Romans 2:14

(14) A sort of parenthesis begins here. Rom_2:16 refers back to the main subject of the paragraph, and not to the particular point on which the Apostle digresses in Rom_2:14-15, the virtual operation of law among the Gentiles as well as Jews.

By nature.—Spontaneously; of their own motion; not acting under the coercion of any external rule, but simply by the promptings of their own conscience left to itself.

The things contained in the law.—Literally, the things of the law. In this one instance the article is used, meaning, however, not “the law of Moses,” but “of this law,” or “of such law”—i.e., the ideal law spoken of just before.

A Bible Commentary for English Readers, edited by Charles John Ellicott (1878–1897) — public domain. Text from a community e-Sword module.

Rom_2:14-15

For when the Gentiles, which have not the law, do by nature the things contained in the law, these … are a law unto themselves.

Man without the Bible

Law means Gods special revelation through the Bible. This contains the moral code of Moses, exhibited in prophetic teaching, inculcated in the instructions, illustrated in the life and death of Christ: It is here suggested that man without the Bible--

I. Has Bible morality written on his spiritual nature.

1. The law written in their hearts. The great cardinal principles of morality are in every mans soul, and the ethics of the Bible are but a transcript of them. Christ, who was the living exemplar of the moral code of the universe, reduced it to supreme love for the great Father of all and unselfish love for all His children; and in every heart these two elements are found--moral reasoning and conduct. Socrates speaks of the unwritten laws which were held in every country, and mentions as samples honour to parents and the prohibition of incest. He says that since these laws are universally held, and are evidently not the result of human legislation, they must have been made by the gods. Sophocles speaks of the unwritted and indelible laws of the gods in the hearts of man, and Plutarch of a law which is not outwardly written in books, but implanted in the heart of man. The moral Governor of the universe, then, has written in the constitution of all the subjects of His empire the eternal laws that should govern them.

II. Can put into practice in his daily life the Bible morality that is written on his nature. For when the Gentiles, etc., are a law unto themselves. Do by nature, i.e., by the outworking of those moral elements within them--not by written directions, but by moral intuitions. The bee that constructs her cells and lays up honey proves thereby the existence within her of architectural principles. She works out the laws which her Maker imprinted upon her constitution. Thus, heathens who have no Bible can work out the moral principles of their nature, and often do to an extent that may well out to blush the conduct of those who possess a written revelation. In estimating their responsibility it is well to remember both I and

II. They are rather the objects, therefore, of honest denunciation than of sentimental pity if they pursue an immoral or ungodly life.

III. Will be inwardly happy or miserable as he puts in practice or otherwise the Bible morality written on his nature. Their conscience also bearing witness, etc.

1. Psychologists supply different and conflicting definitions of conscience. Is it a distinct faculty of the soul, or its substratum--that in which all the faculties inhere? Whatever it is, it is that within us which concerns itself, not with the truth or falsehood of propositions or the expediency or inexpediency of actions, but with the right and wrong of conduct. If a heathen acts up to his ideas of right, it blesses him with peace; if he does not, it scourges him with anguish.

2. The accusing power of conscience was seen in the Pharisees who brought to Jesus the woman taken in adultery (Joh_8:9); in Felix, when he trembled before Paul the prisoner; in Pilate, when he called for a basin of water to wash his hands.

3. Conscience can excuse, i.e., make righteous allowances; she vindicates as well as condemns. Who can tell the sacred calm which fills the soul when Conscience, sitting on her great white throne, pronounces the sentence of approval of any one single act or thought, and assures the misunderstood, or misrepresented, or calumniated, or even self-doubting servant of God, Herein you are free from blame?

Conclusion: Several things may be deduced from this subject.

1. The identity in authorship of human souls and Divine revelation. The grand rudimental subjects of the Bible are love, retribution, God; and these are written in ineffaceable characters on the tables of the human heart everywhere.

2. The impossibility of atheism ever being established in the world. The human soul is essentially theistic and religious.

3. The responsibility of man wherever he is found.

4. The duty of missionaries in propagating the gospel. Let those who go forth to the heathen not ignore the good in the human heart on all shores and under all suns, but let them--

(1) Recognise it;

(2) honour it;

(3) appeal to it; and

(4) develop it. (D. Thomas, D. D.)

Gentile obedience to the law

They do (literally) the things which are of the law, i.e., which are agreeable to its prescriptions. They do not observe the precept as such, for they have it not, but they fulfil its contents; e.g., Neoptolimus in Philoctetes, when he refuses to save Greece at the expense of a lie; or Antigone, when she does not hesitate to violate the temporary law of the city to fulfil the law of fraternal love; or Socrates, when he refuses to save his life by escaping from prison, in order to remain subject to the magistrates. Sophocles speaks of these eternal laws, and contrasts this internal and Divine legislation with the ever-changing laws of man. (Prof. Godet.)

The natural feeling of right and wrong: its analysis

These verses reveal that feeling in three states or stages.

1. The unconscious stage, in which the Gentiles not having the law show its real though latent existence in their own hearts, of which--

2. They have a faint though instinctive perception in the witness of conscience, which--

3. Grows by reflection into distinct approval or disapproval of their own acts and those of others. (Prof. Jowett.)

Natural morality

1. It is a common impression that we are dependent for all our knowledge of moral duty upon the Bible, or at least that there are no motives to moral goodness worth speaking of apart from it: But just think what the latter means. It means that unless a man has faith in God, reverence for His authority, dread of His anger and desire of His approval, there is no strong motive to prevent him from being a liar and a villain. The former lands us in still more startling results, viz., that a man who has not, or disbelieves in, the Bible cannot see that lying, etc., are bad things, and that truthfulness, etc., are good things, i.e., that he can see no difference between vice and virtue. But you know that among your own acquaintances there are nonreligious men who abhor lying, etc., as much as you do, and in the old heathen world there were illustrious examples of lofty virtue.

2. Christ has ennobled our conception of morality and brought new motives and aids to right-doing, but He always assumed that man had a knowledge of duty and recognised its authority. The gospel itself assumes this, for it is a declaration that God is willing to forgive sin; but it could have no meaning for men who did not know that they had done wrong. If the natural conscience were murdered, and men lost the distinction between right and wrong, the gospel would have nothing to take hold of.

3. Some say that religions faith is the foundation of morals: it would be nearer the truth to speak of morals as the foundation of religion; for the grounds of our trust in God are not His infinite power, which, if not governed by justice and goodness, would fill us with terror, nor His infinite knowledge, which might fill us with wonder but could not command affection and confidence--we trust and reverence Him because of His righteousness, truth, and love--his moral perfections, which we see are admirable in themselves. We cannot trust God until we know that He is trustworthy.

4. St. Paul believed that heathens not only knew many of their duties, but discharged them. The subject is not a speculative one merely. One great defeat of the Evangelical revival was that it failed to afford its converts a lofty ideal of practical righteousness and a vigorous moral training, with the result that Evangelical Christians have the poorest conceptions of moral duty and the weakest moral strength. To remedy this defect we must think more about Christian ethics, which we cannot do to any good purpose unless we begin with St. Paul by recognising the power which belongs to man to distinguish between right and wrong.

5. This power is one of the noblest of our prerogatives, but it is forgotten that, like every other faculty, it needs training. Many suffer from colour blindness, but experiments have proved that this arises, not from any disease or malformation of the eye, but from want of education; and it has been cured by teaching the colour alphabet. Skeins of wool of different colours have been displayed and their differences slowly learnt. Most of us learn this without systematic instruction, but drapers and milliners, who have to notice the finer gradations of tints, obtain the power of discriminating the difference between shades of blue and scarlet which seem to ordinary eyes alike. Their eyes are not better than ours, but they have been better taught. And so most of us, if we have lived among good people, learn without regular teaching to distinguish in a rough way between right and wrong. But if the conscience is to have a keen vision, and if its discrimination between right and wrong is to be unaffected by the cross lights of interest and passion, it must be more perfectly trained, and surely it is worth it; and if you are careful to train your childs memory and voice, why not its conscience, which is infinitely more deserving of your care?

6. There is a bad way of teaching morals as there is of teaching arithmetic. In a bad school the rule is given and the child works his sum blindly, accepting the rule on the authority of the teacher. If his mind is sharp, he may puzzle out its reason; if not, he is left to mark it in the dark. So some people teach morality. They give the child Gods rules of conduct, and happily the conscience may discover for itself their nobleness; but if it does, no thanks to the teacher. Having been told the rule, the child is warned that God will punish disobedience; but if from this motive only the rule is obeyed, it is not obedience, but servile superstition. The appeal to Gods authority should only be occasional, or the moral sense will be disabled or checked in its growth by so tremendous a conception. When we follow a guide who never leaves us we are likely to take no notice of the path, and our knowledge of it will be no greater at the end than at the beginning.

7. For the education of the conscience we need teaching that is really moral, and not religious, that trains the mind to recognise for itself the obligation to do right because it is right. The vessel of human nature, when exposed to storms of temptation, needs more than one strong cable. Religious faith is the great security; but all the anchors are sometimes wanted, and we have no right to refuse the aid of such guarantees of safety as a genuine love of righteousness for its own sake, a deep hatred of wrong, a dread of moral shame. It is, however, alleged that apart from the Divine authority it is impossible to enforce the obligations of virtue. The objection is put in this form: You say to a boy that he ought to tell the truth; suppose he asks, Why? what can you answer except that God commands it? But suppose the boy asks, Why should I do what God commands? will you say that because if he does not he will be punished?--a very mean and sandy foundation for morals, for it is no mans duty to do anything simply because he will suffer for not doing it. A rule must be right in itself, or else it is a crime to punish men for disobeying it, If a child asks, Why ought I to obey God or to tell the truth? you must answer, Because you ought. But neither question will be asked if we have done our duty by our children. If they have learnt from us who God is, if they have heard us speak of Him with reverence and trust and love, they will know that they ought to obey Him; and if we are truthful at the impulse of a hearty love and admiration for truth, and put in their way stories about heroic truthfulness, they will know for themselves that lying is wrong and shameful.

8. I have pleaded for the education of the conscience in the interest of morality; I also plead for it in the interest of religion. Why should I trust, obey, and worship God? Because I ought. And wherever that answer is not given by the human soul, no appeal to hope or fear or gratitude will be effective. Mere terror is not without its uses. It may break the strong cords of immoral habits and paralyse for a time the baser passions, and may so give the conscience which has been trampled under the brutal hoofs of insolent vice the chance of asserting its authority. But I believe that as a general rule the nobler power has been in alliance with the terror from the very first. However this may be, I do not believe that religious faith can have any secure hold of man except it is confederate with conscience; and a man who has learned to revere his minister is most likely to revere God Himself. (R. W. Dale, LL. D.)

The moral constitution of man

The question which the apostle was obliged to argue was largely the condition of the heathen world. He argues both sides of it; and in chap. 1 that they were to be condemned on substantially moral grounds, and that yet they must be condemned in much less measure than the Jews--a peculiarly offensive turn to the argument, because the Jew held that he had a right to superiority before God, no matter how he lived. The fact that men were now Jews, though they might be virtuous and devout, was enough. The apostle, therefore, is obliged to go against this stupid bigotry: It is not they that hear the law that are the safest, but they that do it. Ah! but the Gentiles never had it, and of course they did not do it. But, says Paul, nevertheless, if they do those things under the light of nature which the law commands, that shall suffice. If you, with the law, sin, and they sin without it, they will stand, for that very reason, higher than you do. This question, historically considered, was local, but the apostle settles it upon a ground which makes it universal; for he here takes ground with the moral constitution of man--that man has in himself, not as a full revelation, but in a rudimentary form, an interpreting nature, by which he knows what is right and wrong, by which he accuses or excuses his conduct. He declares that men receive a revelation, not for the sake of creating a moral sense, but for the sake of guiding a moral sense already created; that religion is not a thing superinduced upon the moral constitution of man, but the right unfolding of that constitution. Let us follow this line out.

1. The essential truths of religion are natural, constitutional, organic. They were not first created when declared by inspired men. Mental philosophy does not create mind, and the law of conscience did not create conscience. All those great Bible truths which involve the nature of right and wrong, of inferiority and superiority, of submission, of obligation--all that goes to constitute what we call moral sense--has a foundation in the nature of things; and if man only had the wisdom to know what he was and how to unfold his moral constitution, every man would work from his own moral consciousness to substantially the same ground which is open to him in Scripture. So that, when I preach the gospel, particularly in its relations to duty and obligation, I feel strong, not only because I believe the Word of God, but because, tracing the Word back, I find it written again in you. Studying man as I do, and studying the Word of God, I find the two are respectively witnesses of each other, and both together are stronger than either alone; and all the way through the Word of God appeals to this consciousness of men to bear witness to its essential truth.

2. On the other hand, a right-minded man, if he had no revelation, but had power to keep his mind clear and sensitive and his conduct in harmony with his higher nature, would go up on to the plane of the gospel. Hence, the gospel is not a super addition to nature. It is the opening of nature, the blossom of that which belongs to the race; nature being understood to mean, for the most part, that condition which God first intended.

3. From this fundamental view, it will appear right and wrong in human conduct, in the main, are not conventional, not things of mere custom. There are a thousand things in life which may be changed, and which are different in different nations. But the great fundamental principles of right and wrong--truth, justice, purity, and love--these are the same in every age and everywhere. It makes no difference how much men may philosophise about them. A man may have any theory he pleases of digestion, but digestion does what it pleases. A man may believe that there is a brain in his head, or that there is nothing in it; but his belief makes no difference with the facts. And so with moral theories: they touch not moral facts in the least degree.

4. Men are not released from obligations to virtue and religion simply by keeping away from the church, etc. There are many who think that if they shut out disturbing truths they will have rest. No. The Word of God comes as your friend to help you, by giving you the state of facts; but if you throw the facts away, you simply throw the help away. A man lies sick, and sends for his physician. The physician prescribes such and such remedies, and forbids the use of such and such articles of food, etc., etc. But after the physician has gone the man says to his attendant, Go, tell him not to come again--to keep his advice and his medicines away. And then he says, There! I have dismissed my doctor. If you could only dismiss your disease as easily as you can your doctor, it would be all very well; but to dismiss your doctor and keep your disease is not wise. The fever is a fact, and does not depend on quarrelling schools of medicine. A man says, The Churches are all by the ears, and I am going to take my own way. I will manage my case myself. You may in that way get rid of Churches and of a thousand disagreeable circumstances; but will any men get rid of that nature in which the law is written, Thou shalt love the Lord thy God with all thy heart, etc., and thy neighbour as thyself? Go out, now, into the world to get gain, to be happy. Wind yourself up with the key of selfishness. Try to make your own powers serve you faithfully in harmony with each other. They are at a jangle with themselves. And you are not any better off because you have put the Church away from you; for the obligations rest not on the Church, but on you. Not they alone who have made a profession of religion are bound by its duties: they are binding upon every man. A man does not see any better for being in an oculists establishment. The necessity or the desirableness of his seeing does not arise from the fact that he is there, but from the nature of things. And if a man has ophthalmia the necessities of his eye and the laws of sight are just the same as though he were under medical treatment and care. And yet there are people who seem to think that of course a man ought to do certain things because he is a member of the Church. No, the obligations came long before the Church could have imposed them upon him. You say, I am not a member of the Church, and you ought not to expect that of me. But are you not born? Have you not that law of God written in you? I preach right, purity, holiness to you, because you are men. If you had never seen a Bible, these obligations would have rested on you by the very primal conditions of your creation.

5. There is an impression among many that freedom is gained by going out of the sphere of religious teaching into infidelity; and they laugh and say, I used to feel guilty if I broke the Sabbath, but I do not now; I used to think that I ought to pray, but prayer is a superstition. And so men go on setting aside point after point of fundamental religious belief; and they think they are becoming more and more free, and they ridicule Christians, whom they think to be bound hand and foot. Now, I do not say that the Churches have the perfect view of religion; but I do affirm that the faith which is held by all Christians is in the main a guide and a light. You and another man are walking in a troublous path. There are precipices on the right and left, and deep morasses below. Your companion is walking with a little lantern, containing only a tallow candle, and, taking one step at a time, manages to pick his way, though with some difficulty. You, who are so bold as to venture without any light, say to him, Your tallow candle makes a miserable pretence of giving light; of all absurd things, the greatest is the attempt to make ones way through the world with such a light as that; and you knock it into the mud. It may be that the lantern could have been improved; but is it improved by darkness? Now the man has nothing to guide himself with. The light he had was feeble, but it was enough to guide him safely; and now he makes a misstep, and plunges headlong down the precipice and perishes. Suppose all is true that you say of Churches: after all, are they not better than nothing? Do not they attempt to take hold of those fundamental instincts which belong to men, and which must be cared for and satisfied? And do not they go a certain way toward satisfying them? And does not infidelity bring men into bondage and darkness instead of into liberty and light?

6. By throwing off religious faith and the restraint of the Church men do not escape conviction of sin, nor a sense of guilt, nor unhappiness (Rom_1:20). If there were not a Church, nor a Bible, nor a teacher; if there were nothing but the sun and the stars and the rolling seasons; and if there were but a single man living, he would be without excuse; for God has made the heavens and the glimmering light of nature, and these are enough to hold a man responsible for his character and conduct. And then in the text he says, When the Gentiles which have not the law, etc. There is no man of any degree of reflectiveness or sensibility who is not made unhappy in himself by the way in which he is living. In the excitement of a career of business, in the intoxication of pleasure, men drown their unhappiness; but the moment there comes a leisure moment there comes a time for thought. A mans reason looks over his life, and he says, I have toiled fifty years, and I have built my house and furnished it, and I have a place among men; but, after all, what am I profited? If I might live again, would I live over the same life? Have I satisfied my early aspirations, realised my own ideal? Or, if he looks more closely at himself, he says, Am I selfish, or am I not? I have learned to wield the pen; I know how to paint; I can carve; I am able to build a house; I can handle the sword; I have power to manage anything in this world almost; but myself I cannot manage. My conscience jangles with my feelings; I am often carried away by temptation. Everything is wrong. There is nothing that I make such poor business in dealing with as myself. A man reads this, not out of the Bible, but out of his own soul. And if a mans faculties do not live in harmony, then his own thoughts accuse him, and his judgment judges him, and his moral sense brings him under condemnation. It is in such cases that the gospel way is shown to men; and though they may set aside the revelation of mercy, they cannot set aside this judgment that is perpetually going on in their consciences.

7. The gradation in condemnation is a matter for thought. Those who have been taught the truth, and who then sin, are condemned in the greatest measure. But let no man say, I was born of ignorant parents, remote from instruction, and I cannot be condemned. According to your measure you will be condemned; but the lowest grade of condemnation will be more than you can bear. No one can afford to be sick. All the contrivances of nature have never made anybody attempt to be sick. You can make the body love odious things, you can modify the digestive powers, but no sort of treatment ever made sickness an agreeable thing. And by no means can a soul that is out of order be happy. There is a condemnation that rests upon it just so long as it is in that state. And now comes the declaration of the gospel, Except a man be born again, etc. It rests not alone upon those that have been instructed, but upon everybody.

8. This moral constitution is not a mere thing of time. It is not an arrangement for a special occasion, not for a transitory scene. The testimony of the Saviour and the New Testament all through is that right and wrong are eternal; that the moral constitution which divided men in this world divides them in the other. As on the one hand he that in this world loves, seeks, and so far as in him lies does the right, goes on forever with increasing blessedness, so, on the other hand, he who in this world perverts his body and soul grows worse and worse; and the evil effects of his misspent life do not drop off from him when he dies, but go on with him. You are not sinful, then, because you have been preached to or because the Bible says so and so, but on account of the perversion of that nature which God gave you. But when an offer is made to you of pardon for the past, and God in His infinite mercy through Jesus Christ gives you a remedy for your sins thus far if you will forsake that which is evil, if you turn away from Him you are destroyed. Men are very much like lunatics in hospitals. All their wants are provided for, and yet they set fire to the institution and burn it up. They are not made well by this deed. It is simply a part of their insanity to do it. (H. W. Beecher.)

The Biblical Illustrator, edited by Joseph S. Exell (c. 1880s–1900s) — public domain. Text from a community e-Sword module.

Rom 2:14-15. For when the Gentiles — That is, any of them who have not the law — Not a written revelation of the divine will; do by nature — That is, by the light of nature, without an outward rule, or by the untaught dictates of their own minds, influenced, however, by the preventing grace of God, which hath appeared to all men, Tit 2:11; or, the true light, which lighteth every man that cometh into the world: the things contained in the law — The moral duties required by the precepts of the law, the ten commandments being only the substance of the law of nature. These, not having the written law, are a law unto themselves — That is, what the law was to the Jews, they are by the light and grace of God to themselves, namely, a rule of life. All the ancient Greek commentators, as Whitby has shown, interpreted this passage not of the Gentiles who had been converted to Christianity, but of those Gentiles who had not been favoured with a revealed law, and therefore were neither proselytes to Judaism nor Christianity. Who show — To themselves and others, and, in a sense, to God himself, the work of the law — In its most important moral precepts, in the substance, though not in the letter of them; written in their hearts — By the same divine hand which wrote the commandments on the tables of stone; their conscience also bearing witness — For or against them, or testifying how far they have complied with their light or law. There is not one of all its faculties which the soul has less in its power than this. And their thoughts — Or their reasonings or reflections upon their own conduct; the meanwhile — Or, as the expression, μεταξυ αλληλων, is translated in the margin, between themselves, or by turns, according as they do well or ill; accusing — Checking and condemning them when they have acted contrary to their light; or else excusing — Approving and justifying them when they have conformed to it. Hence the apostle meant it to be inferred, that it was not the having, or knowing the law, (Rom 2:13,) nor the condemning others for the transgression of it, could avail a man, but the doing of it, or walking according to it. We may observe further on this verse, that, as the law in this context signifies divine revelation, the work of the law must be men’s duty, which revelation discovers by its precepts, which is also in part discovered by men’s natural reason and conscience, influenced by the light and grace of God; on which account it is said to be written on their hearts. Thus, in the compass of two verses, the apostle hath explained what the light of nature is, and demonstrated that there is such a light existing. It is a revelation from God written originally on the heart or mind of man; consequently is a revelation common to all nations; and, so far as it goes, it agrees with the things written in the external revelation which God hath made to some nations. We are compelled, however, when we come to consider matters of fact, to acknowledge that this light of nature has been dreadfully obscured and corrupted, even in the most learned and civilized heathen nations upon earth, as the apostle has proved at large in the latter part of the preceding chapter. And long before the ages referred to by him, All flesh had corrupted its way, Gen 6:5; Gen 6:11; darkness covered the earth, and gross darkness the people, Isa 60:2; there was none that understood, (Rom 3:11;) and all were alienated from the life of God, through the ignorance that was in them, Eph 4:18, &c.

Joseph Benson's Commentary on the Old and New Testaments (1811–1818) — public domain. Text from a community e-Sword module.

2:14-15 The Gentiles who know his law when they instinctively obey it may be Gentile Christians, especially since written in their hearts (2:15) alludes to the prophecy of the new covenant (Jer 31:31-34). Or they could be non-Christian Gentiles who know God’s general moral law through their consciences. In this case, Paul would be using the notion of natural law to show how all people could be held accountable for certain basic moral requirements.

Tyndale Open Study Notes — © Tyndale Open Resources, licensed CC BY-SA 4.0. Text via the HelloAO Bible API.

Rom 2:14. Ὅταν, when) After Paul has finished the refutation of the perverse judgment of the Jews against the Gentiles, he next proceeds to show the true judgment of God against the latter. He treats here of the Gentiles more directly, for the purpose of convicting them; and yet, what is granted to them in passing, is granted with this end in view, that the Jew may be dealt with the more heavily; but Rom 2:26 treats of the Gentiles quite incidentally, in order to convict the Jew. Wherefore, ὅταν, when, is used here [Rom 2:14]; ἐὰν, if, there [Rom 2:26].—γὰρ for) He gives the reason, why the Gentiles should also be required to be the doers of the law; for when they do ever so little of it, they recognise their obligations to obey it. And yet he shows, that they cannot be justified by the law of nature, or by their ownselves. There are four sentences beginning with the words: when—these—who—the conscience bearing witness along with. The second is explained by the third, the first by the fourth.—ἔθνη) Not, τὰ ἔθνη; some individuals of the Gentiles; and yet there is no man, who does not fulfil some of the requirements of the law (ἐκ τῶν τοῦ νόμου). He did not choose to say ἐθνικοὶ, which is usually taken rather in a bad sense.—μὴ νόμον· νόμον μὴ,—not the law: the law not) Not even here is the change in the arrangement of the words without a reason; in the former place, the not is the emphatic word, so that greater force may be given to the, have not; in the latter place, the word νόμον, the law, contains the emphasis, thus forming an antithesis to the ἑαυτοις, unto themselves. So also, νὁμος, law, has sometimes the article, and sometimes not, and not without a good reason in each instance, Rom 2:13; Rom 2:23; Rom 2:27; Rom 3:19-21; Rom 7:1., etc.—φύσει, by nature) The construction is, μὴ νόμον ἔχοντα φύσει, not having the law by nature.[29] [But Engl. vers. joins nature with do, not with having] precisely as in Rom 2:27, ἡ ἐκ φύσεως ἀκροβυστία, the uncircumcision by nature, contrary to the Syriac version of Rom 2:27, which connects the word nature with doing, “doing by nature the law.” The Gentiles are by nature (that is, when left to themselves, as they are born, not as individuals, but as nations), destitute of the (written) law; the Jews are by nature Jews, Gal 2:15, and therefore have by nature the (written) law, ch. Rom 11:24, the end of the verse. Nor yet, however, is there any danger, that the force of the construction, which most follow, do by nature those things, which are of [contained in] the law, should be lost; for what the Gentiles, who have not the law, do, they in reality do by nature. The term law, in the writings of the apostle, does not occur in the philosophical, but in the Hebrew use; therefore, the phrase, natural law, is not found in sacred Scripture; Rom 2:12 shows, that the thing itself is true.—ποιῇ do), not only in actual performance, but also in their inmost thoughts, Rom 2:15, at the end.—οὗτοι, these) This little word turns the collective noun ἔθνη, Gentiles, to a distributive sense [so far to wit as they really do it.—V. g.]—νόμος, a law) What the law is to the Jews, that the Gentiles are to their ownselves.

[29] It may be thought by this interpretation, that the clause which precedes the words, von Natur, in the German version should be omitted to avoid the ambiguity, although, perhaps, the Author knowingly and willingly made use of the ambiguous [equivocal] punctuation.—E. B.

Bengel's Gnomon of the New Testament — English translation (T&T Clark, Edinburgh, 1860) — public domain. Text from a community e-Sword module.

Rom_2:14. Ὅταν] quando, supposes a case which may take place at any time, and whose frequent occurrence is possible, as eventus ad experientiam revocatus (Klotz, a[643] Devar. p. 689): in the case if, so often as.

γάρ] introducing the proof that the proposition of Rom_2:13 also holds of the Gentiles. See above.

ἔθνη] not to be understood of the Gentiles collectively, to which Reiche, de Wette, Köllner, Philippi refer itfor this must have been expressed by the article (against which view neither Rom_9:30 nor Rom_3:29, nor 1Co_1:23, is to be adduced), and the putting of the case ὅταν.… ποιῇ with respect to the heathen generally would be in itself untruebut Paul means rather Gentiles among whom the supposed case occurs.

τὰ μὴ νόμον ἔχοντα] they who have not the law; a more precise definition bearing on the case, and bringing forward the point on which here the argument turns. See Winer, p. 127 [E. T. 174]. Observe the distinction between μὴ νόμον ἔχ. and ΝΌΜΟΝ ΜῊ ἜΧ. The former negativeswhile the contrast of the ΦΎΣΕΙ floats before the mindthe possession of the law, instead of which they have merely a natural analogue of it (compare Stalb. a[644] Plat. Crit. p. 47 D); the latter negatives the possession of the law, which is wanting to them, whilst the Jews have it.

φύσει τὰ τοῦ νόμου ποιῇ] Most expositors uphold this connection, including Rückert, 2nd ed. On the other hand Bengel and Usteri join ΦΎΣΕΙ to ΜῊ ΝΌΜ. ἜΧΟΝΤΑ, but thus make it superfluous and even unsuitable, and deprive it of all weight in the connection, especially as the word ΦΎΣΙς has here no other sense than nativa indoles, i. e. the original constitution given with existence, and not moulded by any extraneous training, culture, or other influence beyond the endowments of nature and their natural development (comp on Eph_2:3); ΦΎΣΕΙ: quia natura eorum ita fert, Stalb. a[646] Plat. Phaedr. p. 249. The dative denotes the mediating cause. And that it is the moral prompting of conscience left to itself, which Paul means by φύσει in contrast to the divine leading of the law, is plain from Rom_2:15. The φύσει ποιεῖν lies beyond the sphere of positive revelation and its promptings, leadings, etc. It takes place in virtue of an indoles ingenita, not interventu disciplinae divinae formata, so that the thought of an operation of grace or of the Logos taking place apart from Christ is quite foreign to this passage, and its affirmation is not in harmony with the truncus et lapis of the Formula Concordiae. See the later discussions of dogmatic writers as to this point in Luthardt, v. freien Willen, p. 366 ff.

τὰ τοῦ νόμου] what belongs to the law, i.e. its constituent elements, its precepts. Paul does not say simply τὸν νόμον; for he is thinking not of Gentiles who fulfil the law as a whole, but of those who in concrete cases by their action respond to the particular portions of the law concerned. Compare Luthardt l.c[647] p. 409. The close relation, in which the ποιεῖν τὰ τοῦ νόμου here stands to ΠΟΙΗΤΑῚ ΝΌΜΟΥ in Rom_2:13, is fatal to the view of Beza, Joh. Cappell., Elsner, Wetstein, Michaelis, Flatt, and Mehring, who explain it as quae lex facit, namely, the commanding, convincing, condemning, etc.

ἑαυτοῖς εἰσὶ νόμος] They are the law unto themselves, i.e. their moral nature, with its voice of conscience commanding and forbidding, supplies to their own Ego the place of the revealed law possessed by the Jews. Thus in that ποιεῖν they serve for themselves as a regulator of the conduct that agrees with the divine law. For parallels (Manil. v. 495, al[648]: ipse sibi lex est, Arist. Nicom. Rom_4:14 : νόμος ὤν ἑαυτῷ al[649]) see Wetstein; compare also Porph. a[650] Marc. 25, p. 304.

Observe further that here, where the participle stands without the articleconsequently not οἱ νόμ. μὴ ἔχοντες (as previously ΤᾺ ΜῊ.… ἜΧΟΝΤΑ)it is to be resolved by since they, because they; which however does not convey the idea: because they are conscious of the absence of the law (as Hofmann objects), but rather: because this want occurs in their case. See Buttmanns neut. Gr. p. 301. The resolution by although (Th. Schott) is opposed to the connection; that by while (Hofmann) fails to convey the definite and logical meaning; which is, that Gentiles, in the cases indicated by ὅταν Κ.Τ.Λ[651] would not be ἑαυτοῖς νόμος, if they had the positive law.

The οὗτοι comprehends emphatically the subjects in question; Kühner, II. 1, p. 568; Buttmann l.c[652] p. 262 f.

[643] d refers to the note of the commentator or editor named on the particular passage.

[644] d refers to the note of the commentator or editor named on the particular passage.

[646] d refers to the note of the commentator or editor named on the particular passage.

[647] .c. loco citato or laudato.

[648] l. and others; and other passages; and other editions.

[649] l. and others; and other passages; and other editions.

[650] d refers to the note of the commentator or editor named on the particular passage.

[651] .τ.λ. καὶ τὰ λοιπά.

[652] .c. loco citato or laudato.

Rom_2:14-16. The οἱ ποιηταὶ νόμου δικαιωθήσονται just asserted did not require proof with regard to the Jews. But, as the regulative principle of the last judgment, it could not but appear to need proof with regard to the Gentiles, since that fundamental rule might seem to admit of no application to those who sin ἀνόμως and perish ἀνόμως. Now the Gentiles, though beyond the pale of the Mosaic law and not incurring condemnation according to the standard of that law, yet possess in the moral law of nature a certain substitute for the Mosaic law not given to them. It is in virtue of this state of things that they present themselves, not as excepted from the above rule οἱ ποιηταὶ νόμου δικαιωθ., but as subjected to it; namely, in the indirect way that they, although ἄνομοι in the positive sense, have nevertheless in the natural law a substitute for the positive onewhich is apparent, as often as Gentiles do by nature that which the positive Mosaic law not given to them enjoins. The connection may therefore be paraphrased somewhat thus: With right and reason I say: the doers of the law shall be justified; for as to the case of the Gentiles, that ye may not regard them as beyond reach of that rule, it is proved in fact by those instances, in which Gentiles, though not in possession of the law of Moses, do by nature the requirements of this law, that they are the law unto themselves, because, namely, they thereby show that its obligation stands written in their hearts, etc. It is to be observed at the same time that Paul does not wish to prove a justification of the Gentiles really occurring as a result through the fulfilment of their natural lawa misconception against which he has already guarded himself in Rom_2:12,but he desires simply to establish the regulative principle of justification through the law in the case of the Gentiles. Real actual justification by the law takes place neither among Jews nor Gentiles; because in no case is there a complete fulfilment, either, among the Jews, of the revealed law or, among the Gentiles, of the natural lawwhich in fact is only a substitute for the former, but at the same time forms the limit beyond which their responsibility and their judgment cannot in principle go, because they have nothing higher (in opposition to Philippi, who refers to the πλήρωμα νόμου, Rom_13:10).

The connection of thought between Rom_2:14 and what precedes it has been very variously apprehended. According to Koppe (compare Calvin, Flatt, and Mehring) Rom_2:14-16 prove the condemnation of the Gentiles asserted in Rom_2:12, and Rom_2:17 ff. that of the Jews; while Rom_2:13 is a parenthesis. But, seeing that in the whole development of the argument γάρ always refers to what immediately precedes, it is even in itself an arbitrary proceeding to make ὅταν γάρ in Rom_2:14, without any evident necessity imposed by the course of thought, refer to Rom_2:12, and to treat Rom_2:13, although it contains a very appropriate reason assigned for the second part of Rom_2:12, as a parenthesis to be broken off from connection with what follows; and decisive against this view are the words ἢ καὶ ἀπολογουμένων in Rom_2:15, which place it beyond doubt that Rom_2:14-16 were not intended as a proof of the ἀπολοῦνται in Rom_2:12. Philippi regards Rom_2:14 as establishing only the first half of Rom_2:13 : not the hearers of the law are just before God, for even the Gentiles have a law, i.e. for even the Gentiles are ἀκροαταὶ τοῦ νόμου. But we have no right to exclude thus from the reference of the γάρ just the very assertion immediately preceding, and to make it refer to a purely negative clause which had merely served to pave the way for this assertion. The reference to the negative half of Rom_2:13 would only be warranted in accordance with the text, had Paul, as he might have done, inverted the order of the two parts of Rom_2:13, and so given to the negative clause the second place.[640] And the less could a reader see reason to refer the γάρ to this negative clause in the position in which the Apostle has placed it, since Rom_2:14 speaks of Gentiles who do the law, by which the attention was necessarily directed, not to the negative, but to the affirmative, half of Rom_2:13 (οἱ ποιηταὶ κ.τ.λ[641]).[642] Such a mode of presenting the connection is even more arbitrary than if we should supply after Rom_2:13 the thought: and therewith also the Gentiles (Köllner and others), which however is quite unnecessary. Our view is in substance that given already by Chrysostom (οὐκ ἐκβάλλω τὸν νόμον, φῆσιν, ἀλλὰ καὶ ἐντεῦθεν δικαιῶ τὰ ἔθνη), Erasmus, and others; more recently by Tholuck, Rückert, Reiche, Köllner, Fritzsche, de Wette, Baumgarten-Crusius, Reithmayr, van Hengel, Ewald, Th. Schott, though with very various modifications.

[640] Only thusbut not as Paul has actually placed itcould the negative clause be regarded as the chief thought, for which Philippi is obliged to take it, p. 54 f. 3rd ed.

[641] .τ.λ. καὶ τὰ λοιπά.

[642] These reasons may also be urged against Hofmann, who, substantially like Philippi, takes vv. 1416 as a proof, that in the matter of righteousness before God nothing can depend on whether one belongs to the number of those who hear the law read to them.

Meyer — Critical and Exegetical Commentary on the New Testament — English translation by Peter Christie, edited by Frederick Crombie (T&T Clark, 1880) — public domain. Text from a community e-Sword module.

Rom 2:14 . There is, indeed, when we look closely, no such thing as a man absolutely without the knowledge of God’s will, and therefore such a judgment as the Apostle has described is legitimate. Gentiles, “such as have not law” in any special shape, when they do by nature “the things of the law” i.e. , the things required by the law given to Israel, the only one known to the Apostle are in spite of not having law (as is the supposition here) a law to themselves. ἔθνη is not “the Gentiles,” but “Gentiles as such” persons who can be characterised as “without law”. The supposition made in τὰ μὴ νόμον ἔχοντα is that of the Jews; and the Apostle’s argument is designed to show that though formally, it is not substantially true.

The Expositor's Greek Testament, edited by W. Robertson Nicoll (1897–1910) — public domain. Text from a community e-Sword module.

14. ἔθνη: τὰ ἔθνη would mean all or most Gentiles, ἔθνη means only some Gentiles; the number is quite indefinite, the prominent point being their character as Gentiles.

Cf. 4 Ezr. 3:36 homines quidem per nomina invenies servasse mandata tua, gentes autem non invenies.

τὰ μὴ νόμον ἔχοντα, the force of μή is ‘who ex hypothesi have not a law,’ whom we conceive of as not having a law; cf. τὰ μὴ ὄντα 1Co 1:28 (quae pro nihilo habentur (Grimm).

ἑαυτοῖς εἰσι νόμος: ubi legis impletio, ibi lex P. Ewald.

The doctrine of this verse was liberal doctrine for a Jew. The Talmud recognizes no merit in the good deeds of heathen unless they are accompanied by a definite wish for admission to the privileges of Judaism. Even if a heathen were to keep the whole law it would avail him nothing without circumcision (Debarim Rabba 1). If he prays to Jehovah his prayer is not heard (ibid.). If he commits sin and repents, that too does not help him (Pesikta 156a). Even for his alms he gets no credit (Pesikta 12b). ‘In their books’ (i.e. in those in which God sets down the actions of the heathen) ‘there is no desert’ (Shir Rabba 86c). See Weber, Altsyn. Theol. p. 66 f. Christian theologians have expressed themselves much to the same effect. Their opinions are summed up concisely by Mark Pattison, Essays, ii. 61. ‘In accordance with this view they interpreted the passages in St. Paul which speak of the religion of the heathen; e.g. Rom 2:14. Since the time of Augustine (De Spir. et Lit. § 27) the orthodox interpretation had applied this verse, either to the Gentile converts, or to the favoured few among the heathen who had extraordinary divine assistance. The Protestant expositors, to whom the words “do by nature the things contained in the law” could never bear their literal force, sedulously preserved the Augustinian explanation. Even the Pelagian Jeremy Taylor is obliged to gloss the phrase “by nature,” thus: “By fears and secret opinions which the Spirit of God, who is never wanting to men in things necessary, was pleased to put into the hearts of men” (Duct. Dubit. Book II. ch. i., § 3). The rationalists, however, find the expression “by nature,” in its literal sense, exactly conformable to their own views (John Wilkins [1614-1672], Of Nat. Rel. II. c. 9), and have no difficulty in supposing the acceptableness of those works, and the salvation of those who do them. Burnet, on Art. XVIII., in his usual confused style of eclecticism, suggests both opinions without seeming to see that they are incompatible relics of divergent schools of doctrine.’

15., οἵτινες: see on 1:25.

ἐνδείκνυνται: ἕνδειξις implies an appeal to facts; demonstratio rebus gestis facta (P. Ewald, De Vocis Συνειδήσεως, &c., p. 16 n.).

τὸ ἔργον τοῦ νόμου: ‘the work, course of conduct belonging to’ (i. e. in this context ‘required by’ or ‘in accordance with’) ‘the Law’: collective use of ἔργον as in ver. 7 above.

[Probably not as Ewald op. cit. p. 17 after Grotius, opus legis est id, quod lex in Judaeis efficit, nempe cognitio liciti et illiciti.]

συμμαρτυρούσης αὐτῶν τῆς συνειδήσεως. This phrase is almost exactly repeated in ch. 9:1 συμμαρτ. μοι τῆς συνειδ. μου. In both cases the conscience is separated from the self and personified as a further witness standing over against it. Here the quality of the acts themselves is one witness, and the approving judgement passed upon them by the conscience is another concurrent witness.

συνειδήσεως. Some such distinction as this is suggested by the original meaning and use of the word συνείδησις, which = ‘co-knowledge,’ the knowledge or reflective judgement which a man has by the side of or in conjunction with the original consciousness of the act. This second consciousness is easily projected and personified as confronting the first.

The word is quoted twice from Menander (342-291 b.c.), Monost. 597 (cf. 654) ἁπᾶσιν ἡμῖν ἡ συνείδησις θεός (ed. Didot, pp. 101, 103). It is significant that both the word and the idea are completely absent from Aristotle. They rise into philosophical importance in the more introspective moral teaching of the Stoics. The two forms, τὸ συνειδός and ἡ συνείδησις appear to be practically convertible. Epictetus (Fragm. 97) compares the conscience to a παιδαγωγός in a passage which is closely parallel to the comment of Origen on this verse of Ep. Rom. (ed. Lommatzsch, 6:107) spiritus … velut paedagogus ei [sc. animae] quidam sociatus et rector ut eam de melioribus moneat vel de culpis castiget et arguat.

In Biblical Greek the word occurs first with its full sense in Wisd. 17:10 [11] ἀεὶ δὲ προσείληφε τὰ χαλεπὰ [πονηρία] συνεχομένη τῇ συνειδήσει. In Philo τὸ συνειδός is the form used. In N. T. the word is mainly Pauline (occurring in the speeches of Act 23:1, Act 23:24:16; Rom_1 and 2 Cor., Past. Epp., also in Heb.); elsewhere only in 1 Pet. and the peric. adult. Joh 8:9. It is one of the few technical terms in St. Paul which seem to have Greek rather than Jewish affinities.

The ‘Conscience’ of St. Paul is a natural faculty which belongs to all men alike (Rom 2:15), and pronounces upon the character of actions, both their own (2Co 1:12) and those of others (2Co 4:2, 2Co 5:11). It can be over-scrupulous (1Co 10:25), but is blunted or ‘seared’ by neglect of its warnings (1Ti 4:2).

The usage of St. Paul corresponds accurately to that of his Stoic contemporaries, but is somewhat more restricted than that which obtains in modern times. Conscience, with the ancients, was the faculty which passed judgment upon actions after they were done (in technical language the conscientia consequens moralis), not so much the general source of moral obligation. In the passage before us St. Paul speaks of such a source (ἑαυτοῖς εἰσι νόμος); but the law in question is rather generalized from the dictates of conscience than antecedent to them. See on the whole subject a treatise by Dr. P. Ewald, De Vocis Συνειδήσεως apud script. N. T. vi ac potestate (Lipsiae, 1883).

μεταξὺ ἀλλήλων. This clause is taken in two ways: (i) of the ‘thoughts,’ as it were, personified, Conscience being in debate with itself, and arguments arising now on the one side, and now on the other (cf. Shakspeare’s ‘When to the sessions of sweet silent thought, I summon up remembrance of things past’); in this case μεταξὺ ἀλλήλων almost = ‘alternately,’ ‘in mutual debate’; (ii) taking the previous part of the verse as referring to the decisions of Conscience when in private it passes in review a man’s own acts, and this latter clause as dealing rather with its judgements on the acts of the others; then μεταξὺ ἀλλήλων will = ‘between one another,’ ‘between man and man,’ ‘in the intercourse of man with man’; and λογισμῶν will be the ‘arguments’ which now take one side and now the other. The principal argument in favour of this view (which is that of Mey. Gif. Lips.) is the emphatic position of μεταξὺ ἀλλήλων, which suggests a contrast between the two clauses, as if they described two different processes and not merely different parts or aspects of the same process.

There is a curious parallel to this description in Assump. Moys. i. 13 Creavit enim orbem terrarum propter plebem suam, et non coepit eam inceptionem creaturae … palam facere, ut in ea gentes arguantur et humiliter inter se disputationibus arguant se.

τῶν λογισμῶν: the λογισμοί are properly ‘thoughts’ conceived in the mind, not ‘arguments’ used in external debate. This appears from the usage of the word, which is frequently combined with καρδίᾳ (πολλοὶ λογισμοὶ ἐν καρδίᾳ ἀνδρός Pro 19:21; cf. Psa 32:11; Pro 6:18): it is used of secret ‘plots’ (Jer 18:18 δεῦτε λογισώμεθα ἐπὶ Ἱερεμίαν λογισμόν, ‘devise devices’), and of the Divine intentions (Jer_29 [36], 11 λογιοῦμαι ἐφʼ ὑμᾶς λογισμὸν εἰρήνης). In the present passage St. Paul is describing an internal process, though one which is destined to find external expression; it is the process by which are formed the moral judgements of men upon their fellows.

‘The conscience’ and ‘the thoughts’ both belong to the same persons. This is rightly seen by Klöpper, who has written at length on the passage before us (Paulinische Studien, Königsberg, 1887, p. 10); but it does not follow that both the conscience and the thoughts are exercised upon the same objects, or that μεταξὺ ἀλλήλων must be referred to the thoughts in the sense that influences from without are excluded. The parallel quoted in support of this (Mat 18:15 μεταξὺ σοῦ καὶ αὐτοῦ μόνου) derives that part of its meaning from μόνου, not from μεταξύ.

ἢ καί: ‘or even,’ ‘or it may be,’ implying that ἀπολ. is the exception, κατηγ. the rule.

International Critical Commentary — older volumes (1896–1929), various authors — public domain. Text from a community e-Sword module.

Vv. 14, 15. “For when Gentiles, which have not the law, do by nature the things which the law prescribes, these, having not the law, are their own law unto themselves: for they show thereby the work of the law written in their hearts, their conscience also bearing witness to it, and their thoughts accusing or else excusing them one with another.”

There are four principal ways of connecting Rom 2:14 with what precedes.

1. Calvin goes back to Rom 2:12 a: “The Gentiles will perish justly, though they have not the law (Rom 2:12); for they have a law in their hearts which they knowingly violate” (Rom 2:14). The explanations of Neander, de Wette, Hodge, etc. are to the same effect. But the number of important intermediate propositions and ideas intervening between this and Rom 2:12 a renders it unnatural to connect the “for” of Rom 2:14 with this declaration. Besides, was it necessary to prove to the Jews the righteousness of the punishment which would be inflicted on the Gentiles!

2. Meyer connects the for with the immediately preceding proposition, 13b: “It is only doers of the law who can be justified, for this rule can be applied even to the Gentiles, since they too have a law engraved on their hearts.” The connection is simple and logical. But can the apostle really mean to say that a Gentile can obtain justification by observing the law of nature? That is impossible. We should require in that case to revert to the purely abstract explanation of Rom 2:13 b, to regard it as a hypothetical maxim, and consequently to take Rom 2:14-15 as an abstract proof of an impracticable maxim. These are too many abstractions.

3. Tholuck, Lange, Schaff likewise join the for with 13b; but they hold at the same time that this for will be veritably realized: “The doers of the law shall be justified, for God will graciously take account of the relative observance of the law rendered by the Gentiles” (here might be compared Mat 25:40; Mat 10:41-42); so Tholuck. Or: “Those Gentiles, partial doers of the law, will certainly come one day to the faith of the gospel, by which they will be fully justified;” so Lange, Schaff. But these are expedients; for there is nothing in the text to countenance such ideas. In Rom 2:15, Paul takes pains to prove that the Gentiles have the law, but not that they observe it; and about faith in the gospel there is not a word. This could not possibly be the case if the thought were an essential link in the argument.

4. The real connection seems to me to have been explained by Philippi. The for refers to the general idea of Rom 2:13 : “It is not having heard the law, as the Jews think, but having observed it, which will justify; for if the hearing of it were enough, the Gentiles also could claim this advantage, since positive features in their moral life testified to the existence of a law engraved on their hearts, and the very definite application of it which they are able to make.” This connection leaves nothing to be desired; and Meyer’s objection, that it is necessary in this case to pass over 13b in order to connect the for with 13a, is false; for the idea of 13b is purely restrictive: “The doers of the law shall alone be justified,” while the real affirmation is that of 13a: “Those who had been only hearers shall not be justified.” It is on this essential idea of Rom 2:13 that the for of Rom 2:14 bears.— ῞Οταν, when it happens that. These are sporadic cases, happy eventualities.

The word ἔθνη, Gentiles, has no article: “people belonging to the category of the Gentiles.”

The logical relation included in the subjective negative μή is that which we should express by: “without having the law,” or: “though they have it not.”—Τὰ τοῦ νόμου, literally: the things which are of the law, agreeable to its prescriptions. They do not observe the precept as such, for they have it not; but they fulfil its contents; for example, Neoptolemus in Philoctetes, when he refuses to save Greece at the expense of a lie; or Antigone, when she does not hesitate to violate the temporary law of the city to fulfil the eternal law of fraternal love; or Socrates, when he rejects the opportunity of saving his life by escaping from prison, in order to remain subject to the magistrates. Sophocles himself speaks of these eternal laws (οἱ ἀεὶ νόμοι), and contrasts this internal and divine legislation with the ever-changing laws of man.—Φύσει, by nature, spontaneously, by an innate moral instinct. This dative cannot be joined with the preceding participle (ἔχοντα); it qualifies the verb ποιῇ, do; the whole force of the thought is in this idea: do instinctively what the Jew does in obedience to precepts. The readings ποιῶσιν and ποιοῦσιν may be corrections of ποιῇ with the view of conforming the verb to the following pronoun οὗτοι; the Byz. reading ποιῇ may also, however, be a correction to make the verb agree with the rule of neuter plurals. In this case the plural of the verb is preferable, since Paul is speaking not of the Gentiles en masse, but of certain individuals among them. Hence also the following οὗτοι, these Gentiles. This pronoun includes and repeats all the qualifications which have just been mentioned in the first part of the verse; comp. the οὗτος, Joh 1:2.

The logical relation of the participle μὴ ἔχοντες, “not having law,” and of the verb εἰσίν, “are law,” should be expressed by for; not having law, they therefore serve as a law to themselves. The negative μή, placed above before the participle and the object (τὸν νόμον), is here placed between the two. This separation is intended to throw the object into relief: “This law (τὸν νόμον), for the very reason that they have it not (μὴ ἔχοντες), they prove that they have it in another way.” This delicate form of style shows with what painstaking care Paul composed. But so fine a shade can hardly be felt except in the original language. The phrase: to be a law to oneself, is explained in Rom 2:15.

The descriptive pronoun οἵτινες, “as people who,” is meant to introduce this explanation; it is in consequence of what is about to follow that Paul can affirm what he has just said of them, Rom 2:14. The relation of the verb ἐνδείκνυνται, show, and its object ἔργον, the work of the law, may be thus paraphrased: “show the work of the law (as being) written;” which would amount to: prove that it is written. But it is not even necessary to assume an ellipsis (ὡς ὄν). What the Gentile shows in such cases is the law itself written (as to its contents) within his heart. Paul calls these contents the work of the law, because all the law commanded was meant to become work; and he qualifies νόμου by the article (the law), because he wishes to establish the identity of the Gentile’s moral instinct with the contents of the Mosaic law strictly so called. But this phrase: the work of the law, does not merely designate, like that of Rom 2:14, τὰ τοῦ νόμου (the things agreeable to the law), certain isolated acts. It embraces the whole contents of the law; for Rom 2:15 does not refer to the accidental fulfilment of some good actions; it denotes the totality of the moral law written in the heart. The figure of a written law is evidently borrowed from the Sinaitic law graven on the tables of stone. The heart is always in Scripture the source of the instinctive feelings from which those impulses go forth which govern the exercise of the understanding and will. It is in this form of lofty inspiration that the law of nature makes its appearance in man. The plural: their heart, makes each individual the seat of this sublime legislation. The last propositions of the verse have embarrassed commentators not a little. They have not sufficiently taken account of the starting-point of this whole argument. St. Paul, according to the connection of Rom 2:14 with Rom 2:13, does not wish merely to prove that the Gentile possesses the law; he means to demonstrate that he hears it, just as the Jew heard it at Sinai, or still hears it every Sabbath in the synagogue (ἀκροατής, hearer of the law, Rom 2:13 a). And to this idea the appendix refers which closes Rom 2:15. That the Gentile has the law (is a law to himself), is already demonstrated. But does he hear this law distinctly? Does he give account of it to himself? If it were not so, he would certainly remain inferior to the Jew, who brings so much sagacity to bear on the discussion of the sense and various applications of the legal statute. But no; the Gentile is quite as clever as the Jew in this respect. He also discusses the data of the moral instinct which serves as his guide. His conscience joins its approving testimony afterhand to that of the moral instinct which has dictated a good action; pleaders make themselves heard within, for and against, before this tribunal of conscience, and these discussions are worth all the subtleties of Rabbinical casuistry.—Συνείδησις, the conscience (from συνειδέναι, to know with or within oneself). This word, frequently used in the New Testament, denotes the understanding (the νοῦς, for it is a knowing, εἰδέναι, which is in question), applied to the distinction of good and evil, as reason (the διάνοια) is the same νοῦς applied to the discernment of truth and falsehood. It is precisely because this word denotes an act of knowledge that it describes a new fact different from that of the moral instinct described above. What natural impulse dictated without reflection, conscience, studying it afterward, recognizes as a good thing. Thus is explained the σύν, with, in the compound verb συμμαρτυρεῖν, to bear witness with another. Conscience joins its testimony to that of the heart which dictated the virtuous action by commending it, and proves thereby, as a second witness, the existence of the moral law in the Gentile. Volkmar: “Their conscience bears testimony besides the moral act itself which already demonstrated the presence of the divine law.” Most really, therefore, the Gentile has a law—law not only published and written, but heard and understood. It seems to me that in the way in which the apostle expresses this assent of the conscience to the law implanted within, it is impossible not to see an allusion to the amen uttered aloud by the people after hearing the law of Sinai, and which was repeated in every meeting of the synagogue after the reading of the law.

But there is not only hearing, there is even judging. The Rabbins debated in opposite senses every kind of acts, real or imaginary. The apostle follows up the comparison to the end. The soul of the Gentile is also an arena of discussions. The λογισμοί denote the judgments of a moral nature which are passed by the Gentiles on their own acts, either (as is most usually the case) acknowledging them guilty (κατηγορεῖν, accusing), or also sometimes (such is the meaning of ἢ καί; comp. Rom 2:14: when it happens that...) pronouncing them innocent. Most commonly the voice within says: That was bad! Sometimes also this voice becomes that of defence, and says: No, it was good! Thus, before this inner code, the different thoughts accuse or justify, make replies and rejoinders, exactly as advocates before a seat of judgment handle the text of the law. And all this forensic debating proves to a demonstration not only that the code is there, but that it is read and understood, since its application is thus discussed.

The μεταξὺ ἀλλήλων, between them (among themselves). Some, like Meyer, join this pronoun with αὐτῶν, the Gentiles; he would refer it to the debates carried on between Gentiles and Gentiles as to the moral worth of an action. But it is grammatically more natural, and suits the context better, to connect the pronoun between themselves with λογισμῶν, judgments. For this internal scene of discussion proves still more clearly than a debate of man with man the fact of the law written in the heart. Holsten proposes to understand the participle συμμαρτυρούντων (borrowed from συμμαρτυρούσης) with λογισμῶν: “their conscience bearing witness, and the judgments which they pass on one another’s acts in their mutual relations also bearing witness.” This construction is very forced, and it seems plain to us that the two participles accusing or else excusing refer to the thoughts, just as the participle bearing witness referred to their conscience.

How can one help admiring here, on the one hand, the subtle analysis whereby the apostle discloses in the Gentile heart a real judgment-hall where witnesses are heard for and against, then the sentence of the judge; and, on the other hand, that largeness of heart with which, after drawing so revolting a picture of the moral deformities of Gentile life (chap. 1), he brings into view in as striking a way the indestructible moral elements, the evidences of which are sometimes irresistibly presented even by this so deeply sunken life?

Frédéric Louis Godet — Commentaries on Luke, John, Romans, and 1 Corinthians — English translation (T&T Clark, Edinburgh, 1870s–1890s) — public domain. Text from a community e-Sword module.

Rom_2:14

For whenever the Gentiles, not having the law. In the preceding verse the apostle had said, That not the hearers but the doers of the law are justified before God; and then adds, For whenever the Gentiles, not having the law, do by nature the things of the law, they are a law unto themselves. But the fact that the Gentiles are a law unto themselves, has nothing to do, either as an illustration or confirmation, with the general proposition contained in Rom_2:13. Those who insist on establishing such a connection, suppose that Rom_2:14 refers to the last clause of Rom_2:13, and is designed to prove either that with regard to the Gentiles as well as Jews, doing is the thing required; or that there are doers of the law who may be justified, among the heathen. The doers of the law, says the apostle, shall be justified; but the heathen do the law, therefore they shall be justified. This, however, is not the conclusion at which the apostle is aiming. He is not teaching the method of justification, or arguing to prove that the Gentiles as well as the Jews may be doers of the law, and thus be justified in the sight of God. He is expounding the law; he is showing the principles by which God will judge the world, Gentiles as well as Jews. Those who are without the written law, he will judge without any reference to that law; and those who are under the law, he will judge by that law. This general proposition he confirms first by saying, in Rom_2:13, that the mere possession of the law is not enough; and secondly by saying, in Rom_2:14, that the Gentiles have a law by which they may be judged. The logical connection of Rom_2:14, therefore, is not with Rom_2:13, but with Rom_2:12. Thus Calvin, who says, Probationem prioris membri (Rom_2:12) nunc repetit. Probat enim frustra obtendi a gentibus ignorantiam, quum factis suis declarent, nonnullam se habere justitiae reguam. Nulla enim gens unquam sic ab humanitate abhorruit, ut non se intra leges aliquas contineret. When, whenever or as often as, which may be the sense of the particle in this case, Whenever, or as often as the heathen do so or so. Or it may have the sense of while, because: Because, or since the heathen do so or so. Comp. 1Co_15:27. As ἔθνη is without the article, many would render it heathen, that is, some heathen. But in the first place, it is evident from the context that this is not what the apostle means to say. His object is to show that the heathen world have a rule of duty written on their hearts; a fact which is not proved by some heathen obeying the law, but which is proved by the moral conduct of all men. Men generally, not some men, but all men, show by their acts that they have a knowledge of right and wrong. And secondly, this word has, without the article, in virtue of its frequent occurrence, a definite sense. Comp. Rom_3:29; Rom_9:24, and especially Rom_9:30 : ἔθνη … κατέλαβε δικαιοσύνην; the heathen attained righteousness. Do by nature the things of the law. There are two misinterpretations of the phrase, τὰ τοῦ νόμου ποιεῖν. The one is, that it means to fulfill the law; the other, to do the office of the law, i.e., to command and forbid. The former is unnecessary, and is in direct opposition to the express and repeated declaration of the apostle, that none, whether Jew or Gentile, has ever fulfilled the law. To do the things of the law, is indeed to do what the law prescribes (comp. Rom_10:5; Gal_3:12); but whether complete or partial obedience is intended, depends upon the context. The man who pays his debts, honors his parents, is kind to the poor, does the things of the law; for these are things which the law prescribes. And this is all the argument the apostle requires, or his known doctrine allows us to understand by the phrase, in the present instance. This being the case, there is no need of resorting to the second interpretation mentioned above, which was proposed by Beza, and adopted by Wetstein, Flatt, and others. Though ποιεῖν τὰ τοῦ νόμου might mean to do what the law does, prescribe what is good and forbid what is evil, it certainly has not that sense elsewhere in Pauls writings, see Rom_10:5; Gal_3:12; and is especially out of place here, in immediate connection with the phrase ποιηταὶ τοῦ νόμου, in the sense of doers of the law. The heathen do φύσει, by nature, the things of the law. The φύσις of anything is the peculiarity of its being, that in virtue of which it is what it is; it is that which belongs to its original constitution, and is opposed to what is taught, acquired, or made. The word is sometimes used for a disposition or sentiment arising out of our nature, as opposed to mere arbitrary rules, as in 1Co_11:14. In the present case, the opposition is to νόμος. It is by nature, not by an external law, that the Gentiles are led to perform moral acts. Comp. Gal_4:8; Eph_2:3. The proper connection of φύσει with τὰ τοῦ νόμου ποιῆ, they do by nature the things of the law, is retained in our version, and by the great majority of commentators. Bengel, Rückert, and a few others, connect it with μὴ νόμον ἔχοντα, not having the law by nature; but this saying very little to the purpose of the apostle. His object is to show that φύσις supplies to the Gentiles the place of νόμος. These not having the law, are a law unto themselves. Νόμον, without the article, may be rendered either, a law, not having a law, by implication, a written, external law; or the law, i.e., the Jewish law, since that word is often used without the article for the law of the Jews; that is, the law of God, as revealed in the Scriptures. The Gentiles, then, are law unto themselves; they have in their own nature a rule of duty; a knowledge of what is right, and a sense of obligation. As the absence of all moral acts among the lower animals shows that they have no sense of right and wrong, that they are not under a moral law, so the performance of such acts by the Gentiles, shows that they have a law written on their hearts.

Charles Hodge — Commentary on Romans (1835), First Corinthians (1857), and Ephesians (1856) — public domain. Text from a community e-Sword module.

Command honest things, and forbid dishonest.

He preventeth an objection which might be made by the Gentiles, who although they have not the Law of Moses, yet they have no reason whereby they may excuse their wickedness in that they have somewhat written in their hearts instead of a Law, as men that forbid, and punish some things as wicked, and command and commend other some as good.

Not simply, but in comparison of the Jews.

Geneva Bible (1599) marginal notes — public domain. Text via Bolls.life.

Verse 14. For when the Gentiles, which have not the law, c.] Nor does it follow that the Gentiles who have not had a Divine revelation, shall either perish, because they had it not or their unrighteous conduct pass unpunished, because not having this revelation might be considered as an excuse for their sins.

Do by nature the things contained in the law] Do, without this Divine revelation, through that light which God imparts to every man, the things contained in the law - act according to justice, mercy, temperance and truth, the practice of which the revealed law so powerfully enjoins; these are a law unto themselves - they are not accountable to any other law, and are not to be judged by any dispensation different from that under which they live.

Rabbi Tanchum brings in the Supreme Being as saying: When I decreed any thing against the Gentiles, to whom I have not given laws and statutes, and they know what I have decreed; immediately they repent; but the Israelites do not so. Tanchum, fol. 43. 2.

Adam Clarke's Commentary on the Bible (1810–1826) — public domain. Text from a community e-Sword/MySword module.

14. For when the Gentiles, etc. He now states what proves the former clause; for he did not think it enough to condemn us by mere assertion, and only to pronounce on us the just judgment of God; but he proceeds to prove this by reasons, in order to excite us to a greater desire for Christ, and to a greater love towards him. He indeed shows that ignorance is in vain pretended as an excuse by the Gentiles, since they prove by their own deeds that they have some rule of righteousness: for there is no nation so lost to every thing human, that it does not keep within the limits of some laws. Since then all nations, of themselves and without a monitor, are disposed to make laws for themselves, it is beyond all question evident that they have some notions of justice and rectitude, which the Greeks call preconceptions προληψεις, and which are implanted by nature in the hearts of men. They have then a law, though they are without law: for though they have not a written law, they are yet by no means wholly destitute of the knowledge of what is right and just; as they could not otherwise distinguish between vice and virtue; the first of which they restrain by punishment, and the latter they commend, and manifest their approbation of it by honoring it with rewards. He sets nature in opposition to a written law, meaning that the Gentiles had the natural light of righteousness, which supplied the place of that law by which the Jews were instructed, so that they were a law to themselves.

John Calvin's Commentaries (1540-1563) — public domain. Text from the Calvin Translation Society English edition (1840s-50s) via the Christian Classics Ethereal Library (ccel.org). Calvin's coverage is partial (roughly two-thirds of the Bible); uncommented books and verses are honest gaps, never fabricated. The 19th-century editor's footnotes and remarks are omitted so the notes are faithfully Calvin's own voice.

14. For when the Gentiles, &c.] The connexion marked by “for” is not easy to state. We take it to refer (over Rom_2:13, which is an explanation of the previous words) to Rom_2:12, and to be connected with the words “shall perish without law.” How this shall be St Paul now suggestively states, by explaining that Conscience is to the heathen a substitute for Revelation, in regard of responsibility. Q. d., “Heathen sinners shall be justly condemned; for though without the law, they have a substitute for it:”

by nature] This phrase here has to do with a contrast not of nature and grace, but of nature and law. “Nature” here means impulses which, however produced, are not due to known Revelation, or indeed to any precept ab extra. Cp. 1Co_11:14.

the things contained in the law] Lit. the things of the law. It is just possible to explain this as “things both commanded and forbidden by the law.” But far more naturally it means the “principles of the law,” i.e. the grand Difference of right and wrong; and thus the whole phrase = “to act on the principles of the law.” Nothing is here stated as to perception, or love, of holiness by heathen; but it is certainly stated that they had conscience, and could, up to a certain point, act upon it. It is scarcely needful to say that this is fully illustrated by ancient literature, while the same literature illustrates fully the mysterious limits of conscience and tremendous force of evil. See Appendix E.

having not the law] i.e. “though not having it.” Their lack of the law gives special importance to the fact of conscience.

a law unto themselves] This may mean “each to himself,” or “each and all to the community.” As to facts, both explanations would hold. Without individual conscience, there could be no public moral code. But we believe the main reference here to be to the public code; to the general consciousness and opinion of heathens that right and wrong are eternally different, and that judgment is to be accordingly hereafter. This consciousness and opinion St Paul regards as influencing heathen minds mutually; as “shewn” in intercourse of thought and speech; as “witnessed to” by individual consciences; as coming out in “reasonings” philosophic or popular, concerning right and wrong; and as all pointing to a great manifestation of the truth of the principle at the Last Day.

The Cambridge Bible for Schools and Colleges (gen. ed. J. J. S. Perowne; Cambridge University Press, 1878–1918) — public domain. Text from a community e-Sword module.

In the day when God shall judge,.... These words are to be read in connection with Rom 2:13, and express the time when both Jews and Gentiles will be judged, called a "day", both because of the clearness and evidence of the judgment that will be made, and because a certain time is fixed, though not known, which will surely come; also the matter of the judgment, which will be,

the secrets of men: whether good or bad, which are only known to God and themselves, and which may have been done ignorantly by them; "for God shall bring every work into judgment with every secret thing, whether it be good, or whether it be evil", Ecc 12:14, which is so interpreted by the Jews (t),

"when R. Jochanan came to that Scripture, he wept; "for God shall bring every work into judgment with every secret thing";''

upon which the gloss says, yea, for those things which are hidden from him, which he has committed through ignorance, will he bring him into judgment; everything, even the least thing in a literal sense, but not for such silly trifling things they mention in the same place; doubtless the Holy Ghost means the secrets of men's hearts and actions, and the hidden things of darkness which are contrary to the holy law of God. The person by whom this awful judgment will be carried on is,

Jesus Christ; to whom all judgment is committed, who is ordained Judge of quick and dead, and is every way fit for that office, being God as well as man, and so both omniscient and omnipotent: and this the apostle says will be,

according to my Gospel; his meaning is not that the Gospel will be the, rule of judgment, because he speaking of the judgment of the Gentiles, as well as of the Jews, who never heard of the Gospel; but that what he had said concerning a day of judgment, of Christ's being the Judge, and of God's judging by him the secrets of men, were as true and as certain as the Gospel which he preached was; and was "conformable", or agreeable to it, as the Arabic version reads it, and might be learned and proved from it. This he calls, "my Gospel"; not because the author or subject of it; but because it was committed to his trust and was preached by him; and in opposition to, and to distinguish it from the Gospel of the false apostles. Eusebius says (u), that the Apostle Paul had used to call the Gospel according to Luke his Gospel, and that it is said, that whenever he makes mention of his Gospel, he designs that.

(t) T. Bab. Chagigah, fol. 5. 1. (u) Eccles. Hist. l. 3. c. 4. p. 73.

John Gill's Exposition of the Whole Bible (1746–1763) — public domain (CC PDM 1.0). Text via the HelloAO Bible API.

14 For when the Gentiles, which have not the law, do by nature the things contained in the law, these, having not the law, are a law unto themselves:

Ver. 14. Do by nature, &c.] Velleius saith that Cato was Homo virtuti simillimus, cui id solum visum est rationem habere, quod haberet iustiam, omnibus humanis vitiis immunis, &c. Aristides, Phocion, and Socrates were famous for their integrity. (Plin. vii. 31.)

Are a law to themselves] The Thracians gloried that they were αυτονομοι living laws, walking statutes.

John Trapp, A Commentary or Exposition upon All the Books of the Old and New Testament (1647–1656) — public domain. Text from a community e-Sword module.

For when - The apostle, in Rom 2:13, had stated a general principle, that the doers of the Law only can be justified, if justification is attempted by the Law. In this verse and the next, he proceeds to show that the same principle is applicable to the pagan; that though they have not the written Law of God, yet that they have sufficient knowledge of his will to take away every excuse for sin, and consequently that the course of reasoning by which he had come to the conclusion that they were guilty, is well founded. This verse is not to be understood as affirming, as an historical fact, that any of the pagan ever did perfectly obey the Law which they had, any more than the previous verse affirms it of the Jews, The main point in the argument is, that if people are justified by the Law, their obedience must be entire and perfect; that this is not to be external only, or to consist in hearing or in acknowledging the justice of the Law; and that the Gentiles had an opportunity of illustrating this principle as well as the Jews, since they also had a law among themselves. The word “when” ὅταν hotan does not imply that the thing shall certainly take place, but is one form of introducing a supposition; or of stating the connection of one thing with another, Mat 5:11; Mat 6:2, Mat 6:5-6, Mat 6:16; Mat 10:19. It is, however, true that the main things contained in this verse, and the next, actually occurred, that the Gentiles did many things which the Law of God required.

The Gentiles - All who were not Jews.

Which have not the law - Who have net a revelation, or the written word of God. In the Greek the article is omitted, “who have not law,” that is, any revealed law.

By nature - By some, this phrase has been supposed to belong to the previous member of the sentence, “who have not the law by nature.” But our translation is the more natural and usual construction. The expression means clearly by the light of conscience and reason, and whatever other helps they may have without revelation. It denotes simply, in that state which is without the revealed will of God. In that condition they had many helps of tradition, conscience, reason, and the observation of the dealings of divine Providence, so that to a considerable extent they knew what was right and what was wrong.

Do the things - Should they not merely understand and approve, but actually perform the things required in the Law.

Contained in the law - Literally, the things of the Law, that is, the things which the Law requires. Many of those things might be done by the pagan, as, e. g., respect to parents. truth, justice, honesty, chastity. So far as they did any of those things, so far they showed that they had a law among themselves. And wherein they failed in these things they showed that they were justly condemned. “Are a law unto themselves.” This is explained in the following verse. It means that their own reason and conscience constituted, in these things, a law, or prescribed that for them which the revealed law did to the Jews.

Albert Barnes' Notes on the Bible (1834–1885) — public domain. Text from a community e-Sword/MySword module.

When the Gentiles...do by nature, or naturally, that is, without having received any written law, these men are a law to themselves, and have it written in their hearts, as to the existence of a God, and their reason tells them, that many sins are unlawful: they may also do some actions that are morally good, as by giving alms to relieve the poor, honouring their parents, &c. not that these actions, morally good, will suffice for their justification of themselves, or make them deserve a supernatural reward in the kingdom of heaven; but God, out of his infinite mercy, will give them some supernatural graces, by which they come to know, and believe, that he will reward their souls for eternity. Such, says St. John Chrysostom, were the dispositions of Melchisedech, Job, Cornelius the Centurion, &c. (Witham)

George Leo Haydock (1774–1849), Haydock's Catholic Family Bible and Commentary, 1859 edition — public domain. Excludes Psalms (Douay-Rheims chapter numbering differs from Protestant) and Deuterocanonical books (Catholic canon only).

Here he preoccupates the Gentiles’ plea. They might object, that having not the law, they could not transgress, nor be culpable in judgment: see Rom 4:15. To this he says, that though they had not the law written in tables of stone, as the Jews had, yet they had a law written in their hearts, which was a copy or counterpart of the other, and had in a manner the effects of it; for thereby they were instructed to do well, and debarred from doing evil, which are the two properties of all laws.

Do by nature; nature is opposed to Scripture and special revelation: by the direction of the law, and light of nature, they did many things which the law of Moses commanded, and forbore many things which it forbade.

Are a law unto themselves; i.e. they have in themselves such principles of reason and rules of equity, as are to them instead of a law, prescribing what they ought to do and avoid.

Matthew Poole's English Annotations on the Holy Bible (1683–1685) — public domain. Text from a community e-Sword/MySword module.

14. By nature—By natural conscience. Yet even in heathen dispensations nature is not alone and unaided. Paul’s own doctrine is, that the glorious headship of Christ is as wide as the inglorious headship of Adam. Through a universal though unknown Saviour is dispensed a universal Spirit, a universal drawing of the Father. Do…

things… in the law—The apostle does not affirm but assume the fact that the law is sometimes truly fulfilled by the Gentiles.

A law unto themselves—They are their own regulators. That law may not perfectly coincide with the written law nor with the absolute law; but it is a law to them, and available in their behalf. Nor under a heathen dispensation any more than under a Jewish, must an obedience be absolute in order to be accepted. As we have shown above, there may be a virtual Christian faith and acceptance where there is no known Christ—a faith that secures pardon for shortcomings in keeping the law. Aristotle is quoted by Wetstein as saying (Nic. Rom_4:14) that the enlightened man will “so carry himself as being a law unto himself.” Another Greek writer says: “So will I be a law to the multitude, not the majority to me.” Philo says of Moses that he was “a living and rational law.” (Notes on Luk_12:47-48; Luk_12:57.)

Daniel D. Whedon (gen. ed.), Commentary on the Old and New Testaments (1874–1909) — public domain. Text from a community e-Sword module.

Vers. 14, 15. For when Gentiles, which have not law, do by nature (or, having not law by nature, do; cf. ver. 27, h ek fusewv akrobustia) the things of the Law (i.e. the Mosaic Law), these, not having law, are law unto themselves; which (oitinev , with its usual significance of quippequi) show the work of the Law written in their hearts, their conscience also bearing witness (or, bearing witness therewith), and their thoughts betwixt each other accusing or else excusing (not, as in the Authorized Version, meanwhile accusing or else excusing one another, metaxu being used as a preposition, governing allhlwn). The "for" at the beginning of ver. 14 connects it with the preceding one thus: "Not hearers but doers of law will be justified." The Jew, therefore, has no advantage in the way of justification over the Gentile from being in a peculiar sense a hearer. For Gentiles also may be doers, though not of a positive revealed law, yet of the law of conscience. It is not, of course, implied that on the ground of any such doing they "shall be justified;" only that, so far as they do, they will, equally with the Jews, be rewarded. Nor is it said that any, in fact, do all that law enjoins. We observe the hypothetical form of expression, otan poih , and also, ta tou nomou , i.e. any of the Law"s requirements. The Law, for instance, says, "Thou shalt not steal;" and if a Gentile, though knowing nothing of the ten commandments, on principle refrains from stealing, his conscientious honesty will have its own reward as much as that of the Jew who refrains in obedience to the revealed commandment. A few of the expressions in these verses call for consideration.

(1) What is meant by to ergon tou nomou , said to be "written in their hearts"? To ergon cannot be pleonastic, as supposed by Tholuck. One view is that it is equivalent to ta erga tou nomou , which is an expression frequently used elsewhere; (Rom_3:27, 28 9:32 Gal_2:16 Gal_3:2, Gal_3:5, Gal_3:10) and the singular number has been explained as collective, as in 1Co_3:13 Gal_6:4, and ver. 7 above (so Meyer), or as applying to each of the particular cases supposed in the otan ... poiwsin" (so Alford). The objection to this view is that it is not the works of the Law that can be said to be written, but rather the Law itself from which the works proceed. Seeing that grapton implies evident reference to the tables of the Law, it seems best to take ergon as denoting the efficacy of the Law, as opposed to the letter, which alone was written on the tables. So in effect Bengel: "Legem ipsam cum sua activitate. Opponitur literae, quae est accidens.

(2) How do they show (endeiknuntai) this ergon nomou ? Evidently, from the context of ver. 14, by doing ta tou nomou ; i.e. doing them (as is, of course, implied) as being the right things to do, and approving them. The very possibility of their doing this is evidence of an innate moral sense in the human heart, which, however it may often be obscured or perverted, remains as a characteristic of humanity, and is more or less operative in all communities. "Nulls enim gens unquam sic ab humanitate abhorruit ut non se intra leges aliquas contineret. Constat absque dubio quasdam justitiae et rectitudinis conceptiones, quas Graeci prolhqeiv recant, hominum animis esse naturaliter ingenitas" (Calvin).

(3) What is exactly meant by the conscience witnessing, and the thoughts accusing or else excusing? Suneidhsiv is not the Law in the heart, but rather our consciousness, whereby wittingly, in accordance with that Law, we approve or condemn. The compound verb summarturoushv seems to denote a joint witness of conscience. In Rom_8:16 and Rom_9:1, where alone the word occurs elsewhere, it is followed by a dative, and means certainly concurrent witness. But, if so here, with what? Probably with the endeixiv already spoken of. Right conduct on principle, and conscience approving, witness together to the inward law; or, conduct and conscience together witness to a man"s merits or demerits in accordance with that law. Then, what is added about the logismoi shows how conscience operates. Reason comes into play, evoked by conscience, to reflect on its witness, and definitely condemn or approve what has been done. A kind of court of judicature is supposed. Man calls himself to the bar of his own moral judgment; his conscience adduces witness to the character of his deeds, or rather, with his deeds bears witness for or against himself; his thoughts are as advocates on both sides, arguing for condemnation or acquittal. "Observa quam erudite describat conscientiam, quum dicit nobis venire in mentem rationes, quibus quod recte factum est defendimus; rursum quae nos flagitiorum accusent et redarguant" (Calvin).

The Pulpit Commentary (1880–1919), ed. H.D.M. Spence-Jones & Joseph S. Exell — public domain. Text from a community e-Sword module.

For when the gentiles - That is, any of them. St. Paul, having refuted the perverse judgment of the Jews concerning the heathens, proceeds to show the just judgment of God against them. He now speaks directly of the heathens, in order to convince the heathens. Yet the concession he makes to these serves more strongly to convince the Jews. Do by nature - That is, without an outward rule; though this also, strictly speaking, is by preventing grace. The things contained in the law - The ten commandments being only the substance of the law of nature. These, not having the written law, are a law unto themselves - That is, what the law is to the Jews, they are, by the grace of God, to themselves; namely, a rule of life.

John Wesley, Explanatory Notes Upon the Whole Bible (1754–1765) — public domain. Text via the GEBible commentary corpus.

The sense is, that the Gentiles, which have not the law of Moses promulged, are yet not without a law ingrafted in their consciences; and although they have not a written law; yet are they a law, that is a rule of living to themselves; doing those things which shew the work of the law written in their hearts their consciences bearing witness to it, and their natural reason either accusing or defending of them from it.

Learn, 1. That there is a law of nature ingrafted and written by God in the hearts of men, whereby the common notions of good and evil are found with them.

Learn, 2. That this law of nature serveth for the instigation and provocation of men to many good actions and duties towards God and man.

3. That to rebel against, and not walk in conformity unto this ingrafted law of nature, is a God-provoking and wrath procuring sin.

4. That although many of the Gentiles gave themselves over to all manner of uncleanness, yet others shewed the works of the law written in their hearts: They shewed it two ways.

1. By their temperance, righeousness, and moral honesty; wherein (to our shame) they excelled many of us who are called Christians.

2. In the efficiacy of their conscience; which, as it cleared and comforted them for things well done, so it witnessed against them, yea judged and condemned them for doing evil: And these evidences of a law written on the heart, are everywhere to be found, wherever man are found: The Gentiles having not a written law, are a law unto themselves, and shew the work of the law written in their hearts.

William Burkitt's Expository Notes on the New Testament (1700–1703) — public domain. Text from a community e-Sword module.

14. “For when the heathens, not having the law, do by nature the things of the law, they not having the law, are a law unto themselves.” This confirms the gracious possibility for the heathens, through the light of nature, conscience and the Holy Spirit, actually to do the things of the divine law and be saved, as doubtless millions have done who are now in heaven. Gentile in E. V. is the very same word translated heathen. Hence, remember they are synonymous.

14, 15. The Holy Spirit is everywhere substantially revealing the will of God.

“He is the true Light, who lighteth every man that cometh into the world” (Joh 1:9).

Here is a beautiful allusion to heathen conscience, “their conscience bearing them witness, their thoughts accusing or excusing either with other.” How wonderfully the Holy Spirit, through human conscience in all the earth, is constantly speaking to every immortal soul, saying, “This is right, that is wrong,” et cetera. Where Paul speaks of the seared conscience (1Ti 4:2) it does not mean the conscience of men, but of devils. That is a reason why the demons can not be saved. When a human soul passes the dead line and is abandoned by the Holy Ghost, having committed the unpardonable sin, so that He ceases to strive, then that soul becomes demonized, the conscience being cauterized. As the Holy Spirit deals with every human spirit, whether heathen or Christian, speaking through His telephone, the conscience, He will witness to the condemnation or acquittal in the Judgment Day.

William B. Godbey, Commentary on the New Testament (1896–1900) — public domain. Text from a community e-Sword module.

(for when Gentiles that have not the law do by nature the things of the law, these, not having the law, are the law unto themselves ;

J. W. McGarvey (with Philip Y. Pendleton), Commentaries on the New Testament (The Fourfold Gospel, 1914; Acts; and the epistles) — public domain. Text from a community e-Sword/MySword module.

14. When Gentiles, which have no law. No revelation, such as the Jews had. They had a law of nature (1:18, 32). Do by nature the things of the law. Paul has shown how the general principle that God “will render to every man according to his works” applies to the Jews; they will be judged by law, and only law-doers will be justified. He now shows that the same principle applies to the Gentiles. They have no revealed and written law like the Jews, but in case Gentiles, without it, should keep the things contained in the law, the moral principles of the law of Moses, they are a law unto themselves. Their consciences and moral sense are a law. The apostle does not say that this was the rule among the Gentiles, but applies the principle to the very rare instances of Gentiles of pure character.

B. W. Johnson's The People's New Testament with Notes (1889–1891) — public domain. Electronic text from the Christian Classics Ethereal Library (CCEL) ThML edition.

14. ὅταν γὰρ. The principle of Rom 2:13 applies to Gentiles, only we have to think not of explicit law, but of knowledge of right and wrong evidenced in their conscience and utterances.

Suspicion has been cast on these verses (14, 15) on the ground that they interrupt, both the rhythmical antitheses, and the argumentative structure of the passage (Rom 2:16 returning to Rom 2:13). Some take them as a later comment, though in strict accordance with the principles of the passage; some as a marginal note by S. Paul himself. But their genuineness is indicated by the fact that they are not only in accordance with but strictly necessary to the argument; for it is essential to make it clear here in what sense Gentiles are in relation to law: only if in such relation could they be amenable to judgment. cf. J. Weiss, op. cit[87] p. 218 n.

[87] op. cit. opus citatum

ἔθνη. Gentiles as such.

τὰ μὴ νόμον ἔχοντα. The admitted condition of ἔθνη.

φύσει with ποιῶσιν = without the help of an external revelation in law; cf. Eph 2:3 (n. Robinson); Gal 2:15; Gal 4:8. φύσις, morally neutral, depends on man’s use; cf. Rom 1:26, Rom 2:27.

τὰ τοῦ νόμου = the acts prescribed by such a revealed law.

ἑαυτοῖς εἰσὶν νόμος. Here S. Paul boldly applies the term νόμος to the condition which has just been described as ἄνομος. They have no law outside themselves; but the knowledge of GOD, which they have, takes the place of revealed law and may even be called law for them. It is a good instance of the way in which S. Paul goes behind the ordinary use of language and cuts down to the vital nerve of thought. See further in ch. 7, Rom 8:1-4.

Cambridge Greek Testament for Schools and Colleges (Cambridge University Press, 1896; 21 vols, various authors incl. Carr, Maclear, Plummer, Farrar, Lumby, Moule, M. R. James, Simcox) — public domain. Text from a community e-Sword module.

14.] ἔθνη, the Gentiles [in general]; see ch. 3:29; 11:13; 15:10, 12. In this place, ἔθνη τὰ μὴ νόμ. ἔχοντα is the only way in which the sense required could be expressed, for τὰ ἔθνη τὰ μὴ ν. ἔχ., would mean ‘those Gentiles who have not the law,’ as also would ἔθνη μὴ νόμον ἔχ., whereas the meaning clearly is, the Gentiles not having the law.

νόμον] Again, ‘the law,’ viz. of Moses. A law, they have; see below.

φύσει, by nature, τοῖς φυσικοῖς ἑπόμενα λογισμοῖς, Schol. in Matthaï.

τὰ τοῦ νόμου π.] do things pertaining to the law [i.e. the things about which the law is concerned], e.g. abstain from stealing, or killing, or adultery. But it by no means follows that the Apostle means that the Gentiles could fulfil the law, do the things, i.e. all the things enjoined by the law (as De Wette): he argues that a conscientious Gentile, who knows not the law, does, when he acts in accordance with requirements of the law, so far set up the (see below on the art.) law to himself.

τὰ τοῦ νόμου is interpreted by Beza, Wetst., and Elsner, ‘that which the law does,’ i.e. make sanctions and prohibitions: but this can hardly be.

The Apostle does not deny certain virtues to the Gentiles, but maintains the inefficiency of those, and all other virtues, towards man’s salvation.

ἑαυτοῖς εἰσιν νόμος] are to themselves (so far) the law, not ‘a law,’ for a law may be just or unjust, God’s law or man’s law: there is but one law of God, partly written in men’s consciences, more plainly manifested in the law of Moses, and fully revealed in Jesus Christ. The art. could not have been here used without stultifying the sentence by distributing the predicate, making the conscientious heathen to be to himself the whole of the law, instead of ‘the law, so far as he did the works of the law.’ Cf. Aristot. Eth. iv. 14, ὁ δὲ χαρίεις κ. ἐλευθέριος οὕτως ἕξει οἷον νόμος ὢν ἑαυτῷ.

Henry Alford, The Greek Testament (1849–1861) — public domain. Text from a community e-Sword module.

When [οταν] . Lit., whenever, supposing a case which may occur at any time.

The Gentiles. Rev., properly, Gentiles. There is no article. Not the Gentiles collectively, but Gentiles among whom the supposed case occurs. Which have not the law [τα μη νομον εχοντα] . The mh not negatives the possession of the law. Rev., which have no law.

Having not the law [νομον μη εχοντες] . Here mh not negatives the possession of the law. Rev., having no law. It is difficult to indicate the proper emphasis in the English text, since the use of italics is limited to words not in the original.

Marvin R. Vincent, Word Studies in the New Testament (1887–1900) — public domain. Text from a community e-Sword/MySword module.