) had spoken words of prophecy concerning the ten scattered tribes, which involved the same principle as that on which God was acting now the right to reprobate for idolatry, and the right to restore. And, as they had lapsed into idolatry, and as they were furthermore so intermingled with the Gentiles that a definite separation might be impossible, theirs was not only a new election, as of Gentiles themselves, but actually involved the election of Gentiles also. Isaiah, too, (Isa_10:22, Isa_10:23) speaking of Israel, sets forth the other principle, or another aspect of the same, on which God was dealing with the world now his right, while reprobating Israel from the great work of the world"s salvation, to spare a remnant, with whom the Gentiles should be joined, and who with the Gentiles should form the new Church for the extension of the kingdom of God. So, then, their Scriptures pointed to this very selfsame, twofold principle for the formation of the new society. And all their history, as recorded in the Scriptures, had been one repeated manifestation of the same. Yes, God had the right, and he had already used it from the beginning, to take or set aside, as he would, nations or individuals, in the great economy of the redemption of the world. The apostle goes on to show (ver. 30 Rom_10:21) that there were reasons for God"s dealings in all cases, and what, in the main, these reasons were; also (Ro 11) that the very reprobation of Israel now, in accordance with such reasons, should ultimately redound to the good of the world.

Let us remember this for ourselves as a nation. We may think, God hath not so dealt with any people." But he does not pledge himself rigidly to deal so with us to the end. Our earnest question must be not captiously, or he would not answer, but devoutly, and he will answer Why are we now exalted? and how may we secure a continuance of his blessing which maketh rich? And so for ourselves, as individuals, we can ask no more important question than How may I become "a chosen vessel," "a vessel unto honour, meet for the Master"s use"? T.F.L. (Act_9:15 2Ti_2:21)

Vers. 19-33. Vessels of wrath and vessels of mercy.

We have already seen that God"s hatred of Esau was after a millennium of patience. This fact of God"s long-suffering with Esau"s seed carries the light we need into the difficult section now before us. It is a specious objection that the Divine will is resistless, and so, as each one finds he cannot resist God successfully, what reason has the Most High to find fault with his helpless creatures? But a little fair thinking on the whole subject of God"s sovereignty will show that he has every right to complain. Assume that we are all clay in the hands of the potter: what then? Is the potter responsible for the composition of the clay? If one lump is most common clay, out of which no glorious vessel could be fashioned, surely the potter can be held responsible only for the use to which he puts the base lump supplied him, and not for the common character of the clay? It is the unfair use of the figure which has led to exegetical difficulty. Let us, then, take up the two kinds of vessels here referred to, and see what truths are actually communicated by them.

I THE VESSELS OF WRATH FITTED UNTO DESTRUCTION. And here I cannot do better than translate from a writer already quoted. In his little-known work, "La Predestination," Monsell says, "The all-important point for the interpretation of these verses is to decide when the act of forming the vessels took place; does this operation represent the predestination, or the moral government of God in actual time? A word of ver. 23 decides this question, without giving ground for the least hesitation; this word is the key of the whole passage, and, strange to say, it is omitted by Luther and by the French translations anterior to that of Lausanne. It is the word "afore he has prepared afore for his glory." The predestination of the vessel, then, is not its fabrication; it precedes it. Thus, then, when God is compared to a potter who fashions the clay, the question is about his actual treatment of sinners. They are before him one identical mass, vile and shapeless; to make the one portion vessels unto dishonour, to make them promote his glory without bettering their condition, is to treat them according to their nature; to make the other portion vessels unto honour is to treat them according to his grace which has been given them in Christ before the foundation of the world. As to the vessels of wrath, God is not the Author of their nature, but only of their form; he has fashioned them, but he has not " prepared" them; their form is already a merited punishment; he shows therein his wrath. Could one believe that God was irritated against those who would be such as he had wished them to be? Would he need "a grand long-suffering" to endure his own work in the state which he had himself determined? Has he raised with one hand what he has overturned with the other? Such a doctrine ends by doing violence to that reason in the name of which it has outraged our moral sentiments." It is clear, then, that the potter"s relation to the vessels of wrath is that of the fashioner of material made ready to his hand. He is not to be blamed if the coarse Clay will only make a dishonoured vessel. The preparation of the clay, the contraction of its coarse character, has been anterior to the potter"s disposal of it. All he can do is to determine the destination which suits the nature of the provided clay. In the very same way, God is not to be held responsible for the coarse characters sinners contract in the process of their development. They have exercised their freedom in reaching the condition when, like clay, they lie before the great Potter"s wheel. All that God can be held responsible for is the form as vessels of dishonour they are to take; and if he shows his deserved wrath in disposing of them as dishonoured vessels, he is acting well within his rights. It is in the disposal of incorrigible sinners, in suffering long with them, and in at last dooming them to destruction, that he displays the severe side of his character that side without which he could not ensure our respect. As for this wrath of God, it has been very happily denominated by some of the Germans "the love-pain (Liebesschmerz) of God." And there can be no doubt that with his long-suffering there enters a large element of pain. These wrecked lives are not disposed of by God without due sensibility. He grieves over them as in human form he grieved over doomed Jerusalem.

II THE VESSELS OF MERCY PREPARED AFORE UNTO GLORY. It is much pleasanter, however, to turn to the vessels of mercy the vessels which God fashions into "vessels unto honour, fitted and prepared for the Master"s use." He can and does take men like Isaac and Jacob, whose natural qualities are not of the highest and noblest, and out of their unlikely characters he can by his grace make what is pure and holy. Of Jews and Gentiles he has called a proportion, and they have become Christ-like, and so glorious. And here we have to notice:

1. That in this way God has made known the riches of his glory. For if these elect ones had not become the subjects of God"s grace, much of God"s rich glory would have remained unknown. The fall of man and his deterioration have furnished God with splendid opportunities for the revelation of his glorious love and transforming power. The whole universe has profited by the manifestation of the riches of God"s glory in the vessels of mercy.

2. In the formation of the vessels of mercy God was not working without a plan. Just as a skilful potter, in the formation of some specially fine piece of porcelain, spends anxious thought upon its form and ornamentation, so God afore prepared the vessels of mercy unto glory. The predestination of grace is simply the due foresight and prearrangement of God. There is nothing fortuitous; nothing of chance-work about God"s acts of grace. "There is," says Monsell, "in our chapter only one predestination, that of grace; and not only that, but the words of the apostle are weighed and chosen to prevent all misapprehension: the one are ready or fit for perdition, the other are prepared for glory; the first, it is not God who has made them ready on the contrary, he endures them "with a grand long-suffering;" the latter, it is God who has prepared them still more, he has prepared them afore. Were it not for the care with which the idea of reprobation is here put aside, I should never have supposed that such a dogma had presented itself to the spirit of a sacred writer. Paul makes on purpose an antithetic parallelism, as he had done (Rom_6:23) between wages and gift, and this parallelism finds itself in all the members of the sentence. God shows his anger towards the wicked, and the riches of his glory towards the saved; but the latter, the mercy, is altogether gratuitous. If he wishes to make his power known (ver. 22), it is not his power to create evil, but to punish it; and how to punish evil if not by evil, how to show his anger towards the clay unless by making the vessels unto dishonour?

3. It is faith which makes the vessels glorious. After quoting several prophecies about the elect remnant, the apostle proceeds to point out that faith in the one case, and the lack of it in the other, made all the difference. The Jews for the most part stumbled at the idea of a crucified Messiah. They would not trust him, but busied themselves about building up their own righteousness. Self-righteousness became their ruin. But the Gentiles, on the other hand, not seeking self-righteousness, went forward and believed in Jesus, and the faith transfigured them. They found that "whosoever believeth on Jesus shall not be ashamed." And faith in the risen Lord, ever present with them according to his promise, made them noble men and women, ready to witness for Christ even unto the death. It is thus that God in his sovereign mercy makes men and women "vessels unto honour," fitting them by the gift of faith for service here on earth, and preparing them for still more glorious service in the life to come. As Ray Palmer sweetly sang, so may we"My faith looks up to thee, Thou Lamb of Calvary, Saviour Divine: Now hear me while I pray; Take all my guilt away; Oh, let me from this day Be wholly thine! "When ends life"s transient dream, When death"s cold, sullen stream Shall o"er me roll; Blest Saviour, then, in love, Fear and distrust remove; Oh, bear me safe above, A ransomed soul!

The Pulpit Commentary (1880–1919), ed. H.D.M. Spence-Jones & Joseph S. Exell — public domain. Text from a community e-Sword module.

Why doth he still find fault - The particle still is strongly expressive of the objector's sour, morose murmuring. For who hath resisted his will - The word his likewise expresses his surliness and aversion to God, whom he does not even deign to name.

John Wesley, Explanatory Notes Upon the Whole Bible (1754–1765) — public domain. Text via the GEBible commentary corpus.

Silencing the reasonable objector:

v. 19. Thou wilt say then unto me, Why doth He yet find fault? For who hath resisted His will?

v. 20. Nay but, O man, who art thou that replies against God? Shall the thing formed say to him that formed it, Why hast thou made me thus?

v. 21. Hath not the potter power over the clay, of the same lump to make one vessel unto honor and another unto dishonor?

Paul here introduces the objection, not of a humble seeker after truth, but of a truly modern faultfinder, who prides himself upon his intellect and logic. Hearing that God withdraws His gracious hand from the hardened sinner, such a one might ask, why does God go on finding fault? For His expressed will, who will withstand? The blasphemous objector presents the thought that, if God seriously wanted to manifest His grace and mercy to all men, He certainly could do so. And who could resist Him? The answer is implied: No one! If God employs His sovereign majesty and glory in the performance of any work, His almighty power will always bring the attempt to a successful conclusion. But God does not choose to deal with men in this manner in the matter of their salvation. He works through the means of the Gospel and the Sacraments, without any arbitrary application of sovereign power. If a person, therefore, consistently rejects the means of grace and refuses to heed all the attempts of God, in whatever way shown, then his self-hardening is justly punished by the withdrawal of God’s grace, and he has only himself to blame for his damnation. God is not responsible for evil, and the blame for a person’s hardening cannot be laid to His charge.

The apostle, therefore, does not even choose to show the fallacy and foolishness of the opponent’s argument, but introduces a counter-question containing a distinct reproof for the irreverent spirit with which men judge the acts of God: Yes indeed, man, who are you that reply to God? How will any mere man dare to call God to account or to question His justice? Man’s insignificance and weakness in comparison with the perfection of the great God is so great that even the suspicion as though He were in any way guilty of injustice is irreverence and presumption. Surely the thing formed will not say to him that formed it, Why do you make me thus? Or has not the potter power over the clay out of the same lump or mass to make one vessel to honor, the other to dishonor? The apostle places an alternative before the eyes of his opponent, either to recognize the absolute authority of God in silence, or to make the preposterous claim that the potter has no power over the clay which he uses to form vessels therefrom. The figure employed by the apostle is one often found in the Old Testament, and in similar thought connections, Isa 29:16; Isa 45:9; Isa 64:7; Jer 18:6. The very thought that a vessel made by a potter should object to the form and to the intended use for which it is designed seems so foolish that no answer is necessary. But just as preposterous it is, according to Paul’s argument, for any person in the world to call God to account for the manner in which He governs the world. God, as Creator and Sovereign, has the right to have mercy upon whom He will, and to harden whom He will, in the sense as shown above. The apostle does not go beyond that fact, nor does he enter the realm of speculation. He wants no conclusions drawn that tend to provoke rebellion. Note: For a Christian to indulge in speculation regarding doctrines which God has not revealed in His Word is not only a waste of time, but very often leads to a false understanding of the truths that are plainly set forth in the infallible Book of God.

Paul E. Kretzmann, Popular Commentary of the Bible (1921–1924) — public domain. Text from a community e-Sword module.

Here the apostle brings in the unbelieving and rejected Jews making an objection against God: "If the case be thus, that God doth sometimes, and that justly, leave abdurate sinners to harden themselves, why is he offended at it, and complains of it? If God hardeneth us because he will, why doth he find fault with us for our hardness of heart? For who hath at any time resisted his will? How is it in our power to avoid being hardened, it it be his will that we should be hardened?"

Learn hence, That guilty sinners are full of hard thoughts of God, and very prone to think the divine dispensations unreasonable, if not unrighteous; but upon false and mistaken grounds: Why doth he find fault? Who hath resisted his will? To this objection the apostle returns a very smart answer, saying, Who art thou, O man, that repliest against God? Shall, &c.

In which answer, Observe, 1. A vehement objurgation or reproof.

2. A substantial vindication of the righteousness and wisdom of God in his proceedings with men.

Note, 1. The objurgation or reproof, drawn up in an interrogative form, which argues great intenseness of mind in the person speaking: Nay but, O man, who art thou?

As if the apostle had said, "What bold and unheard-of presumption is this, that man, blind and ignorant man, guilty, sinful man, obnoxious to wrath and eternal death, that he should undertake to reprove and censure, to judge and condemn the actions and dispensations of the most high and holy God, as if they were crooked and perverse, defective either in justice or wisdom!"

Learn hence, that it is no less than horrid and horrible presumption for so weak, sinful, and worthless a creature, as man is, to contest or dispute with the most high God about the wisdom or righteousness of any of his ways: O man, who art thou that repliest against God?

Note, 2. How the apostle vindicates the wisdom and righteousness of God in his proceedings with men in general, and against the Jews in particular; showing that there is no more cause to make this objection against God for rejecting the unbelieving Jews, and showing favour to the believing Gentiles, than for the pitcher to contend with him that formed it, why he made it of such a shape, and not of another figure; or for the clay, when it is marred and broken, to complain of the potter for making of one part of it a vessel unto honour, and the other unto dishonour.

Learn hence, That men who have made themselves obnoxious to the justice of God by a long-continued course of sin and disobedience against God, (as the unbelieving Jews here spoken of evidently did,) have no cause either to complain of God’s severe proceedings against themselves, or of his favourable dispensations towards others. What just cause had the Jews, rejected for their own unbelief and hardness of heart, to murmur against God for showing mercy to the Gentiles, who submitted to the terms of mercy?

William Burkitt's Expository Notes on the New Testament (1700–1703) — public domain. Text from a community e-Sword module.

Thou wilt say then unto me, Why doth he still find fault? [That God actually and always does find fault with sinners is a fact never to be overlooked, and is also a fact which shows beyond all question or peradventure that God abhors evil and takes no positive steps toward its production. Even in the case cited by Paul, where God hardened Pharaoh's heart, the act of God was permissive, for else how could the Lord expostulate with Pharaoh for a rebellious spirit for which God himself was responsible? ( Exo_9:17 ; Exo_10:3-4 ) Again, let us consider the case in point. If God hardened Israel by positive act, why did his representative and "express image" weep over Jerusalem? and why was the Book of Romans written?] For who withstandeth his will? [Since Paul is still justifying God in formulating a gospel which results in the condemnation of Jews and the saving of Gentiles, this objector is naturally either a Jew or some one speaking from the Jewish standpoint. This fact is made more apparent in the subsequent verses, for in them the apostle appropriately answers the Jew out of his Jewish Scriptures. The objection runs thus: But, Paul, if God shows mercy to whom he will, and if he hardens whom he will, then it is he who has hardened us Jews in unbelief against the gospel. Why, then, does he still find fault with us, since he himself, according to your argument, has excluded us from blessedness, and made us unfit for mercy? This reply implies three things: 1. God, not the Jew, was at fault. 2. The Jew was ill used of God, in being deprived of blessing through hardening. 3. The rewards of saints and sinners should be equal, since each did God's will absolutely in the several fields of good and evil where God had elected each to work. To each of these three implications the apostle replies with lightning-like brevity: 1. It is impious, O man, to so argue in self-justification as to compromise the good name of God. 2. It is folly for the thing formed to complain against him that formed it. 3. Rewards and destinies need not be equal, since, for instance, the potter out of the same lump forms vessels for different destinies, whether of honor or dishonor. But it must be borne in mind that in the last of these three brief answers the apostle aims rather, as Alford says, "at striking dumb the objector by a statement of God's indubitable right, against which it does not become us men to murmur, than at unfolding to us the actual state of the case." Let us now consider the three answers in detail.]

J. W. McGarvey (with Philip Y. Pendleton), Commentaries on the New Testament (The Fourfold Gospel, 1914; Acts; and the epistles) — public domain. Text from a community e-Sword/MySword module.

19–24. Who withstandeth his will? He now meets another objection of the Jewish adversary. If God's will is paramount, why should he find fault, for no one nation can withstand his will. If God hardens, the nation that is hardened only submits to him. Paul does not stop to show that this objection is far-fetched, and illogical, but in substance says: “Let that be granted. Then what right has the Jewish nation to object? It is nothing but a lump of clay in the hands of the potter.”

B. W. Johnson's The People's New Testament with Notes (1889–1891) — public domain. Electronic text from the Christian Classics Ethereal Library (CCEL) ThML edition.

You will say then to me

Paul is talking to the critics of his teaching as though he were only talking to one person. You may need to use the plural here. (See: Forms of You)

Why does he still find fault? For who has ever withstood his will?

These are rhetorical questions that Paul uses to add emphasis. You can translate all of these questions as strong statements. (See: Rhetorical Question)

he ... his

The words "he" and "his" here refer to God.

Will what has been molded say ... daily use?

Paul uses the potter's right to make any kind of container he wants from the clay as a metaphor for the creator's right to do whatever he wants with his creation. Paul asks these questions to emphasize his point. (See: Metaphor and Rhetorical Question)

Why did you make me this way?

The word "you" here refers to God. Paul uses this question to add emphasis. You can translate it as a strong statement. AT: "God, you should not have made me this way!" (See: Rhetorical Question)

translationWords

will of God

unfoldingWord translationNotes — © Distant Shores Media and the Door43 World Missions Community, licensed CC BY-SA 4.0. Source: git.door43.org/Door43/en_tn.

19. ἐρεῖς μοι οὖν κ.τ.λ. You will say to me, In this case what room is still left for faultfinding? If men are thus appointed to be instruments of GOD’S use whether for mercy or hardening, how can they be responsible? how can GOD find fault? The answer is, on the one hand, that the question cannot be properly raised by man as against GOD, because man has to accept the conditions of his creation, and on the other hand that the revelation of GOD’S wrath is itself turned by the patience of GOD into a revelation of mercy. The answer does not seem to us sufficient, for it still leaves the fundamental point unsolved—why are some men to be the subjects of the revelation of wrath in order that the mercy may be revealed in others? If moral responsibility is to be maintained, the cause of this difference must be seen to lie in the man himself. But this is not brought out until we get to Rom 9:31 where the cause of Israel’s failure is named as want of faith. Can we use this particular instance to interpret the whole argument? If we are meant to, it is strange that it should be left so late, and unapplied to the general problem. The reason for this perhaps is that S. Paul’s mind is really absorbed in the particular problem of Israel, and does not attempt to elucidate, perhaps did not feel the weight of, the general problem. See Add. Note, p. 222.

τῷ γὰρ βουλήματι κ.τ.λ. The question assumes that the hardening is the primary purpose of GOD. The use of the term βούλημα slightly exaggerates the statement δν θέλει κ.τ.λ.; βούλομαι involving “volition guided by choice and purpose; θέλει expressing the mere fact of volition” (Hort, James, p. 32): but the distinction cannot be used to help the situation here.

ἀνθέστηκεν has ever succeeded in resisting (cf. Rom 13:12): if the hardening is GOD’S will, how can a man help it?

Cambridge Greek Testament for Schools and Colleges (Cambridge University Press, 1896; 21 vols, various authors incl. Carr, Maclear, Plummer, Farrar, Lumby, Moule, M. R. James, Simcox) — public domain. Text from a community e-Sword module.

19.] Thou wilt say then to me (there seems no reason to suppose the objector a Jew, as Thol. after Grot., Calov., Koppe, al.:—the objection is a general one, applying to all mankind, and likely to arise in the mind of any reader. The expression ὦ ἄνθρωπε seems to confirm this), Why then doth He yet find fault (ἔτι as ch. 3:7, assuming your premises,—‘if this be so:’ at the same time it expresses a certain irritation on the part of the objector: ‘exprimit morosum fremitum,’ Bengel. μέμφομαι has a stronger sense than mere blame here: interprets it αἰτιᾶται, ἐξουθενεῖ, καταγινώσκει: see the apocryphal reff. Thol.)? For who resists (not, ‘hath resisted:” ἀνθέστηκεν, like ἕστηκεν, is present, see Winer, edn. 6, § 40. 4. b, and compare ἐφέστηκεν, 2Ti 4:6) His will (i.e. if it be His will to harden the sinner, and the sinner goes on in his sin, he does not resist but goes with the will of God)? Yea rather (μενοῦνγε, see reff., takes the ground from under the previous assertion and supersedes it by another: implying that it has a certain show of truth, but that the proper view of the matter is yet to be stated. It thus conveys, as in ref. Luke, an intimation of rebuke; here, with severity: ‘that which thou hast said, may be correct human reasoning—but as against God’s sovereignty, thy reasoning is out of place and irrelevant’), O man (perhaps without emphasis implying the contrast between man and God,—for this is done by the emphatic σύ following, and we have ἄνθρωπε unemphatic in ch. 2:1), who art thou that repliest against (the ἀντί seems to imply contradiction, not merely dialogue: see besides reff., ἀνταπόκρισιν, Job 13:22, BCא) God?—implying, ‘thou hast neither right nor power, to call God to account in this manner.’

Notice, that the answer to the objector’s question does not lie in these vv. 20, 21, but in the following (see there);—the present verses are a rebuke administered to the spirit of the objection, which forgets the immeasurable distance between us and God, and the relation of Creator and Disposer in which He stands to us. So Chrys.,—καὶ οὐδὲ τὴν λύσιν εὐθέως ἐπάγει, συμφερόντως καὶ τοῦτο ποιῶν· ἀλλʼ ἐπιστομίζει πρῶτον τὸν ζητοῦντα, λέγων οὕτω μενοῦνγε … θεῷ; ποιεῖ δὲ τοῦτο, τὴν ἄκαιρον αὐτοῦ περιεργίαν ἀναστέλλων, κ. τὴν πολλὴν πολυπραγμοσύνην, κ. χαλινὸν περιτιθείς, κ. παιδεύων εἰδέναι τί μὲν θεὸς τί δὲ ἄνθρωπος, κ. πῶς ἀκατάληπτος αὐτοῦ ἡ πρόνοια, κ. πῶς ὑπερβαίνουσα τὸν ἡμέτερον λογισμόν, κ. πῶς ἅπαντα αὐτῷ πείθεσθαι δεῖ· ἵνα ὅταν τοῦτο κατασκευάσῃ παρὰ τῷ ἀκροατῇ, κ. καταστείλῃ κ. λεάνῃ τὴν γνώμην, τότε μετὰ πολλῆς εὐκολίας ἐπάγων τὴν λύσιν, εὐπαράδεκτον αὐτῷ ποιήσῃ τὸ λεγόμενον. Hom. xvi. p. 614. Similarly Calvin: ‘Hac priori responsione nihil aliud quam improbitatem illius blasphemiæ retundit, argumento ab hominis conditione sumpto. Alteram mox subjiciet, qua Dei justitiam ab omni criminatione vindicabit.’

Shall the thing formed (properly of a production of plastic art, moulded of clay or wax) say to him who formed it, “Why madest thou me thus?”

These words are slightly altered from Isa 29:16 LXX,—μὴ ἐρεῖ τὸ πλάσμα τῷ πλάσαντι αὐτό (om. αὐτό Aא), Οὐ σύ με ἔπλασας; ἢ τὸ ποίημα τῷ ποιήσαντι, Οὐ συνετῶς με ἐποίησας;

Or (introduces a new objection, or fresh ground of rebuke, see ch. 2:4; 3:29; 6:3; 11:2) hath not the potter power over the clay (the similitude from ref. Isa. In Sir. 36 (33) 13, we have a very similar sentiment: ὡς πηλὸς κεραμέως ἐν χειρὶ αὐτοῦ.… οὕτως ἄνθρωποι ἐν χειρὶ τοῦ ποιήσαντος αὐτούς. And even more strikingly so, Wisd. 15:7: καὶ γὰρ κεραμεὺς ἁπαλὴν γῆν θλίβων ἐπίμοχθον πλάσσει πρὸς ὑπηρεσίαν ἡμῶν ἕκαστον (ἓν ἕκ. א), ἀλλʼ ἐκ τοῦ αὐτοῦ πηλοῦ ἀνεπλάσατο τά τε τῶν καθαρῶν ἔργων δοῦλα σκεύη τά τε ἐναντία πάνθʼ (πάντα Aא) ὁμοίως· τούτων δὲ ἑκατέρου (ἑτέρου Bא3a, ἑτέρων א1) τίς ἑκάστου ἐστὶν ἡ (om. ἡ א) χρῆσις, κριτὴς ὁ πηλουργός. See also Jer 18:6), out of the same lump to make one vessel unto honour (honourable uses) and another unto dishonour (dishonourable uses. See ref. 2 Tim. The honour and dishonour are not here the moral purity or impurity of the human vessels, but their ultimate glorification or perdition. The Apostle in asking this question, rather aims at striking dumb the objector by a statement of God’s undoubted right, against which it does not become us men to murmur, than at unfolding to us the actual state of the case. This he does in the succeeding verses; see above, from Chrys. and Calv.)?

Henry Alford, The Greek Testament (1849–1861) — public domain. Text from a community e-Sword module.

19. ἐρεῖς μοι οὖν. Hardly are the last words ὃν δὲ θέλει σκληρύνει out of St. Paul’s mouth than he imagines his opponent in controversy catching at an objection, and he at once takes it up and forestalls him. By substituting this phrase for the more usual τί οὖν ἐροῦμεν, St. Paul seems to identify himself less with his opponent’s objection.

μοι οὖν is the reading of אc A B R, Orig 1/3 Jo.-Damasc.; οὖν μοι of the T. R. is supported by D E F G K L &c., Vulg. Boh., Orig. 2/3 and Orig.-lat. Chrys. Thdrt. It is the substitution of the more usual order.

τί ἔτι μέμφεται: ‘why considering that it is God who hardens me does He still find fault?’ Why does he first produce a position of disobedience to His will, and then blame me for falling into it? The ἔτι implies that a changed condition has been produced which makes the continuation of the previous results surprising. So Rom 3:7 εἰ δὲ ἡ ἀλήθεια τοῦ Θεοῦ ἐν τῷ ἐμῷ ψεύσματι ἀπερίσσευσεν εἰς τὴν δόξαν αὐτοῦ, τί ἔτι κάγὼ ὡς ἁμαρτωλὸς κρίνομαι; Rom 6:2 οἵτινες ἀπεθάνομεν τῇ ἁμαρτίᾳ, πῶς ἔτι ζήσομεν ἐν αὐτῇ;

τί ἔτι μέμφεται is read by T. R. and RV. with א A K L P &c., Vulg. Syrr. Boh., and many Fathers. B D EF G Orig.-lat. Hieron. insert οὖν after τί.

βουλήματι, which occurs in only two other passages in the N. T. (Act 27:43; 1Pe 4:3) seems to be substituted for the ordinary word θέλημα as implying more definitely the deliberate purpose of God.

ἀνθέστηκε. Perfect with present sense; cf. Rom 13:2 ὥστε ὁ ἀντιτασσόμενος τῇ ἐξουσίᾳ τῇ τοῦ Θεοῦ διαταγῇ ἀνθέστηκεν, Winer, § xl. 4, p. 342, E. T. The meaning is not: ‘who is able to resist,’ but ‘what man is there who is resisting God’s will?’ There is no resistance being offered by the man who disobeys; he is only doing what God has willed that he should do.

International Critical Commentary — older volumes (1896–1929), various authors — public domain. Text from a community e-Sword module.

Hath resisted [ανθεστηκεν] . Rev., more correctly, with - standeth. The idea is the result rather than the process of resistance. A man may resist God 's will, but cannot maintain his resistance. The question means, who can resist him?

Marvin R. Vincent, Word Studies in the New Testament (1887–1900) — public domain. Text from a community e-Sword/MySword module.

Vv. 19-21. “Thou wilt say then unto me, Why doth he yet find fault? For who can resist His will? Much rather, O man, who art thou that repliest against God? Shall the vessel of clay say to him that formed it, Why hast thou made me thus? Or hath not the potter power over the clay, of the same lump to make one vessel unto honor, and another unto dishonor?”

The word then proves that the interlocutor accepts the answer made to his first objection (Rom 9:14), but that he starts from it to raise a new one. The ἔτι, yet, after τί, signifies: yet, after hardening me. The verb μέμφεσθαι, to find fault, to speak with anger, applies to the perdition with which God threatens sinners who are hardened by Him. When He hardens any one, God cannot ask that he should not harden himself. The question, Who can resist His will? literally signifies, Who hath resisted, or rather Who resisteth?...For the perfect of the verb ἵστημι and its compounds has really the sense of the present: “I have placed myself there, and continue there.” It is therefore clear that the question: “Who is he that resisteth Him?” signifies: “Who is he that can resist Him?” Hofmann thinks that the interlocutor means: Who, in this case (that of my hardening), hath resisted God? Answer: “Nobody; for in hardening myself I have done nothing but obey Him.” This meaning is not impossible; it is ingenious, but more far-fetched than the preceding.

Frédéric Louis Godet — Commentaries on Luke, John, Romans, and 1 Corinthians — English translation (T&T Clark, Edinburgh, 1870s–1890s) — public domain. Text from a community e-Sword module.