Matthew 5:32

5:32 The exception clause permits but does not demand divorce when one partner has been unfaithful (see also 19:9). Notably, Jesus does not demand death for the guilty party (see Deut 22:21-22). • The implication seems to be that by divorcing his wife for illegitimate reasons, the man causes her to commit adultery by wrongly putting her in a situation where she remarries and so breaks the law. • anyone who marries a divorced woman: It is not clear whether Jesus is referring to any woman who is divorced, regardless of the reason, or only to a woman who is divorced without an acceptable reason (unfaithfulness). The underlying assumption in Jewish divorce law was simple: Legitimate divorces permitted remarriage.

Tyndale Open Study Notes — © Tyndale Open Resources, licensed CC BY-SA 4.0. Text via the HelloAO Bible API.

Mat 5:32. Λόγου, for the cause) The Hebrew דָּבָר corresponds to the Greek λόγος in the sense of a cause, why anything may be rightly done.[212]—ποιεῖ αὐτὴν μοιχᾶσθαι, makes her to commit adultery) sc. by other nuptials into which the divorce permits her to enter.—ἀπολελυμένην, one that has been divorced).

[212] These words, παρεκτὸς λόγου πορνείας, apply also to the following clause καὶ ὁ͂ς εἄν ἀπολελ. γαμ, and are to be supplied in it.—Vers. Germ.

Bengel's Gnomon of the New Testament — English translation (T&T Clark, Edinburgh, 1860) — public domain. Text from a community e-Sword module.

Mat_5:32. Παρεκτὸς λόγου πορν.] that is, except (see on 2Co_11:28) if an act of whoredom, committed by the woman during marriage (consequently adultery, Joh_8:41; Amo_7:17; Hos_3:3; Sir_26:9; Sir_14:12), is the motive (λόγος, comp. Thuc. i. 102, iii. 6, lxi. 4; and see on Act_10:29). In spite of the point of controversy which lies at the foundation, Paulus and Gratz are of opinionmost recently especially, Döllinger, Christenthum und Kirche, p. 392 ff., 460 ff., ed. 2 (comp. Baeumlein in the Stud. und Krit. 1857, p. 336)that by πορνεία, which does not mean adultery,[412] whoredom before marriage is meant, so that the man, instead of a virgin, receives one who is no longer so.[413] The correct view is already to be found in Tertullian, and in the whole old exegetical tradition, where, however, on the Catholic side, the permission was limited only to separation a toro et mensa. On the subject, comp. the explanation which was specially called forth on a later occasion, Mat_19:3 ff. But in Mar_10:11, Luk_16:18 (also 1Co_7:10 f.), this exception is not expressed, not as if Jesus had at the beginning made greater concessions to the pre-Christian Jewish marriages, and only at a later time completely denied the dissolubility of marriage (Hug, de conjugii christ. vinculo indissolub. 1816, who therefore declares, in Mat_19:9, μὴ ἐπὶ πορνείᾳ to be spurious), nor even as if that ΠΑΡΕΚΤῸς, Κ.Τ.Λ., were a later modification, and not originally spoken by Christ (Bleek, Wittichen, Weiss, Holtzmann, Schenkel, and others), but Mark and Luke regard this exception by itself, understanding it as a matter of course; and rightly so,[414] since adultery eo ipso destroys the essence of all marriage obligations; comp. Weiss in d. Zeitschr. f. christl. Wissensch. 1856, p, 261. But as the exception which Jesus here makes cannot become devoid of meaning by means of Lev_20:10 (in answer to Schegg, see Joh_8:3 ff.), so also it is not to be annulled on critical grounds, which in view of the witnesses is impossible (in answer to Keim here and on Mat_19:9). The second half of the verse also, καὶ ὃς, κ.τ.λ., cannot be condemned with Keim on the authority of D and Codd. in Augustine.

ΠΟΙΕῖ ΑὐΤῊΝ ΜΟΙΧᾶΣΘΑΙ] per alias nuptias, quarum potestatem dat divortium (Bengel), although, according to that principle, she is still the wife of the first husband; therefore the man also, if he marries again, ΜΟΙΧᾶΤΑΙ (Mat_19:9).

ΚΑΊ] not causal, but and, and on the other side.

μοιχᾶται] because he has intercourse with a person who, according to the divine law, is the wife of another. That by ἈΠΟΛΕΛΥΜΈΝΗΝ, a woman who is dismissed illegally, consequently not on account of adultery, is intended, was understood as a matter of course, according to the first half of the verse.

[412] It means in general every kind of whoredom (Dem. 403. 26, 433. 25, 612. 5). Where it specially refers to adultery (μοιχεία) this is clear from the context, as here and Mat_19:9. Thus, for example, it means also the idolatry of the people of God, because that is adultery against Jehovah, πορνεία, as in Hos_1:2; Eze_16:15; Eze_23:43.

[413] How can one seriously suppose that Jesus could have laid down so slippery an exception! indelicate, uncertain, unwise, a welcome opening to all kinds of severity and chicanery, especially considering the jealousy of the Jews. And the exception would have to hold good also in the case of marriages with widows!

[414] But by the circumstance that Jesus here expressly quotes as an exception this actual ground of separation, which was understood as a matter of course, He excludes every other (comp. especially Calovius); and it is incorrect to say that, while He grants one actual ground of separation, He still allows several others (Grotius, de Wette, Bleek, and others; comp. also Werner in d. Stud. u. Krit. 1858, p. 702 ff.), which is quite opposed to the point of view of moral strictness, from which He excepts only that case in which the actual dissolution of the marriage in its innermost nature is directly given.That Christ bases His answer on the question of divorce purely upon the nature of the divine ordinance of marriage as it was already given at the creation (una caro, Mat_9:5), not upon its object, is of decisive importance for the legislation in question, where we have also to observe that the altered form of divorce (the judicial) can make no change in the principles laid down by Jesus. Otherwise the legislation relating to marriage is driven on and on, by way of supposed consistency, to the laxity of the Prussian law and that of other lands (comp. the concessions of Bleek). Moreover, as regards malicious desertion, the declarations of Christ admit of application only so far as that desertion quoad formam, consequently according to its essential nature, is fully equivalent to adultery, which, however, must always be a question in each individual case. It cannot be shown from 1Co_9:15 that malicious desertion was regarded as a reason for dissolving Christian marriage. See on the passage.Of that case of separation, where the man commits adultery, Christ does not speak, because the law, which does not know of any dismissal of the man on the part of the woman, presented no occasion to it. But the application of the principle in the case of adultery on the part of the woman to that of the man as a ground of divorce rightly follows in accordance with the moral spirit of Jesus; comp. Mar_10:12; Gal_3:28; 1Co_11:11.

Meyer — Critical and Exegetical Commentary on the New Testament — English translation by Peter Christie, edited by Frederick Crombie (T&T Clark, 1880) — public domain. Text from a community e-Sword module.

But I say unto you, That whosoever shall put away his wife, saving for the cause of fornication, causeth her to commit adultery--that is, drives her into it in case she marries again.

and whosoever shall marry her that is divorced--for anything short of conjugal infidelity.

committeth adultery--for if the commandment is broken by the one party, it must be by the other also. But see on Mat 19:4-9. Whether the innocent party, after a just divorce, may lawfully marry again, is not treated of here. The Church of Rome says, No; but the Greek and Protestant Churches allow it.

Same Subject Illustrated from the Third Commandment (Mat 5:33-37).

Jamieson, Fausset & Brown — Commentary Critical and Explanatory on the Whole Bible (1871) — public domain (CC PDM 1.0). Text via the HelloAO Bible API.

Verse 32. Saving for the cause of fornication] λογου πορνειας, on account of whoredom. As fornication signifies no more than the unlawful connection of unmarried persons, it cannot be used here with propriety, when speaking of those who are married. I have therefore translated λογου πορνειας, on account of whoredom. It does not appear that there is any other case in which Jesus Christ admits of divorce. A real Christian ought rather to beg of God the grace to bear patiently and quietly the imperfections of his wife, than to think of the means of being parted from her. "But divorce was allowed by Moses;" yes, for the hardness of their hearts it was permitted: but what was permitted to an uncircumcised heart among the Jews, should not serve for a rule to a heart in which the love of God has been shed abroad by the Holy Spirit. Those who form a matrimonial connection in the fear and love of God, and under his direction, will never need a divorce. But those who marry as passion or money lead the way, may be justly considered adulterers and adulteresses as long as they live.

Adam Clarke's Commentary on the Bible (1810–1826) — public domain. Text from a community e-Sword/MySword module.

(32) Saving for the cause of fornication.—The most generic term seems intentionally used to include ante-nuptial as well as post-nuptial sin, possibly, indeed, with reference to the former only, seeing that the strict letter of the Law of Moses made death the punishment of the latter, and so excluded the possibility of the adultery of a second marriage. The words causeth her to commit adultery imply that the “putting away” was legally a divorce à vinculo, leaving the wife, and à fortiori the husband, at liberty to marry again; for otherwise she could not have incurred the guilt of adultery by a second marriage: but it asserts that in such a case, when divorce was obtained on any other ground than the specific sin which violated the essence of the marriage contract, man’s law (even that of Moses) was at variance with the true eternal law of God.

Whosoever shall marry her that is divorced.—The Greek is less definite, and may be rendered either “a woman who has been put away,” or better, “her when she has been put away.” Those who take the former construction, infer from it the absolute unlawfulness of marriage with a divorced woman under any circumstances whatever; some holding that the husband is under the same restrictions, i.e., that the vinculum matrimonii is absolutely indissoluble; while others teach that in the excepted case, both the husband and the wife gain the right to contract a second marriage. The Romish Church, in theory, takes the former view, the Greek and most Reformed Churches the latter; while some codes, like those of some countries in modern Europe, go back to the looser interpretation of Deu_24:1, and allow the divorce à vinculo for many lesser causes than incontinence. Of these contending views, that which is intermediate between the two extremes seems to be most in harmony with the true meaning of our Lord’s words. The words “put away” would necessarily convey to His Jewish hearers the idea of an entire dissolution of the marriage union, leaving both parties free to contract a fresh marriage; and if it were not so, then the case in which He specially permits that dissolution would stand on the same level as the others. The injured husband would still be bound to the wife who had broken the vow which was of the essence of the marriage-contract. But if he was free to marry again, then the guilt of adultery could not possibly attach to her subsequent marriage with another. The context, therefore, requires us to restrict that guilt to the case of a wife divorced for other reasons, such as Jewish casuistry looked on as adequate. This, then, seems the true law of divorce for the Church of Christ as such to recognise. The question as to how far national legislation may permit divorce for other causes, such as cruelty or desertion, seems to stand on a different footing, and must be discussed on different grounds. In proportion as the “hardness of heart” which made the wider license the least of two evils prevails now, it may be not only expedient, but right and necessary, though it implies a standard of morals lower than the law of Christ, to meet it, as it was met of old, by a like reluctant permission.

A Bible Commentary for English Readers, edited by Charles John Ellicott (1878–1897) — public domain. Text from a community e-Sword module.

32. causeth her to commit adultery] By adopting a slightly different reading in the original with Lachmann, Tischendorf, and Tregelles, the idea of wilful sin on the woman’s part is removed.

that is divorced] Lit. when she hath been divorced.

The Cambridge Bible for Schools and Colleges (gen. ed. J. J. S. Perowne; Cambridge University Press, 1878–1918) — public domain. Text from a community e-Sword module.

But I say unto you; that whosoever shall put away his wife,.... Christ does not infringe, or revoke the original grant, or permission of divorce; only frees it from the false interpretations, and ill use, the Pharisees made of it; and restores the ancient sense of it, in which only it was to be understood: for a divorce was allowable in no case,

saving for the cause of fornication; which must not be taken strictly for what is called fornication, but as including adultery, incest, or any unlawful copulation; and is opposed to the sense and practices of the Pharisees, who were on the side of Hillell: who admitted of divorce, upon the most foolish and frivolous pretences whatever; when Shammai and his followers insisted on it, that a man ought only to put away his wife for uncleanness; in which they agreed with Christ. For so it is written (i),

"The house of Shammai say, a man may not put away his wife, unless he finds some uncleanness in her, according to Deu 24:1 The house of Hillell say, if she should spoil his food, (that is, as Jarchi and Bartenora explain it, burns it either at the fire, or with salt, i.e. over roasts or over salts it,) who appeal also to Deu 24:1. R. Akiba says, if he finds another more beautiful than her, as it is said, Deu 24:1 "and it come to pass that she find no favour in his eyes."''

The commentators (k) on this passage say that the determination of the matter is, according to the school of Millell; so that, according to them, a woman might be put away for a very trivial thing: some difference is made by some of the Jewish doctors, between a first and second wife; the first wife, they say (l), might not be put away, but for adultery; but the second might be put away, if her husband hated her; or she was of ill behaviour, and impudent, and not modest, as the daughters of Israel. Now our Lord says, without any exception, that a man ought not to put away his wife, whether first or second, for any other reason than uncleanness; and that whoever does, upon any other account,

causeth her to commit adultery; that is, as much as in him lies: should she commit it, he is the cause of it, by exposing her, through a rejection of her, to the sinful embraces of others; and, indeed, should she marry another man, whilst he is alive, which her divorce allows her to do, she must be guilty of adultery; since she is his proper wife, the bond of marriage not being dissolved by such a divorce: and

whosoever shall marry her that is divorced, committeth adultery; because the divorced woman he marries, and takes to his bed; is legally the wife of another man; and it may be added, from Mat 19:9 that her husband, who has put her away, upon any other account than fornication, should he marry another woman, would be guilty of the same crime.

(i) Misn. Gittin, c. 9. sect. 10. Vid. T. Hieros. Gittin, fol. 49. 4. & Sota, fol. 16. 2. & Bemidbar Rabba, sect. 9. fol. 195. 2. (k) Maimon. & Bartenora in Gittin, c. 9. sect. 10. (l) T. Bab. Gittin, fol. 90. 2. Maimon. Hilch. Gerushin, c. 10. sect. 21, 22.

John Gill's Exposition of the Whole Bible (1746–1763) — public domain (CC PDM 1.0). Text via the HelloAO Bible API.

32 But I say unto you, That whosoever shall put away his wife, saving for the cause of fornication, causeth her to commit adultery: and whosoever shall marry her that is divorced committeth adultery.

Ver. 32. Saving for the cause of fornication] Taken in the largest sense for adultery also. Adulteriam est quasi ad alterum, aut alterius locum. (Becman de Originibus.) This sill strikes at the very sinew, heart, and life of the marriage knot, and dissolves it. Further, it directly lights against human society, which the law mainly respects, and was therefore to be punished with death, as a most notorious theft. "Master," say they, "this woman was taken in adultery, in the very act." In the very theft, saith the original (ετ αιτπφωρω, Joh 8:4), to intimate, belike, the great theft that is in adultery, while the child of a stranger carries away the goods or lands of the family. Neither may any conclude from our Saviour’s words to that woman, {Joh 8:11} "Neither do I condemn thee," that adultery is not to be punished; any more than he may, that inheritances are not to be divided, because Christ, who was no magistrate, would not divide them, Luk 12:14. The marriage bed is honourable, and should be kept inviolable; society and the purity of posterity cannot otherwise continue among men; which is well observed by divines to be the reason why adultery is named in the commandment, under it all uncleanness being forbidden; when yet other violations are more heinous, as sodomy and bestiality.

Causeth her to commit adultery] Because it is God that both maketh and keepeth the bonds of wedlock, which is therefore called, "the covenant of God," Pro 2:17. Covenants are either, 1. Religious, as when a man tieth himself by vow to God, to shun such a sin or do such a duty. 2. Civil, between man and man, as in our common contracts, bargains, and businesses. Or, 3. Mixed, that are made partly with God and partly with man. And of this sort is the marriage covenant, the parties thereby tie themselves first to God and then to one another. Hence it is that the knot is indissoluble, and cannot be undone or recalled at the pleasure of the parties that make it, because there is a third person engaged in the business, and that is God, to whom the bond is made; and if afterward they break, he will take the forfeiture. This David understood, and therefore upon his adultery cried out, "Against thee, thee only" (that is, chiefly) "have I sinned, and done this evil in thy sight," Psa 51:4. A sin it is against the Father, whose covenant is broken; against the Son, whose members are made the members of a harlot; and against the Holy Ghost, whose temple is defiled, 1Co 6:19.

John Trapp, A Commentary or Exposition upon All the Books of the Old and New Testament (1647–1656) — public domain. Text from a community e-Sword module.

Excepting the cause of fornication. A divorce or separation as to bed and board, may be permitted for some weighty causes in Christian marriage; but even then, he that marrieth her that is dismissed, commits adultery. As to this, there is no exception. The bond of marriage is perpetual; and what God hath joined, no power on earth can separate. See again Matthew xix. 9. (Witham) --- The know of marriage is so sacred a tie, that the separation of the parties cannot loosen it, it being not lawful for either of the parties to marry again upon a divorce. (St. Augustine, de bon. conjug. chap. vii.) (Bristow)

George Leo Haydock (1774–1849), Haydock's Catholic Family Bible and Commentary, 1859 edition — public domain. Excludes Psalms (Douay-Rheims chapter numbering differs from Protestant) and Deuterocanonical books (Catholic canon only).

32. But I say unto you — Our Lord has quoted the words of Moses, and seems to oppose them with this but. Yet it is not the law in its purity which he quotes and corrects. He does not oppose Moses. But what he does oppose and correct is that law as it is uttered by the mouth of those who quote it for licentious purposes, making it the means of all that dissoluteness described in our note on Mat_5:31. That licentiousness he corrects by limiting divorce to cases of adultery; or rather he restores this provision as the true intent of the law of Moses. Causeth her to commit adultery — The dismissing a wife for other cause than unfaithfulness, did not dissolve the marriage. Yet, as by unlawful custom she could marry again, in such cases the husband dismissing her occasioned the adultery. Whosoever shall marry her that is divorced — That is, thus unlawfully divorced, and so not divorced at all. Committeth adultery — By marrying her who is still bound by an unbroken marriage tie to her former husband, who has unlawfully dismissed her.

Daniel D. Whedon (gen. ed.), Commentary on the Old and New Testaments (1874–1909) — public domain. Text from a community e-Sword module.

For full notes, cf. Mat_19:9. Parallel passages: Mar_10:12 Luk_16:18; apparently the context of Mark represents Mat_19:1-8, and the context of Luke rather represents Mat_5:18. Notice here:

(1) Matthew alone, in both places, gives the exception of fornication.

(2) St. Paul refers in 1Co_7:10, 11 to this saying of our Lord"s.

(3) The laxity in this matter of the Hillel school of the Pharisees is well known.

Their theory, indeed, sounds good, viz. that there should be perfect unity in the marriage state; but starting from this premise they affirmed that if in any single respect the unity was not attained, divorce might follow. For examples, see Lightfoot ("Hor. Hebr."). Our Lord upholds the school of Shammai. It is said that shameful laxity in divorce still exists among Oriental Jews. Fornication. The reference is to sin after marriage. Contrast Deu_22:20, Deu_22:21, where the husband"s action is not thought of as divorce. The more general word (porneia) is used, because it lays more stress on the physical character of the sin than moiceia would have laid. Causeth her to commit adultery; Revised Version, maketh her an adulteress, since the right reading, moiceuyhnai , connotes being sinned against rather than sinning (Received Text, moicasyai). (For the thought, Rom_7:3) And whosoever shall marry, etc. Bracketed by Westcott and Hort, as omitted by certain "Western" authorities (especially D and Old Latin manuscripts). (On the importance of the "Western" group in cases of omission, vide Westcott and Hort, 2. cf. also Mat_9:34, note.) The clause closely resembles cf. Luk_16:18. Her that is divorced; i.e. under these wrong conditions, as Revised Version, her when put away. even though authn is not expressed. This interpretation, notwithstanding Weiss"s stigma of it as "ganz willkurlich," is surely only a plain deduction from the preceding clause. The fact that no such limitation is to be found in Luk_16:18 must not prejudice our judgment here.

The Pulpit Commentary (1880–1919), ed. H.D.M. Spence-Jones & Joseph S. Exell — public domain. Text from a community e-Sword module.

Causeth her to commit adultery - If she marry again.

John Wesley, Explanatory Notes Upon the Whole Bible (1754–1765) — public domain. Text via the GEBible commentary corpus.

32. μοιχευθῆναι for μοιχᾶσθαι. The change to the passive is supported by א B D and approves itself as the truer to fact, but perhaps for that very reason is open to some suspicion.

32. παρεκτός. A rare word in N.T. and condemned by the Atticists. See Sturz, Dial. Mac. 210.

λόγου πορνείας. A Hebraism, ‘the case of adultery.’

ἀπολελυμένην, ‘when she hath been divorced.’

Cambridge Greek Testament for Schools and Colleges (Cambridge University Press, 1896; 21 vols, various authors incl. Carr, Maclear, Plummer, Farrar, Lumby, Moule, M. R. James, Simcox) — public domain. Text from a community e-Sword module.

32.] Third example. The law of divorce. See note on ch. 19:7-9. Lightfoot, Hor. Hebr., gives a form of the ἀποστάσιον, which was a divorcement a vinculo matrimonii, and placed the woman absolutely in her own power, to marry whom she pleased, unless the husband inserted a special clause to bar this. In Deu 24:1, the allowable reason of divorce is ‘some uncleanness.’ This the disciples of Shammai interpreted only of adultery; those of Hillel of any thing which amounted to uncleanness in the eyes of the husband.

32.] πορνείας must be taken to mean sin, not only before marriage, but after it also, in a wider sense, as including μοιχεία likewise. In the similar places, Mar 10:11: Luk 16:18, this exception does not occur; see however our ch. 19:9. Chrysostom explains the connexion of this verse with the former to be, ἵνα γὰρ μὴ ἀκούσας Ἔξελε τὸν ὀφθαλμόν, νομίσῃς καὶ περὶ γυναικὸς ταῦτα λέγεσθαι, εὐκαίρως ἐπήγαγε τὴν ἐπιδιόρθωσιν ταύτην, ἑνὶ τρόπῳ μόνῳ συγχωρῶν ἐκβάλλειν αὐτήν, ἑτέρῳ δὲ οὐδενί. Hom. xvii. 4, p. 228. The figurative senses of πορνεία cannot be admissible here, as the law is one having reference to a definite point in actual life; and this its aim and end restricts the meaning to that kind of πορνεία immediately applicable to the case. Otherwise this one strictly guarded exception would give indefinite and universal latitude.

ποιεῖ αὐτ. μοιχ.] ‘Per alias nuptias, quarum potestatem dat divortium.’ Bengel.

καὶ ὃς ἐάν] How far the marriage of the innocent party after separation (on account of πορνεία) is forbidden by this or the similar passage ch. 19:9, is a weighty and difficult question. By the Roman Church such marriage is strictly forbidden, and the authority of Augustine much cited, who strongly upholds this view, but not without misgivings later in life. ‘Scripsi duos libros de conjugiis adulterinis, … cupiens solvere difficillimam quæstionem. Quod utrum enodatissime fecerim nescio; immo vero non me pervenisse ad hujus rei perfectionem sentio.’ Retract. ii. 57, vol. i. On the other hand, the Protestant and Greek Churches allow such marriage. Certainly it would appear, from the literal meaning of our Lord’s words (if ἀπολελ. be taken as perfectly general), that it should not be allowed: for if by such divorce the marriage be altogether dissolved, how can the woman be said μοιχᾶσθαι by a second marriage? or how will St. Paul’s precept (1Co 7:11) find place, in which he says, ἐὰν δὲ καὶ χωρισθῇ, μενέτω ἄγαμος ἢ τῷ ἀνδρὶ καταλλαγήτω? for stating this as St. Paul does, prefaced by the words οὐκ ἐγώ, ἀλλʼ ὁ κύριος, it must be understood, and has been taken, as referring to this very verse, or rather (see note in loc.) to ch. 19:6ff., and consequently can only suppose πορνεία as the cause. Besides which, the tenor of our Lord’s teaching in other places (see above) seems to set before us the state of marriage as absolutely indissoluble as such, however he may sanction the expulsion a mensâ et thoro of an unfaithful wife. Those who defend the other view suppose the ἀπολελυμένην to mean, when unlawfully divorced, not for πορνεία: and certainly this is not improbable (see below). We may well leave a matter in doubt, of which Augustine could write thus: ‘In ipsis divinis sententiis ita obscurum est utrum et iste, cui quidem sine dubio adulteram licet dimittere, adulter tamen habeatur si alteram duxerit, ut, quantum existimo, venialiter ibi quisque fallatur.’ De Fide atq. c. 19 (35), vol. vi. Meyer gives as a reason for believing ἀπολελ. to refer only to the unlawfully divorced: “ἀπολελ. is not qualified (cf. παρεκτὸς λόγου πορνείας), because the punishment of death was attached to adultery (Lev 20:10: Michaelis, Mos. Recht § 260 ff.), and consequently under the law the marrying a woman divorced for adultery could never happen.” Stier says in a note to his 2nd edn.: “We hold it clear that ἀπολ. can only refer to the woman unlawfully divorced, and then there is no prohibition of the second marriage of one divorced on account of adultery; we see here nothing at all ‘obscurum,’ as Augustine in the passage cited by Alford.” (I may remark, that ἀπολελυμένην is most naturally rendered, “her, when divorced:” not “a divorced woman,” as Wordsw. It is a secondary predicate, of which the subject is to be supplied out of αὐτήν above. Still less of course is it to be rendered “the divorced woman,” τὴν ἀπολελυμένην. And thus understood, the saying concerning marriage after divorce applies only, as far as this passage is concerned, to unlawful divorce, not to that after πορνεία.)

Henry Alford, The Greek Testament (1849–1861) — public domain. Text from a community e-Sword module.

(L) 32. But I say to you, That every one who puts away his wife, except on account of fornication, causes her to commit adultery: and whosoever marries her that has been put away commits adultery.] Cf. Luk 16:18.—παρεκτὸς λόγου πορνείας] λόγου πορνείας is probably equivalent to the Heb. דבר ערוה= “something unchaste,” which the school of Shammai decreed to be the only ground of divorce; cf. Gittin 90 a1 “No one shall divorce his wife unless there be found in her something unchaste.” πορνεία defines the unchastity as illicit sexual intercourse. It is, however, open to question whether this exception is not an addition of the editor, representing no doubt two influences, viz. Jewish custom and tradition, and the exigencies of ethical necessity in the early Christian Church. A similar exception is made in 19:9, and it will there be seen that the clause is clearly an interpolation. There is, therefore, a presumption that it has also been interpolated here. Moreover, the teaching of Christ as recorded by S. Mark (10:11) seems to preclude any such exception. And S. Luke represents His teaching as a simple prohibition of divorce without reservation (16:18). The same may be said of S. Paul’s account of Christ’s teaching, 1Co 7:10, 1Co 7:11.—ποιεῖ σὐτὴν μοιχευθῆναι]. The clause implies the circumstance that after divorce the woman will be likely to marry again. In that case the divorce will have been the means of leading her to marry again; and so from Christ’s standpoint, though not legally, committing adultery, because according to His teaching the divorce was ideally wrong, and the first marriage was ideally still valid.—ὃς ἐάν] cf. Moulton, 42 ff.—μοιχᾶται] because she is ideally still the wife of the first husband. Christ’s teaching here therefore seems to admit of no exceptions. If a man divorces his wife, he causes her to commit adultery (it being presupposed that she will remarry), because ideally her first marriage still holds good. If a man marries such a divorced woman, he not only causes her to commit adultery, but himself does so, since he marries one who ideally is still the wife of her first husband. The interpolated clause confuses the issues. If a man divorced his wife for πορνεία, he would not then cause her to commit adultery, because she would already be guilty of this crime.

32. πᾶς ὁ ἁπολύων] So א B al ὃς ἄν ἀπολύσῃ has strong second century attestation, D S1 S2 k. The first reading might be due to assimilation to vv. 22, 28, the second to assimilation to v. 31. But in a writer fond of sharp, antithesis, the second reading is more probable here, to contrast with v. 31 cf. Introduction, p. xxxi.—καὶ ὂς ἐὰν—μοιχᾶται] Omit D a b k.

International Critical Commentary — older volumes (1896–1929), various authors — public domain. Text from a community e-Sword module.