Matthew 1:19

Mat 1:19. Joseph her husband, being a just [or righteous] man — That is, as many understand it, a strict observer of the law, and of the customs of his ancestors, and therefore not judging it right to retain her under these circumstances. But the following words, and not willing to make her a public example, seem manifestly to lead to another and even an opposite sense of the word here rendered just, or righteous. Hence some interpret the clause thus: Joseph, being a good-natured, merciful, and tender- hearted man, was unwilling to go to the utmost rigour of the law, but chose rather to treat her with as much lenity as the case allowed. But, Dr. Doddridge very well observes, it is without any good reason that δικαιος should be here rendered merciful or good-natured, because, “if we consider the information which Joseph might have received from persons of such an extraordinary character as Zachariah and Elizabeth, who would certainly think themselves obliged to interpose on such an occasion, and whose story so remarkably carried its own evidence along with it; besides the intimation the prophecy of Isaiah gave, and the satisfaction he undoubtedly had in the virtuous character of Mary herself; we must conclude that he would have acted a very severe and unrighteous part, had he proceeded to extremities without serious deliberation; and that putting her away privately would, in these circumstances, have been the hardest measure which justice would have suffered him to take. It seems the expression, παραδειγματισαι, here rendered to make her a public example, “may perhaps refer to that exemplary punishment which the law inflicted on those who had violated the faith of their espousals before the marriage was completed. See Deu 22:23-24, where it is expressly ordered that a betrothed virgin, if she lay with another man, should be stoned. We may suppose, however, that the infamy of a public divorce, though she had not been stoned, may also be expressed by the same word. But then there was besides a private kind of divorce, in which no reason was assigned, and the dowry was not forfeited as in the former case, and by this she would not have been so much defamed.” But it must be observed, that as their being betrothed to each other was a thing publicly known, he could not have put her away so privately, but there must have been witnesses of it, two at least, her parents, suppose, or some of her nearest relations.

Joseph Benson's Commentary on the Old and New Testaments (1811–1818) — public domain. Text from a community e-Sword module.

1:19 As a righteous man—that is, as one who obeyed the law (see Luke 1:6)—Joseph could not take Mary as his wife since she was a suspected adulteress. He could exonerate himself by publicly exposing Mary to trial and having her put to death (Deut 22:23-27; cp. Num 5:11-31), or pay a fine and break the engagement (see also Mishnah Sotah 1:1-5). Joseph mercifully decided to do the latter quietly.

Tyndale Open Study Notes — © Tyndale Open Resources, licensed CC BY-SA 4.0. Text via the HelloAO Bible API.

Mat 1:19. δίκαιος, just[54]) It is disputed in what sense this epithet is applied to Joseph. The thing is clear. Joseph wished to put away Mary, and he also wished to put her away privately. The Evangelist indicates the cause of both wishes. Why did he wish to do it privately? Because he was unwilling to publish the matter, and exact the penalty which the law permitted in the case of women guilty, or suspected, of adultery, and thus to make an example of one, whose sanctity he had in other respects so greatly revered. But why did he wish to put her away at all? We learn from the context. Because he was just (justus), and did not think it reputable (honestum) to retain as his wife one who appeared to have broken her conjugal faith. His thoughts were many and conflicting; his mind was in doubt. St Matthew expresses this with great beauty, by a phraseology somewhat ambiguous in this its brevity: for Greek participles may be resolved into the corresponding verbs with the conjunctions although, because, or since: [and μὴ θέλων, therefore, may be rendered either although he was unwilling, because he was unwilling, or since he did not wish]. Elsewhere δίκαιος is sometimes found with the signification of yielding and kind, as injustus[55] (which signifies primarily unjust or unrighteous) with that of severe.—παραδειγμάτισαι, to make an example of) Thus the LXX. in Num 25:4, have—Παραδειγμάτισον αὐτοὺς τῷ Κυρίῳ, κατέναντι τοῦ ἡλίου, Make an example of them to the Lord before the sun: where the expression is used of persons executed by hanging. The simple form, δειγματίζειν, occurs in Col 2:15: for both δεῖγμα and παράδειγμα [from which the verbs are respectively derived] denote that which is exhibited as a public spectacle.—λάθρᾳ, privily) i.e. without a public trial, without even a record of the reason on the writing of divorcement. Two witnesses were sufficient.—ἀπολυσαῖ, to put her away) fearing to take her.

[54] In Bengel, “justus,” which, as well as the original, δίκαιος, signifies, and is translated, either just or righteous, as the case may require. In Bengel’s own German version, it is rendered in the present instance GERECHT, which is equally ambiguous.—(I. B.)

[55] Ex. gr. Virg. Ecl., “Injusta noverca.”—ED.

Bengel's Gnomon of the New Testament — English translation (T&T Clark, Edinburgh, 1860) — public domain. Text from a community e-Sword module.

Mat_1:19. Ἀνήρ] Although only her betrothed, yet, from the standpoint of the writers, designated as her husband. The common assumption of a proleptic designation (Gen_29:21) is therefore unfounded. It is different with τὴν γυναῖκά σου in Mat_1:20.

δίκαιος] not: aequus et benignus. So (after Chrysostom and Jerome) Euth. Zigabenus (διὰ τὴν πρᾳότητα καὶ ἀγαθωσύνην), Luther, Grotius, Kuinoel, Fritzsche, B.-Crusius, Bleek. For δίκαιος, like צַדַּיק, means generally, he who is as he ought to be (Hermann, ad Soph. Ajac. 543; Kühner, ad Xen. Memor. iv. 4. 5; Gesen. Thes. III. p. 1151); therefore rightly constituted, and, in a narrower sense, just, but never kind, although kindness, compassion, and the like may be in given cases the concrete form in which the δικαιοσύνη expresses itself. Here, according to the context, it denotes the man who acts in a strictly legal manner. Δίκαιος down to δειγματίσαι contains two concurring motives. Joseph was an upright man according to the law, and could not therefore make up his mind to retain Mary, as she was pregnant without him; at the same time he could not bring himself to abandon her publicly; he therefore resolved to adopt the middle way, and dismiss her secretly. Observe the emphasis of λάθρα.

δειγματίσαι] to expose; see on Col_2:15. Here the meaning is: to expose to public shame. This, however, does not refer to the punishment of stoning (Deu_22:23), which was to be inflicted; nor to a judicial accusation generally (the common view), because δειγματίσαι must mean a kind of dismissal opposed to that denoted by λάθρα; comp. de Wette. Therefore: he did not wish to compromise her, which would have been the result had he given her a letter of divorce, and thus dismissed her φανερῶς.

λάθρα] secretly, in private, i.e. by means of a secret, private interview, without a letter of divorce. This would, indeed, have been in opposition to the law in Deu_24:1, which applied also to betrothed persons (Maimonides, Tract. אישוֹת, c. 1; Wetstein in loc.; Philo, de leg. spec. p. 788); but he saw himself liable to a collision between the two cases,of either, in these circumstances, retaining the bride, or of exposing her to public censure by a formal dismissal; and from this no more legal way of escape presented itself than that on which he might with the more propriety lay hold, that the law itself in Deut. l.c. speaks only of married persons, not of betrothed. De Wette thinks, indeed, of dismissal by a letter of divorcement, but under arrangements providing for secrecy. But the letter of divorce of itself, as it was a public document (see Saalschütz, M. R. p. 800 ff.; Ewald, Alterth. p. 272 [E. T. p. 203 ff.]), is in contradiction with the λάθρα.

On the distinction between θέλω and βούλομαι,the former of which expresses willing in general, the action of the will, of the inclination, of desire, etc., in general; while βούλομαι denotes a carefully weighed self-determination,see Buttmann, Lexil. I. p. 26 ff. [E. T., Fishlake, p. 194 ff.], partly corrected by Ellendt, Lex. Soph. I. p. 316. Observe the aorist ἐβουλήθη: he adopted the resolution.

Meyer — Critical and Exegetical Commentary on the New Testament — English translation by Peter Christie, edited by Frederick Crombie (T&T Clark, 1880) — public domain. Text from a community e-Sword module.

Mat 1:19 . Ι . ὁ ἀνὴρ : proleptic, implying possession of a husband’s rights and responsibilities. The betrothed man had a duty in the matter δίκαιος … δειγμανίσαι . He was in a strait betwixt two. Being δίκαιος , just, righteous, a respecter of the law, he could not overlook the apparent fault; on the other hand, loving the woman, he desired to deal with her as tenderly as possible: not wishing to expose her ( αὐτὴν in an emphatic position before δειγματίσαι the loved one. Weiss-Meyer). Some (Grotius, Fritzsche, etc.) take δίκαιος in the sense of bonitas or benignitas , as if it had been ἀγαθός , so eliminating the element of conflict. ἐβουλήθη … αὐτήν . He finally resolved on the expedient of putting her away privately . The alternatives were exposure by public repudiation, or quiet cancelling of the bond of betrothal. Affection chose the latter. δειγματίσαι does not point, as some have thought, to judicial procedure with its penalty, death by stoning. λάθρα before ἀπολῦσαι is emphatic, and suggests a contrast between two ways of performing the act pointed at by ἀπολῦσαι . Note the synonyms θέλων and ἐβουλήθη . The former denotes inclination in general, the latter a deliberate decision between different courses maluit ( vide on chapter Mat 11:27 ).

The Expositor's Greek Testament, edited by W. Robertson Nicoll (1897–1910) — public domain. Text from a community e-Sword module.

Then Joseph her husband--Compare Mat 1:20, "Mary, thy wife." Betrothal was, in Jewish law, valid marriage. In giving Mary up, therefore, Joseph had to take legal steps to effect the separation.

being a just man, and not willing to make her a public example--to expose her (see Deu 22:23-24)

was minded to put her away privily--that is, privately by giving her the required writing of divorcement (Deu 24:1), in presence of only two or three witnesses, and without cause assigned, instead of having her before a magistrate. That some communication had passed between him and his betrothed, directly or indirectly, on the subject, after she returned from her three months' visit to Elizabeth, can hardly be doubted. Nor does the purpose to divorce her necessarily imply disbelief, on Joseph's part, of the explanation given him. Even supposing him to have yielded to it some reverential assent--and the Evangelist seems to convey as much, by ascribing the proposal to screen her to the justice of his character--he might think it altogether unsuitable and incongruous in such circumstances to follow out the marriage.

Jamieson, Fausset & Brown — Commentary Critical and Explanatory on the Whole Bible (1871) — public domain (CC PDM 1.0). Text via the HelloAO Bible API.

Verse 19. To make her a public example] παραδειγματισαι, to expose her to public infamy; from παρα, near, and δεικνυμαι, I show, or expose; what is oddly, though emphatically, called in England, showing up-exposing a character to public view. Though Joseph was a righteous man, δικαιος, and knew that the law required that such persons as he supposed his wife to be should be put to death, yet, as righteousness is ever directed by mercy, he determined to put her away or divorce her privately, i.e. without assigning any cause, that her life might be saved; and, as the offence was against himself, he had a right to pass it by if he chose. Some have supposed that the term δικαιος should be translated merciful, and it certainly often has this signification; but here it is not necessary.

Adam Clarke's Commentary on the Bible (1810–1826) — public domain. Text from a community e-Sword/MySword module.

(19) Joseph her husband.—The word was applied with strict accuracy from the moment of betrothal onwards.

Being a just man. . . .—The glimpse given us into the character of Joseph is one of singular tenderness and beauty. To him, conscious of being of the house of David, and cherishing Messianic hopes, what he heard would seem to come as blighting those hopes. He dared not, as a “righteous” man, take to himself one who seemed thus to have sinned. But love and pity alike hindered him from pressing the law, which made death by stoning the punishment of such a sin (Deu_22:21), or even from publicly breaking off the marriage on the ground of the apparent guilt. There remained the alternative, which the growing frequency of divorce made easy, of availing himself of a “writ of divorcement,” which did not necessarily specify the ground of repudiation, except in vague language implying disagreement (Mat_19:3). Thus the matter would be settled quietly without exposure. The “bill of divorcement” was as necessary for the betrothed as for those who were fully man and wife.

A Bible Commentary for English Readers, edited by Charles John Ellicott (1878–1897) — public domain. Text from a community e-Sword module.

19. being a just man] i. e. one who observed the law, and, therefore, feeling bound to divorce Mary. But two courses were open to him. He could either summon her before the law-courts to be judicially condemned and punished, or he could put her away by a bill of divorcement before witnesses, but without assigning cause. This is meant by “putting her away privily,” the more merciful course which Joseph resolved to adopt.

The Cambridge Bible for Schools and Colleges (gen. ed. J. J. S. Perowne; Cambridge University Press, 1878–1918) — public domain. Text from a community e-Sword module.

Then Joseph her husband,.... To whom she had been betrothed, and who was her husband, and she his wife according to the Jewish law, Deu 22:23 though not yet come together,

being a just man, observant of the law of God, particularly that which respected adultery, being wholly good and chaste, like the Patriarch of the same name; a character just the reverse of that which the Jews give him, in their scandalous (b) book of the life of Jesus; where, in the most malicious manner, they represent him as an unchaste and an unrighteous person:

and not willing to make her a public example, or to deliver her, i.e. to the civil magistrate, according to Munster's Hebrew edition. The Greek word signifies to punish by way of example to others, to deter them from sinning; and with the ancients it (c) denoted the greatest and severest punishment. Here it means either bringing her before the civil magistrate, in order to her being punished according to the law in Deu 22:23 which requires the person to be brought out to the gate of the city and stoned with stones, which was making a public example indeed; or divorcing her in a very public manner, and thereby expose her to open shame and disgrace. To prevent which, he being tender and compassionate, though strictly just and good,

was minded to put her away privily: he deliberately consulted and determined within himself to dismiss her, or put her away by giving her a bill of divorce, in a very private manner; which was sometimes done by putting it into the woman's hand or bosom, see Deu 24:1. In Munster's Hebrew Gospel it is rendered, "it was in his heart to forsake her privately."

(b) Teldos Jesu, p. 3. (c) A. Gellii Noct. Attic. l. 6. c. 14.

John Gill's Exposition of the Whole Bible (1746–1763) — public domain (CC PDM 1.0). Text via the HelloAO Bible API.

19 Then Joseph her husband, being a just man, and not willing to make her a publick example, was minded to put her away privily.

Ver. 19. Then Joseph her husband, being a just man] And yet withal a merciful, tender man of the Virgin’s credit. Hence that conflict and fear within himself lest he should not do right.

And not willing to make her a public example] That is, to wrong her, as the same word is used and expounded by the author to the Hebrews of the Son of God, as here of the mother of God, Heb 6:6; cf. Heb 10:29: παραδειγματισαι. Noluit ipse eam nec poenis, nec infamiae, imo nec risui exponere (Aret.).

Was minded to put her away privily] Which yet he could hardly have done, without blame to himself and blemish to her. So far out we are (the best of us) when destitute of Divine direction. How shamefully was that good Josiah miscarried by his passions to his cost, when he went up against Pharaohnecho, without once advising with Jeremiah, Zephaniah, Huldah, or any other prophet of God then living by him!

John Trapp, A Commentary or Exposition upon All the Books of the Old and New Testament (1647–1656) — public domain. Text from a community e-Sword module.

Her husband - The word in the original does not imply that they were married. It means here the man to whom she was espoused.

A just man - Justice consists in rendering to every man his own. Yet this is evidently not the character intended to be given here of Joseph. The meaning is that he was kind, tender, merciful; that he was so attached to Mary that he was not willing that she should be exposed to public shame. He sought, therefore, secretly to dissolve the connection, and to restore her to her friends without the punishment commonly inflicted on adultery. The word just has not unfrequently this meaning of mildness, or mercy. See 1Jo 1:9; compare Cicero, De Fin. 5, 23.

A public example - To expose her to public shame or infamy. Adultery has always been considered a crime of a very heinous nature. In Egypt, it was punished by cutting off the nose of the adulteress; in Persia, the nose and ears were cut off; in Judea, the punishment was death by stoning, Lev 20:10; Eze 16:38, Eze 16:40; Joh 8:5. This punishment was also inflicted where the person was not married, but betrothed, Deu 21:23-24. In this case, therefore, the regular punishment would have been death in this painful and ignominious manner. Yet Joseph was a religious man - mild and tender; and he was not willing to complain of her to the magistrate, and expose her to death, but sought to avoid the shame, and to put her away privately.

Put her away privily - The law of Moses gave the husband the power of divorce, Deu 24:1. It was customary in a bill of divorce to specify the causes for which the divorce was made, and witnesses were also present to testify to the divorce. But in this case, it seems, Joseph resolved to put her away without specifying the cause; for he was not willing to make her a public example. This is the meaning here of “privily.” Both to Joseph and Mary this must have been a great trial. Joseph was ardently attached to her, but her character was likely to be ruined, and he deemed it proper to separate her from him. Mary was innocent, but Joseph was not yet satisfied of her innocence. We may learn from this to put our trust in God. He will defend the innocent. Mary was in danger of being exposed to shame. Had she been connected with a cruel, passionate, and violent man, she would have died in disgrace. But God had so ordered it that she was betrothed to a man mild, amiable, and tender: and in due time Joseph was apprised of the truth in the case, and took his faithful and beloved wife to his bosom. Thus, our only aim should be to preserve a conscience void of offence, and God will guard our reputation. We may be assailed by slander; circumstances may be against us; but in due time God will take care to vindicate our character and save us from ruin. See Psa 37:5-6.

Albert Barnes' Notes on the Bible (1834–1885) — public domain. Text from a community e-Sword/MySword module.

And Joseph her husband, knowing her strict virtue, was surprised at this her pregnancy, but "being a just man," and not willing to expose her, by denouncing her, or giving her a bill of divorce, he had a mind to dismiss her privately, committing the cause to God. Let us learn from Joseph to be ever tender of our neighbour’s reputation, and never to entertain any injurious thoughts, or any suspicions to his prejudice. (Haydock)

George Leo Haydock (1774–1849), Haydock's Catholic Family Bible and Commentary, 1859 edition — public domain. Excludes Psalms (Douay-Rheims chapter numbering differs from Protestant) and Deuterocanonical books (Catholic canon only).

It was found she was with child, possibly herself or some of her friends told it to Joseph her espoused husband; it is plain from this text he came to the knowledge of it, for upon it, the evangelist saith, he

was minded to put her away privily. Had Joseph at this time heard and believed that the Holy Ghost had come upon her, and the power of the Most High overshadowed her, being a good man, he would not have entertained thoughts of putting her away. But though she had before received this revelation, and might possibly have communicated it to some of her friends, yet it is manifest that her husband Joseph had not heard it, or at least was not easy to believe a thing of so unusual and extraordinary a nature. That she was with child was evident, how she came to be so was as yet hidden from him in nature, and so incredible a thing, as it had argued too much of easiness of belief for him to have believed, had not Joseph had (as afterward he had) a Divine revelation for it: he therefore receiving such a report, and finding it to be true, resolves to put her away in the most private manner he could, rather than to expose her to a public shame, or to be made a public example. Their being betrothed was a thing publicly taken notice of, and he could not put her away so privately but there must be witnesses of it; the meaning therefore must be, as privately as the nature of the thing would bear. Joseph in this case had the choice of three things:

1. He might, notwithstanding this, have taken her to his house as his wife, for the law of divorce, or putting away, was but a law giving a liberty in case of a discerned uncleanness to put away the wife, it did not lay any under an obligation so to do.

2. He might give her a bill of divorce, and leave her with her friends. Now those skilled in the Jewish writings tell us this might be done, either more privately before two or three witnesses, putting a writing of that import into her bosom; or more openly and publicly before the magistrate.

3. He might, according to the law, Deu 22:23,24, &c., have brought her forth to be examined, whether she had only suffered a rape, or had herself consented. If it was done with her consent, she was by the law to be stoned.

Of these Joseph, in his first thoughts upon the matter, and before he rightly did understand the thing, chooseth the second and the milder part, and resolves to put her away, but in the most private manner the law would in that case allow him. He did this (saith the evangelist) because he was

a just man, where the term δικαιος signifieth equitable, in opposition to severity and rigour; nor ought any to say Joseph in this showed himself an unjust man, because by the law she ought to have been stoned to death; for that is a mistake. Supposing she had been with child by man, yet if she had been forced the man only was to die, Deu 22:25,26; or she might have been with child before her betrothing, in which case she was only obliged to marry him that had so abused her. A kind and equitable man always presumes the best, especially in a case where life is concerned; besides that, no doubt Mary had by this time told Joseph the truth, and what the angel had said to her, to which (it being so incredible a thing as not to be believed but upon a Divine revelation) though Joseph was not obliged, having as yet no such revelation, to give a present easy faith, yet he might reasonably give so much credit as to resolve upon the mildest course he could take, though he was willing also to avoid the blot upon himself by taking her to him for his wife according to his contract. God will not leave so good a man long unresolved what to do.

Matthew Poole's English Annotations on the Holy Bible (1683–1685) — public domain. Text from a community e-Sword/MySword module.

19. Just man — Just, not in its severe sense, but in its milder meaning of a fair man, unwilling to inflict unnecessary misery, even in effecting a proper penalty. Make her a public example — By the terrible death, namely, by being stoned to death with her accomplice, prescribed in Deu_22:23-24. Put her away privily — By simply a note of dismissal or bill of divorcement, as described in Deu_24:1.

Daniel D. Whedon (gen. ed.), Commentary on the Old and New Testaments (1874–1909) — public domain. Text from a community e-Sword module.

Then Joseph her husband; and (Revised Version). The thought is slightly adversative (de); though this was "of the Holy Ghost," yet Joseph was about to put her away. Being a just man; righteous (Revised Version); i.e. who strove to conform to the Divine precepts manifested for him in the Law. (cf. Luk_1:6 Luk_2:25) And not willing; i.e. "and yet not wishing," though the Law, which he was striving to follow, seemed to inculcate harshness. This clause has been taken in the opposite sense equivalent to "and therefore not wishing," because the spirit of the Law, which he had learned to understand, was in reality against all unnecessary harshness. The negative used (if it can be at all insisted upon; cf. Simcox, "Language of the New Testament," p. 188) is in favour of the former interpretation. To make her a public example; rather, to proclaim her ("Wold not pupplische her, Wickliffe); a very authsai . (cf. Col_2:15) The thought is of public proclamation of the fact of the divorce, not that of bringing Mary herself forward for public punishment, and so making her a public example (paradeigmatisai). Was minded (eboulhyh). The tense indicates the resolution come to as the result of the conflict between duty and wish implied in the preceding clause. To put her away secretly. Adopting the most private form of legal divorce, and handing the letter to her privately in presence of only two witnesses, to whom he need not communicate his reasons (cf. Edersheim, "Life," 1:154). Observe in this verse Joseph"s insistance on his personal and family purity, and yet his delicate thoughtfulness for her whom he loved.

HOMILIES BY P.C. BARKER Ver. 19. Suggestions of just ways of covering sin.

The contents of this verse and the following are, so far as they go, corroborating evidence of the supernatural origin and superhuman incarnation of our Lord Jesus Christ. For if these things be not the truth respecting him, then will these verses also have to rank among the supposed cunningly devised fables; whereas in very truth their aspect is of the most opposite character. The aspect of these verses and their connection are strikingly of the real and the matter-of-fact. They present themselves and they speak so naturally. In those days of the Church"s history which saw casuistry at its most flourishing, it may easily be imagined that the point would have been considered a most legitimately profitable one for argument, whether Joseph were more entitled or less entitled to the epithet of "a just man," in that he had it in his mind to "put away privily" his espoused wife rather than at once make a public example of what would too probably soon become a public scandal. And again, whether his intention to do this privily" savoured most of regard for public advantage, or of self regard, or of regard for the supposed erring woman. From our point of view, any approach to the casuistical may be safely dispensed with. But in place thereof, we may fitly make this verse the occasion for inquiring what are some of the determining or guiding considerations which may be held to justify the disposition to shield human fault, sin, fall, rather than to expose it. We are on the safe side

I WHEN WE SEEK TO SHIELD A PERSON, THE SINNER, FROM PUBLIC EXPOSURE RATHER THAN SAY A WORD, EITHER TO HIMSELF OR TO THE PUBLIC, IN THE NATURE OF EXTENUATING THE SIN.

II WHEN WE SEEK TO SHIELD ANOTHER RATHER THAN ONE"S SELF.

III WHEN WE SEEK TO SHIELD THE PERSON WHO, EITHER BY NATURE OR BY INDIVIDUAL TEMPERAMENT, WOULD TAKE DISPROPORTIONATE SUFFERING; as, e.g. :

1. A woman, in anything that especially concerns the nature of woman.

2. Or any one whose known sensitiveness would render him liable to abnormal suffering.

IV WHEN WE SEEK TO SHIELD FROM EXPOSURE CERTAIN KINDS OF SIN, VIZ. THOSE WHICH UNIVERSAL OBSERVATION TELLS US DO IN THE VERY ANNOUNCEMENT OF THEM SERVE TO EXCITE UNHEALTHY INTEREST, PRURIENT CURIOSITY. In not a few cases, notoriety undoubtedly attracts instead of deterring. It attracts also not in mere morbid and exceptional cases, but in virtue of a fascination not indeed otherwise explainable, but very easily explained when some of the radical vice of human nature is confessed. In the present instance, it is to be understood by the reverent reader of the history that Joseph, as "a just man," felt he had no choice but

(1) to put away the woman who seemed to have erred;

(2) to put her away privily, in order to avoid both public scandal as far as possible and unadvisable aggravation of her and his own feelings. The justifiableness of qualifications of this kind is amply illustrated by the conduct of Christ himself, alike in the instance of the woman "taken in adultery," and in that of Mary Magdalene. B.

Justice is considerateness.

Very little is known concerning Joseph the husband of Mary; and yet enough is known to reveal a character. And what more especially shows him up to our view is his determination to do what was right, but to do it kindly. According to Jewish ideas, betrothal was as sacred as marriage, and infidelities before marriage were treated as infidelities after marriage, and death by stoning was the punishment for such sins. It was customary for persons to be engaged, or espoused, for twelve months, and during that time the persons did not see each other. Mary had to tell Joseph, and Joseph had to act under the circumstances in the way that seemed best. He was a just man, but he was a kind man. No doubt what Mary told him made a great demand on his faith. He does not seem to have been able to receive her mysterious story until his mind was divinely guided; then he married Mary, and at the time that Jesus was born Joseph was her recognized husband.

I THE JUST MAN WANTS TO DO THE RIGHT. But it is always difficult to decide what is right when other people are affected by our decision. When we have to judge the conduct of others we easily make mistakes. We judge as if persons acted from the motives which decide our action. It was easy for Joseph to explain Mary"s conduct, and see quite sufficient ground for refusing any further relations with her. And in forming judgment on such grounds, he would have been altogether wrong, and he would have unworthily dealt with Mary. She was no wilful sinner; she had only come into the sovereign power and grace of God. In trying to be just there is grave danger of our becoming most unjust. See Eli"s suspicion of Hannah.

II THE JUST MAN WANTS TO DO THE KIND. Noble-minded men let mercy tone judgment. Ignoble-minded men love to persecute, and call it punishment. Charity hideth sin; is jealous concerning imperilled reputation; and suffers most deeply when punishment must be inflicted. So God"s mercy loves to rejoice over judgment. R.T.

The Pulpit Commentary (1880–1919), ed. H.D.M. Spence-Jones & Joseph S. Exell — public domain. Text from a community e-Sword module.

A just man -- a strict observer of the law: therefore not thinking it right to keep her.

John Wesley, Explanatory Notes Upon the Whole Bible (1754–1765) — public domain. Text via the GEBible commentary corpus.

At this critical juncture, Joseph proved himself all that a true Christian should be:

v. 19. Then Joseph, her husband, being a just man, and not willing to make her a public example, was minded to put her away privily.

Unable to believe her innocent, which in the face of the evidence must have been beyond the average man’s strength, he nevertheless found a way out of the difficult dilemma. As the betrothed husband he had the husband’s rights and responsibilities. And he was a just man, righteous, a respecter of the Law, which was especially strict and uncompromising on the subject of infidelity in the woman, Deu 22:22-24. Yet he did not wish to expose Mary publicly and thus heap ignominy and shame upon her, for she was the woman to whom he had given the love of a husband. His humaneness and benevolence, his affection, were put to a severe test. But the result of his weighing the matter was that he did not choose strict measures, resolving rather upon a quiet cancellation of the bond of betrothal, without assigning a cause, in order that her life might be saved. Justice was tempered by mercy.

Paul E. Kretzmann, Popular Commentary of the Bible (1921–1924) — public domain. Text from a community e-Sword module.

That is, being an holy person, and a strict observer of the rites of his nation, he was unwilling to accompany with a defiled woman, and therefore minded to put her away, by giving a bill of divorce into her hand before two witnesses; but being kind and gentle, he intended to put her away privily, lest she should have be exposed and stoned to death.

Observe here, How early our dear Lord’s sufferings began; he and his mother are designed to be put away, even when he was but an embryo in the womb.

Observe further, from the great clemency of Joseph towards the suspected virgin, that kind and merciful men always presume the best, and prosecute with gentleness, especially where life is concerned. Meek Joseph doth resolve upon the milder course, and chooses rather to put her away privily, than publicly to expose her. Lev 19:20; Gen 6:9; Gen 38:24; Deu 24:1-4

William Burkitt's Expository Notes on the New Testament (1700–1703) — public domain. Text from a community e-Sword module.

19. Joseph her husband. Betrothal, according to the law (Deut. 22:24), made him her husband before marriage. A righteous man. Just and humane. To put her away publicly was to expose her to the penalty of death. Probably she had made her defense to him, but her story was so wonderful that he was in doubt. Privily. Give her a bill of divorce. See Deut. 24:1.

B. W. Johnson's The People's New Testament with Notes (1889–1891) — public domain. Electronic text from the Christian Classics Ethereal Library (CCEL) ThML edition.

19. δίκαιος ὤν, ‘since he was a just man,’ i.e. one who observed the law, and, therefore, feeling bound to divorce Mary. But two courses were open to him. He could either summon her before the law-courts to be judicially condemned and punished, or he could put her away by a bill of divorcement before witnesses, but without assigning cause. This is meant by λάθρα ἀπολῦσαι αὐτήν, the more merciful course which Joseph resolved to adopt. The tradition of mediæval art that Joseph was an old man at this time rests on no scriptural evidence, but the fact that he disappears from the Gospel history after Luk 2:51, and the inference that he died before our Lord’s ministry began are adduced in support of that view.

καὶ μὴ θέλων. καὶ appears to have a restrictive force and to be equivalent to καίτοι. See Jelf, 759. 3, and Campbell’s Soph. Introd. § 25. 2. 6. Cp. ὦ στέφανε χαίρων ἄπιθι καί σʼ ἄκων ἐγὼ | λείπω, Aristoph. Eq. 1250, and καὶ θεὸς ἐμμὶ καὶ οὐ δύναμαί σε διώκειν, Bion, Id. I. 53. In all these passages, however, it is better to see the restrictive or adversative force not in the connecting particle but in the contrasted clauses and to regard καὶ as simply conjunctive. See Winer, 545.

μὴ θέλων, ‘since he was unwilling,’ quum nollet. In modern Greek μὴ is always the negative used with participles. Perhaps the origin of the usage may be traced to the fact that the participle generally explains the motive or condition of an action and so would require μὴ rather than οὐ. Then from the tendency to grammatical uniformity the usage became universal. In the N.T. there is a close approach in this respect to the rule of modern Greek.

δειγματίσαι, ‘to display,’ ‘exhibit,’ here ‘to expose in open court,’ as opposed to λάθρα ἀπολῦσαι. παραδειγματίσαι—the reading of the received text—is used by Polybius of punishing the guilty for an example to others, II. 60. 7, XV. 32. 5, et alibi, see Schweighäuser sub voc. The simple verb which does not appear to be classical is found in the sense of ‘displaying’ as in a triumph in Col 2:15, τὰς ἐξουσίας ἐδειγμάτισεν ἐν παρρησίᾳ, see Bp Lightfoot on the passage. The modern Greek version νὰ θεατρίσῃ conveys the idea of exposure simply.

Cambridge Greek Testament for Schools and Colleges (Cambridge University Press, 1896; 21 vols, various authors incl. Carr, Maclear, Plummer, Farrar, Lumby, Moule, M. R. James, Simcox) — public domain. Text from a community e-Sword module.

19. ἀνήρ] so called, though they were as yet but betrothed: so in Gen 29:21: Deu 22:24.

δίκαιος] just; καὶ μὴ θ. being, as the μή plainly shews, not the explanation of δίκαιος, but an additional particular. He was a strict observer of the law,—and (yet) not willing to expose her. The sense of ‘kind,’ ‘merciful,’ is inadmissible.

λάθρα] Not ‘without any writing of divorcement,’ which would have been unlawful; but according to the form prescribed in Deu 24:1. The husband might either do this, or adopt the stronger course of bringing his wife (or betrothed, who had the same rights, Maimon. in Wetstein, and Philo de legg. , ad cap. 6 Est_7 decal. § 12, vol. ii. p. 311, αἱ ὁδμολογίαι γάμοις ἰσοδυναμοῦσι) to justice openly. The punishment in this case would have been death by stoning. Deu 22:23. Maimonides (quoted by Buxtorf de divort.) says, “Femina ex quo desponsata est, licet nondum a viro cognita, est uxor viri, et si sponsus earn velit repudiare, oportet, ut id faciat libello repudii.”

ἐβουλήθη] intended,—was minded: θέλω expresses the mere wish, βούλομαι the wish ripened into intention: see 1Ti 5:14, note, and Buttmann’s Lexilogus, i. p. 26.

Henry Alford, The Greek Testament (1849–1861) — public domain. Text from a community e-Sword module.

(P) 19. And, Joseph her husband, being a righteous man, and (yet) not wishing to disgrace her, was minded to put her away secretly.]—ὁ ἀνὴρ αὐτῆς] According to Jewish law, a betrothed woman was already the wife of her betrothed husband; cf. Merx, op. cit. p. 10.—δίκαιος] i.e. God-fearing, and a keeper of the law. Mary’s condition seemed to make the fulfilment of their contract of marriage impossible for a religious man.—μὴ θέλων δειγματίσαι] On the other hand, he did not wish to expose her to shame. δειγματίσαι occurs besides only Col 2:15, Asc. Is. in Am. Pap. i. I. viii. 21.δειγματισμός occurs on the Rosetta Stone.—λάθρα ἂπολῦσαι] Appeal to the courts for a divorce would expose Mary to public ignominy, and make her liable to severe penalties. Refusal to carry out the contract of marriage would leave her and her child in disgrace in the house of her parents. The latter seemed the more merciful course, and Joseph determined, therefore, to repudiate her by private arrangement.

19. ὀ ἀνὴρ αὐτῆς] Om. S2—δειγματίσαι] So אa B. Z Ox; Eus. Quæst. i. 3. The word is very rare. It occurs in Col 2:15 and in Asc. Is. in Am. Pap. 1. i. viii. 21. Here it presumably means to expose to open and notorious disgrace. δειγματισμός on the Rosetta Stone means “inspection.” Cf Herwerden, Lex. Græc. Suppl. p. 190. א* C E K L al substitute the more common παραδειγματίσαι, which occurs in the LXX. 5 times, Num 25:4, Est 4:17, Jer 13:22, Eze 28:17, Dan 2:5; Ps.-Son 2:14, in Polyb. and Plut.

International Critical Commentary — older volumes (1896–1929), various authors — public domain. Text from a community e-Sword module.

Not willing [μη θελων] - was minded [εβουληθη] . These two words, describing the working of Joseph 's mind, and evidently intended to express different phases of thought, open the question of their distinctive meanings in the New Testament, where they frequently occur [θελω much oftener than βουλομαι] , and where the rendering, in so many cases by the same words, furnishes no clue to the distinction. The original words are often used synonymously in cases where no distinction is emphasized; but their use in other cases reveals a radical and recognized difference. An interchange is inadmissable when the greater force of the expression requires qelein. For instance, boulesqai would be entirely inappropriate at Mt 8:3, "I will, be thou cleansed;" or at Rom 7:15.

The distinction, which is abundantly illustrated in Homer, is substantially maintained by the classical writers throughout, and in the New Testament.

Qelein is the stronger word, and expresses a purpose or determination or decree, the execution of which is, or is believed to be, in the power of him who wills. Boulesqai expresses wish, inclination, or disposition, whether one desires to do a thing himself or wants some one else to do it. Qelein, therefore, denotes the active resolution, the will urging on to action. Boulesqai is to have a mind, to desire, sometimes a little stronger, running into the sense of purpose. Qelein indicates the impulse of the will; boulesqai, its tendency. Boulesqai can always be rendered by qelein, but qelein cannot always be expressed by boulesqai.

Thus, Agamemnon says, "I would not [ουκ εθελον] receive the ransom for the maid (i. e., I refused to receive), because I greatly desire [βουλομαι] to have her at home" (Homer, "Il.," 1 112). So Demosthenes : "It is fitting that you should be willing [εθελειν] to listen to those who wish [βουλομενων] to advise" (" Olynth., "1 1). That is to say, It is in your power to determine whether or not you will listen to those who desire to advise you, but who power to do so depends on your consent. Again :" If the gods will it [θελωσι] and you wish it [βουλησθε] "(Demosth.," Olynth., " 2 20). 1

In the New Testament, as observed above, though the words are often interchanged, the same distinction is recognized. Thus, Mt 2:18, "Rachael would not [ηθελε] be comforted;" obstinately and positively refused. Joseph, having the right and power under the (assumed) circumstances to make Mary a public example, resolved [θελων] to spare her this exposure. Then the question arose - What should he do? On this he thought, and, having thought [ενθυμηθεντος] , his mind inclined (tendency), he was minded [εβουληθη] to put her away secretly.

Some instances of the interchanged use of the two words are the following : Mr 14:15, "Pilate willing" [βουλομενος] ; compare Luk 23:20, "Pilate willing" [θελων] . Act 27:43, "The centurion willing" [βουλομενος] ; Mt 27:17, "Whom will ye that I release" [θελετε] ; so ver. 21. Joh 18:39, "Will ye that I release" [βουλεσθε] ; Mt 14:5, "When he would have put him to death" [θελων] . Mr 6:48, "He would have passed by them" [ηθελε] ; Act 19:30, "Paul would have entered" [βουλομενου] . Act 18:27, "He was disposed to pass" [βουλομενου] . Tit 3:8, "I will that thou affirm" [βουλομαι] . Mr 6:25, "I will that though give me" [θελω] , etc., etc.

In the New Testament qelw occurs in the following senses :

1. A decree or determination of the will.

(a) Of God (Mt 12:7; Rom 9:16, 18; Act 18:21; 1Co 4:19; 1Co 12:18; 1Co 14:38).

(b) Of Christ (Mt 8:3; Joh 17:24; Joh 5:21; Joh 21:22).

(c) Of men (Act 25:9). Festus, having the power to gratify the Jews, and determining to do so, says to Paul, who has the right to decide, "Wilt thou go up to Jerusalem ?" Joh 6:67, Others of the disciples had decided to leave Jesus. Christ said to the twelve, "Will ye also go away?" Is that your determination? Joh 7:17, I any man sets his will, is determined to do God 's will. Joh 8:44, The lusts of your father your will is set to do. Act 24:6.

2. A wish or desire. Very many of the passages, however, which are cited under this head (as by Grimm) may fairly be interpreted as implying something stronger than a wish; notably Mr 14:36, of Christ in Gethsemane. Our Lord would hardly have used what thou wilt in so feeble a sense as that of a desire or wish on God 's part. Mr 10:43, "Whosoever will be great," expresses more than the desire for greatness. It is the purpose of the life. Mt 27:15, It was given to the Jews to decide what prisoner should be released. Luk 1:62, The name of the infant John was referred to Zacharias' decision. Joh 17:24, Surely Christ does more than desire that those whom the Father has given him shall be with him. Luk 9:54, It is for Jesus to command fire upon the Samaritan villages if he so wills. (See, also, Joh 14:7; 1Co 4:21; Mt 16:25, Mt 19:17, Joh 21:22; Mt 13:28; Mt 17:12.) In the sense of wish or desire may fairly be cited 2Co 11:12; Mt 12:38; Luk 8:20; Luk 23:8; Joh 12:21; Gal 4:20; Mt 7:12; Mr 10:35.

3. A liking (Mr 12:38; Luk 20:46; Mt 27:43). (See note there.)

Boulomai occurs in the following senses :

1. Inclination or disposition (Act 18:27; Act 19:30; Act 25:22; Act 28:18; 2Co 1:15).

2. Stronger, with the idea of purpose (1Ti 6:9; Jas 1:18; Jas 3:4; 1Co 12:11; Heb 6:17).

In most, if not all of these cases, we might expect qelein; but this use of boulomai there is an implied emphasis on the element of free choice or self - determination, which imparts to the desire or inclination a decretory force. This element is in the human will by gift and consent. In the divine will it is inherent. At this point the Homeric usage may be compared in its occasional employment of boulomai to express determination, but only with reference to the gods, in whom to wish is to will. Thus, "Whether Apollo will [βουλεται] ward off the plague" (" Il., "1 67)." Apollo willed [βουλετο] victory to the Trojans "(Il.," 7 21).

To make a public example [δειγματισαι] . The word is kindred to deiknumi, to exhibit, display, point out. Here, therefore, to expose Mary to public shame (Wyc., publish her; Tyn., defame her). The word occurs in Col 2:15, of the victorious Savior displaying the vanquished powers of evil as a general displays his trophies or captives in a triumphal procession. "He made a show of them openly." A compound of the same word [παραδειγματιζω] appears in Heb 6:6, "They crucify the Son of God afresh, and put him to an open shame."

Marvin R. Vincent, Word Studies in the New Testament (1887–1900) — public domain. Text from a community e-Sword/MySword module.