Hebrews 9:16

(16) Testament.—As has been already pointed out, the greatest difference of opinion has existed in regard to the meaning of the Greek word diathçkç in this passage. (See Note on Heb_7:22.) It will be seen at once that the interpretation of this verse and the next entirely depends on that one question. If “testament” is the correct meaning of the Greek word, the general sense of the verses is well given in the Authorised version. A few commentators even agree with that version in carrying back the idea of testament into Heb_9:15, although in the other two places in which the word is joined with “Mediator” (Heb_8:6; Heb_12:24) they adhere to the ordinary rendering, “covenant.” By most, however, it is held that a new thought is introduced in the present verse. The writer, it is urged, having spoken of a promise of an inheritance, (Heb_9:15), and a promise that cannot be made valid unless death take place, avails himself of the illustration which a second (and very common) meaning of the leading word affords; and though a covenant has hitherto been in his thoughts, he adds interest and force to his argument by calling up the analogy of a testament or will. It is further urged that this procedure will not seem unnatural if we reflect that the diathçkç between God and man is never exactly expressed by covenant, since it is not of the nature of a mutual compact between equals. (See Heb_7:22.) The position is chiefly defended by two arguments:—(1) Heb_9:16, being a general maxim, gives no intelligible sense in regard to a covenant, but is easy and natural as applied to a will. (2) A Greek word used in Heb_9:17, where the literal translation is “over (the) dead,” cannot be used of sacrifices of slain animals, but of men only. This, we believe, is a fair statement of the case on the one side; and it may be fully acknowledged that, if Heb_9:16-17 stood alone, and if they were written of Gentile rather than Jewish usage, the case would be very strong. As it is, we are compelled to believe that the difficulties which this interpretation brings with it are beyond comparison more serious than those which it removes. (1) There is no doubt that in the overwhelming majority of New Testament passages the meaning covenant must be assigned. By many high authorities these verses are considered to contain the only exception. (2) In the LXX. the word is extremely common, both for the covenants of God and for compacts between man and man. (See Note on Heb_7:22). (3) The application of diathçkç in this Epistle rests on the basis of the Old Testament usage, the key passage being Jer_31:31-34, quoted at length in Hebrews 8. With that quotation this passage is linked by the association of diathçkç with Mediator in Heb_9:15 and Heb_8:6, and with “the first” in Heb_9:15 and in Heb_8:13; Heb_9:1. (4) In the verses which follow this passage the meaning covenant must certainly return, as a comparison of Heb_9:20 with the verse of Exodus which it quotes (Exo_24:8) will show. (5) It is true that the idea of “death” has appeared in Heb_9:15, but it is the death of a sin-offering; and there is no natural or easy transition of thought from an expiatory death to the death of a testator. And yet the words which introduce Heb_9:16; Heb_9:18 (“For” and “Wherefore”) show that we are following the course of an argument. (6) Though to us Heb_9:16 may present a very familiar thought, we must not forget that to Jews dispositions by will were almost altogether unknown. Were it granted that a writer might for illustration avail himself of a second meaning which a word he is using might happen to bear, this liberty would only be taken if by that means familiar associations could be reached, and the argument or exhortation could be thus urged home. In an Epistle steeped in Jewish thought such a transition as that suggested would be inexplicable. There are other considerations of some weight which might be added; but these seem sufficient to prove that, even if the difficulties of interpretation should prove serious, we must not seek to remove them by wavering in our rendering of diathçkç in these verses. We believe, therefore, that the true translation of Heb_9:16-17, must be the following:—For where a covenant is, there must of necessity be brought in the death of the covenanter. For a covenant is of force when there hath been death (literally, over the dead); for hath it ever any strength while the covenanter liveth? In Heb_9:15 we have seen the two-fold reference of the death of Jesus, to the past and to the future. As High Priest He has offered Himself as a sin-offering to cleanse the conscience from dead works; the same offering is also looked on as a ransom redeeming from the penalty of past transgressions; and, still by means of His death, He has, as Mediator, established a new covenant. We are reminded at once of the words of Jesus Himself, “This cup is the new covenant in My blood” (1Co_11:25). It is this very thought which the writer proceeds to develop: a covenant cannot be established without death—cannot exist at all. That amongst Jews and Greeks and Romans alike covenants were confirmed by sacrifice we need not pause to prove; of this usage we have the earliest example in Genesis 15. In such sacrifices, again, there is “brought in,” or assumed the death of him who makes the covenant. There will not, perhaps, be much difficulty in accepting this as a maxim. The conflict of opinion really begins when we ask in what manner this is assumed. The usual answer is, that the death of victims is emblematic of the punishment which the contracting parties imprecated on themselves if they should break their compact. It may have been so amongst the Greeks and Romans, though this is doubtful.[11] Amongst the Jews, however, the analogy of their general sacrificial system, in which the victim represented the offerer, renders such an explanation very improbable. As to the precise idea implied in this representation, it is not easy to speak with certainty. It has been defined in two opposite ways. In the death of the victim each contracting party may be supposed to die either as to the future, in respect of any power of altering the compact (the covenant shall be as safe from violation through change of intention as if the covenanter were removed by death); or as to the past, to the former state of enmity each is now dead. It is not necessary for our argument to decide such a question as this. The only material points are, that a covenant must be established over sacrifices, and that in such a sacrifice “the death of him that made the covenant” must in some manner be “brought in” or assumed. There remains only the application to the particular covenant here spoken of. If this be taken as made between God and man, the sacrificial death of Jesus in man’s stead ratified the covenant for ever, the former state of separation being brought to an end in “the reconciliation” of the gospel. The peculiar character of Heb_9:15, however (see above), seems rather to suggest that, as Jesus is set forth as High Priest and sacrifice, so He is both the Author of the covenant and the sacrifice which gives to it validity. In this case we see represented in His sacrifice the death of each “covenanter.” (The transition from “Mediator” to Giver of the covenant is not greater than that which the other interpretation requires—a transition from a mediator of a testament to a testator.) There are minor points relating to details in the Greek which cannot be dealt with here. Of the two arguments quoted above, the former has, we hope, been fully met; though (it may be said in passing) it would be easier to give up Heb_9:16 as a general maxim, and to regard it as applying only to a covenant between God and sinful man, than to divorce the whole passage from the context by changing “covenant” into “will.” One point of interest must not be omitted. There are coincidences of expression with Psa_1:5 which make it very probable that that Psalm, memorable in the development of the teaching of the Old Testament, was distinctly in the writer’s mind. This comparison is also of use in the explanation of some expressions in the original of these two verses.

[11] See Mr. Wratislaw’s very interesting note in his “Notes and Dissertations,” pp. 155, 156. The whole subject is very carefully treated in an admirable pamphlet by Professor Forbes, of Aberdeen.

A Bible Commentary for English Readers, edited by Charles John Ellicott (1878–1897) — public domain. Text from a community e-Sword module.

Heb 9:16-17. For where a testament is — That is, where there is a covenant, which is also a testament; there must of necessity be the death of the testator — As if he had said, The reason why there was a necessity that Christ should die, is taken from the nature of the covenant whereof he is Mediator, which covenant is also a testament, and therefore could not be of force but by his death. For a testament is of force — Has validity; after men are dead — When, and not before, the legatees may claim their legacies. Otherwise it is of no strength at all while the testator liveth — And therefore hath power to alter his will at pleasure. But it is not necessary that the expression του διαθεμενου, at the end of Heb 9:16, should signify a testator, properly so called: it may mean only a promiser, and one that confirms his promise with his own blood. For διατιθημι, according to Phavorinus, is, I promise, I covenant; and διατιθεσθαι διαθηκην is very commonly in profane authors, to enter into covenant; and in the same sense the phrase is used in the Old Testament; and therefore the participle διαθεμενος, derived from the same verb, must probably have the same signification here, in which it is continually used by the LXX., and which it always bears in the New Testament. Thus, Act 3:25, Ye are the children, διαθηκης ης διεθετο, of the covenant which God made with our fathers; Luk 22:29; καγω διατιθεμαι υμιν, and I appoint to you a kingdom, καθως διεθετο, as my Father hath appointed to me. So in this epistle, Heb 8:10; Heb 10:16, αυτη η διαθηκη ην διαθησομαι, This is the covenant which I will make with the house of Israel. And because covenants were usually made victimas cædendo, by sacrifices, as the Hebrew, Greek, and Latin expressions used in the making of covenants show; accordingly, the new covenant was established in the blood of Jesus. Hence the apostle speaks thus of this covenant, and the appointed disposer or maker of it. This sense of the passage is defended at large by Dr. Macknight, in a note too long to be here quoted. His paraphrase on it is as follows: “And for this reason, that the death of Christ is so efficacious, [namely, as is set forth in Heb 9:13-14,] of the new covenant he is the Mediator, or High-Priest, by whom its blessings are dispensed; and also the sacrifice by which it is procured and ratified; that his death being accomplished for obtaining the pardon of the transgressions of the first covenant, believers of all ages and nations, as the called seed of Abraham, (Rom 8:28,) may receive the promised eternal inheritance. For where a covenant is made by sacrifice, there is a necessity that the death of the appointed sacrifice be produced. For — According to the practice of God and man; a covenant is made firm over dead sacrifices, seeing it never hath force while the goat, calf, or bullock, appointed as the sacrifice of ratification, liveth. Because from the beginning God ratified his covenant by sacrifice, to preserve among men the expectation of the sacrifice of his Son; hence not even the covenant of Sinai was made without sacrifice.”

Joseph Benson's Commentary on the Old and New Testaments (1811–1818) — public domain. Text from a community e-Sword module.

III

In the concluding of this New Covenant the blood of Christ was indispensable

Heb_9:16-22

16For where a testament is, there must also of necessity be [be adduced or declared, φέρεσθαι] the death of the testator. 17For a testament is of force after men are dead: otherwise it is of no strength at all [since it scarcely is of any force] while the testator 18liveth. Whereupon [whence, ὅθεν] neither [not even, οὐδέ]9 the first testament was [has been] dedicated [inaugurated] without blood. 19For when Moses had spoken every precept to all the people according to the10 law, he took the blood of calves and of goats,11 with water, and scarlet wool, and hyssop, and sprinkled12 both the book [itself, 20 αὐτό] and all the people, Saying, This is the blood of the testament [or, covenant] 21which God hath [om. hath] enjoined unto you. Moreover [And] he sprinkled likewise with blood both the tabernacle, and all the vessels of the ministry [service]. 22And almost [parety nearly, or about, σχεδόν] all things are by the law purged with blood; and without shedding of blood is [there takes place] no remission.

[Heb_9:16.—φέρεσθαι, not be, as E. V., but, adduced, declared, Alf., implied; Words., brought to pass; many, afferri coram judice, of establishing judicially; Moll renders “beigebracht werden.”

Heb_9:17.—ἐπὶ νεκροῖς, over the dead, in case of the dead, lit., on condition of persons as dead.—ἐπεί μήποτε elegantly softening and appealing rather to the judgment of the reader; “for look whether perchance it has force;” see if it be not perhaps invalid. It is by no means intensive, as in the E. V., “it has no force at all.” Otherwise it should be taken as a question: “Since does it at all=it does not at all, does it?”

Heb_9:18.—ὃθεν, whence, logical.—οὐδέ., not even.—ἐγκεκαίνισται, Perf., has been inaugurated, not, was dedicated. The Perf, implies that it stands before our eyes.

Heb_9:19.—λαληθείσης γάρ, for after every commandment was spoken, etc.—αὐτό τε τὸ βιβλίον, both the book itself.

Heb_9:20.—ἐνετείλατο, Aor., enjoined, not, hath enjoined.

Heb_9:21.—καὶ τὴν σκηνὴν δέ, and the tabernacle too; so καί—δέ, constantly and elegantly used in Greek. Not quite as in E. V. and Alf., and moreover.

Heb_9:22.—καὶ σχεδόν, and pretty much, pretty nearly, as one might say. It does not like our almost (Gr. ὀλίγου δεῖν) positively exclude a part, but simply declines to guarantee the exact accuracy of the statement. Almost, therefore, is never its proper rendering. Alf. renders almost, but adds parenthetically, one may say that, which is sufficiently exact.—αὶματεκχυσία, either shedding of blood in the slaughter of the victim, or pouring out of the blood of the victim when slaughtered; the former here seems more probable. Αἱματεκ., “seems to be a word coined by the sacred writer, to express his meaning.” Alf.—γίνεται, takes place.—K.].

EXEGETICAL AND CRITICAL

Heb_9:16. For where a testament is, etc.—Attempts have been very naturally made (springing from the ὄθεν of Heb_9:18, and the γάρ connecting this verse with Heb_9:15), to take διαθήκη here in its ordinary sense of covenant (Crit. Sacr., VII. 2 p., 1067 sq., Seb. Schmidt, Michaelis, Cramer, Ebrard, etc.). They are convicted at once, however, of error, by the utter falseness of the idea that in the formation of a covenant the death of Him who framed it is indispensable to its validity, as well as by the intolerable harshness of any other mode of explaining ὁ διαθέμενος. For although ἐπὶ νεκροῖς might indeed denote “over slaughtered sacrificial victims,” inasmuch as in later usage τὸ νεκρόν, is frequently=τὸ πτῶμα,—it is impossible that ὁ διαθέμενος can be applied either to the animal offered in sacrifice in confirmation of the covenant, or to the man regarded as replaced and represented by the victim, and thus pledging himself as it were to a moral death, or to the mediator of the covenant. If, on the other hand, in allusion to the above mentioned inheritance (κληρονομία), we evolve here out of the more general signification of διαθήκη (arrangement, dispositio) the more special one of testamentary arrangement, testament, we must beware of extending the application of the comparison made in illustration of the thought, beyond the immediate sentiment and purpose of the writer, and thus of introducing alien and incongruous elements into the passage. Such is the idea advanced by Menken, who says (Homilies on Chapters 9 and 10., p. 142) that only He who by His death has proved Himself worthy of the inheritance, could make others fellow-heirs with Him; as also that of Hofmann, who (Weissag. II., 165) appeals in proof of the necessity of the death of the ὁ διαθέμενος, to the fact that during His life He could add something to His possessions, and thus could not during His life-time make any one an heir of the whole property that He should leave behind Him. The question is not now of a setting forth of the ultimate ground of the death of Christ, a ground already assigned at Heb_9:15—but of an illustration of its practical necessity, in order for the delivering over of the blessings of salvation, as an inheritance. Compare as to the idea, Luk_22:29 : κἀγὼ διατίθεμαι ὑμῖν καθὼς διέθετό μοι ὁ πατήρ μου βασιλείαν. Among the ancient Hebrews there were, it is true, no arbitrary testamentary bequests, Deu_21:16. But among the later Jews they were by no means unknown (Michaelis, Mos. Recht. II., § 80), and the sentiment in question is conceived and expressed not from a Hebrew, but a Hellenic point of view. If we decline giving to φέρεσθαι the signification adduced (Hofm. Schriftb. II. 1, 428) or endured (referred by Wittich to the relatives), the most probable rendering will be that of sermone ferri=constare (Bretschn.). The juristic application of the word=afferri coram judice (Hammond, Elsner, and the majority, since Valckenaer) is restricted properly to the adducing of evidence in court, and applies not to the right of inheritance. The rendering esse, extare=γίγνεσθαι [be or become), which, with the ancients and up to the time of Valck., was the prevalent one, is held among later comm. only by Schultz and Böhme, and cannot be sustained. The rendering expectari (Grot.) is totally inadmissible. Grammatically indefensible too is the making μήποτε=μήπω, not yet (Vulg., Erasm., Luth., Schlicht., Böhme). In a strictly objective sentence we should indeed have expected οὐ; but the later writers in causal sentences with ὅτι and ἐπεί frequently confound οὐ and μή (Madvig, Synt., § 207, Anm. 2). If, with Winer, we decline ascribing to our author a negligence belonging properly to the vulgar idiom (Mullach, Gramm. der Griech. Vulgarsprache, p. 29), but give to μή its subjective force, we must then (with Œc., Beng., Lachm., Hofm., Del., etc.) assume an interrogation; and this all the more, as ἐπεί, also at Heb_10:2; Rom. 3 6; 1Co_14:16; 1Co_15:29; introduces a proof in the form of interrogation, and μήποτε appears alike in direct (Joh_7:26) and indirect (Luk_3:15; 2Ti_2:25) interrogations. Quite unnecessarily Isidor. Pelus. (Ep. IV., 113) prefers the reading μὴ τότε found only in D13.

Heb_9:18. Whence, also, neither has the first covenant, etc.—The reference of ὅθεν to Heb_9:15 by putting Heb_9:16-17, in parenthesis (Zachar., Mor., Storr, Heinr., Bisp.,) is inadmissible. The words κατὰ τὸν νόμον are not to be connected with πάσης ἐντολῆς=(“Every commandment as contained in the law,” (Schlicht., Calov, Beng., Bl., Bisp., etc.,) but with λαληθείσης, Œc. Erasm., Calv., Bez., Grot., etc.,); not, however, in the sense of “according to the command” in reference to the injunction, Exo_20:22, (Bez., etc.,) but, “in accordance with the law received on Sinai;” inasmuch as in concluding the covenant, an exact repetition of the divine commands was indispensable.

Heb_9:19. He took the blood, etc.—The καί after βιβλίον which we must not (with Colomes. and Valcken.) strike out, and which cannot possibly, with Beng., be taken as corresponding to the καὶ δέ of Heb_9:21, forbids our making αὐτὸ τὸ βιβ. dependent on λαβών. We are to assume here, as also in the mention of the goats which might be chosen for burnt offering, (Lev_1:10 f.; Lev_4:23 f.; Lev_9:2 f.; Num_6:10 f.; Heb_7:27; comp. Exo_24:5); and were also used in the expiatory offerings mentioned in Heb_9:12-13, and in like manner in respect to the means of purification, (which elsewhere are found only in the case of lepers, LeHebrews Heb_9:14 and those defiled by dead bodies, Numbers 19.) an expression drawn from tradition, (and which, at least in respect to that which immediately follows, is also found in Joseph. Antt. III. 8, 6), of the event recorded, Exodus 24. In the citation we have τοῦτο instead of the ἰδοὐ of the Sept., ὁ θεός instead of κύριος, and ἐνετείλατο instead of διέθετο.

Heb_9:21. And the tabernacle, too.—Since the tabernacle and vessels were constructed at a later period, the author cannot refer to anything that is contemporaneous with what is hitherto mentioned. To this fact points the καὶ δέ=but also, on the other hand also. The anointing is that enjoined, Exo_40:10, which is probably identical with that which was performed, Lev_8:10, during the seven days of priestly consecration, an account of which, similar to that here recorded, is given by Josephus, while the original text recounts only the sprinkling with oil, as of the positive means of consecration, but mentions the purifying by the blood of atonement only in reference to the altar, Lev_8:15; Lev_8:19; Lev_8:24.

Heb_9:22. And all things, as one might say, are purified with blood, etc.—Also, water and fire are a means of purification; but when the question is of forgiveness of sin, then blood is demanded, according to Lev_17:11. The vegetable sin-offering of the poor, Lev_5:11-13, forms no exception, but is a recognized substitute. Chrys., Primas., etc., erroneously refer σχεδόν to καθαρίζεται as if expressing the imperfection of this purification, neither, however, does it belong to ἐν αἵματι, (Beng., Böhm.), but to πάντα. The word αἱματεκχυσία is understood by De W., Thol., Hofm., Keil, of the pouring out of blood on the altar, and the sprinkling, while Bl., Lün., Del., Kurtz, on the contrary, refer it to the slaughter, which is parallel to the death of Christ upon the cross. Del. recalls the language of the last Supper, Luk_22:20, as in point of symbol and of fact, furnishing the closest parallel, without yet being insensible to what, on purely archæological grounds, may be urged in favor of the former explanation (comp. Einhorn, Prinzip des Mosaismus, p. 82 ff.).

DOCTRINAL AND ETHICAL

1. Even in the Old Test the salvation promised by God to His people, under certain terms and conditions, appears as an inheritance. נַחֲלָה. It is thus not unscriptural, and not even surprising, but merely uncommon, when Christ, who previously was regarded as the accomplisher of the revelation of God, and as royal head and leader of His people to salvation, as pledge and mediator of that new covenant which was promised and typified in the Old, is now represented as a Testator, in that, for the vivid illustration of the close connection, lying in the very nature of the case, between the death of Jesus Christ and the attainment of the inheritance of the children of God, promised to us by God, and given over as His own, to Christ, for transmission to us, this comparison opens the most appropriate and the most instructive analogies.

2. Since such is the state of the case, for this reason even in the formation of the old covenant, the application of blood, for cleansing and for expiation, was indispensable, and during the existence of that economy was always employed for such a purpose, in accordance with the express command of God. It was then, with a reference to the death of Jesus Christ, as the true and efficacious sacrifice, that this arrangement was instituted; and it is no accommodation to Jewish prejudices, and Rabbinical modes of expression, to regard Christ as a priest and an offering; rather, on the contrary, the Levitical offerings are to be conceived under the point of view of a divinely ordained type of the sacrifice determined in the eternal counsels of God, and freely undertaken by Christ, (Heb_10:5 ff.). Hence the ὅθεν, Heb_9:18.

3. In this connection becomes explicable, also, the sprinkling of the Tabernacle, and of the sacred vessels, and of the sacred records of the divine revelation and covenant, with blood, as well as the sprinkling of the people, although this belongs only to tradition. It expresses the obligation inhering in both parties for the offering of the efficient sacrifice, and the present inability to furnish it with the means existing at the time. Remittere peccata non est opus absolutæ misericordiæ, sed fit interveniente simul satisfactione eaque sufficientissima licet a misericordia divina procurata. (Seb. Schmidt).

HOMILETICAL AND PRACTICAL

Obedience to the ordinances of God is not merely the duty of men, but our best auxiliary in the struggle against sin.—The law of God which makes acquainted with and condemns sin, points also the way to the forgiveness of sin.—Sin is a stain which can be removed only by blood.—On the connection of sin, expiation, and forgiveness.

Starke:—Just as surely as Christ has died, so sure is the covenant of grace with God.—Divine justice demanded blood, and without this God could not be propitiated, Col_1:14; Col_1:20.—Moses, a faithful servant in the house of God. Blessed are they who are his imitators!—There is, in itself, nothing pure before God, not even the holy place, nor the teachers who enter thither to conduct the service of God, as the people who assemble there to serve God, and this even in their best acts; yet the blood of Christ purifies all.—How capital a point of faith is furnished by the blood and death of Jesus Christ! without this, all His suffering were in vain, and that even though it had been far heavier than it was. By this we are reconciled with God.

Rieger:—Only through Christ, and His death, has the whole blessing of redemption, which God would apply to us miserable wretches for our salvation, amounted to a proper testament and bequest, i.e., to a gracious economy confirmed by the death of its Author.

Heubner:—If everything is defiled by the impure hands of men, if the whole earth is desecrated by sin, then does everything stand in need of cleansing and consecration, Job_15:4.—In the expiatory power of the death of Jesus lies its proper significance, Isaiah 53.—Without a surrender to death there is no reconciliation. The yielding up of life an expiation for desecrated life, Exo_17:11.

Footnotes:

[9]Heb_9:18.—Instead of οὐδ’ A. C. D. E. L., 4, 44, 55 (but at the Sin.), write οὐδέ.

[10]Heb_9:19.—The article before νόμον is vouched for by A. C. D*. L., 21, 47, 71. In the Sin. it comes from a second hand.

[11]Heb_9:19.—The Art. before τράγων is required by Sin. A. C. D. E., 80.

[12]Heb_9:19.—For ἐῤῥάντισε all the Uncial MSS. have ἐράντισεν.

[13]Alford criticises the Eng. ver. “must have suffered” on the ground that the antecedent time, being already indicated by the ἔδει, need not be again expressed by παθεῖν. The criticism would be just if the ἔδει were in the English version instead of in the Greek. But in English the must, which translates the ἔδει, not having in itself the idea of past time, this idea has to be put into the accompanying Infinitive. The rendering of the common version is therefore, I think, idiomatic and unexceptionable.—K.].

Lange's Commentary on the Holy Scriptures (Critical, Doctrinal, and Homiletical), ed. John Peter Lange, English translation edited by Philip Schaff (1864–1880) — public domain. Text from a community e-Sword module.

9:16-22 The author gives a general principle about the nature of wills or covenants (9:16-17), which he then expounds in light of the inauguration of the first covenant (9:18-22).

Tyndale Open Study Notes — © Tyndale Open Resources, licensed CC BY-SA 4.0. Text via the HelloAO Bible API.

Heb 9:16. Διαθήκη) testament. This is the peculiar force of the Greek word, as compared with (above, præ) the Hebrew ברית. The article ἡ omitted agrees with the general sentiment expressed, as in Gal 3:15.—φέρεσθαι) be shown, or made good, fulfilled (præstari). The Greek words, φέρεσθαι, προσφέρεσθαι, Heb 9:14, allude to each other.—τοῦ διαθεμένου, of the testator) Christ is the testator in respect of us. This agrees with the words of the Lord before His death; Luk 22:29.

Bengel's Gnomon of the New Testament — English translation (T&T Clark, Edinburgh, 1860) — public domain. Text from a community e-Sword module.

Heb_9:16-17. Demonstration of the necessity of the θάνατον γενέσθαι by means of a truth of universal application. That Christ might be able to become the Mediator of a new διαθήκη, His death was required. For, to the validity of a διαθήκη, it is essential that the death of the διαθέμενος be first proved. Since immediately before (Heb_9:15) and immediately after (Heb_9:18 ff.) διαθήκη was employed in the sense of covenant, elsewhere usual in our epistle, we might naturally, on account of the conjunction of Heb_9:16-17, by means of γάρ, with Heb_9:15, and on account of ὅθεν, by which again Heb_9:18 is joined to Heb_9:15-16, expect this signification of the word to be found also in Heb_9:16-17. This has accordingly been insisted upon, here too, by Codurcus (Critt. sacrr. t. VII. P. ii. p. 1067 sqq.), Seb. Schmidt, Peirce, Whitby [in com.], Macknight, Michaelis, Sykes, Cramer, Paulus, and others, lastly also by Ebrard. But it is altogether inadmissible. For if we take διαθήκη as covenant, ὁ διαθέμενος could only designate him who makes or institutes the covenant; to take ὁ διαθέμενος as the mediator of the covenant, as is generally done in connection with that view, and to understand this again of the sacrificial victims, by the offering of which the covenant was sealed, is pure caprice. The thought, however, that for the validity of a covenant-act the death of the author of the covenant must first ensue, would be a perfectly irrational one. Irrational the more, inasmuch as, Heb_9:16-17, only an entirely general truth is contained, passing for a norm in ordinary life. Ebrard finds expressed the thought: Where a sinful man wishes to enter into a covenant with the holy God, the man must first die, must first atone for his guilt by death (or he must present a substitutionary עוֹלָה). But all these definings have been arbitrarily imported. For Heb_9:16-17 nothing is said either about a sinful man, or about a volition on his part, or about the holy God, or about an atoning for guilt, or about a substitutionary עוֹלָה. From what has been said, it follows that διαθήκη, Heb_9:16-17, can be taken only in the sense, likewise very frequently occurring with the Greek authors, of testament or disposition by will. It is true there arises therefrom a logical inaccuracy,[93] owing to the fact that διαθήκη is used in these two verses in another sense than before, and the formal demonstrative force of that which is advanced by the authoralthough the underlying thoughts are in themselves perfectly justis thereby sacrificed. It is, however, to be observed that while for us, since we are obliged to employ a twofold expression for the reproducing of the diversity of sense, the transition from the one notion to the other appears abruptly made, this transition for the author, on the other hand, might be an imperceptible one, inasmuch as in the Greek one and the same word included within itself both significations. Thus, accordingly, it has happened that the ancient Greek interpreters explain ΔΙΑΘΉΚΗ, Heb_9:16-17, expressly in the sense of a testament or will, then at once pass over to the declaration contained in Heb_9:18, without so much as noticing the logical inaccuracy which presents itself. The sense consequently is: where a testament or deed of bequest exists, there it is necessary, in order to give it validity (comp. ἰσχύει, Heb_9:17), that the death of the testator first be proved. The New Covenant, therefore, which Christ has established between God and man by His sacrificial death, the author here representsin accordance with the figure of the κληρονομία, Heb_9:15as a testamentary disposition on the part of Christ, which, however, as such could only acquire validity, and put the heirs in possession of the blessings bequeathed to them, by means of the death of Christ.

ΘΆΝΑΤΟΝ] emphatically preposed, while ΤΟῦ ΔΙΑΘΕΜΈΝΟΥ, upon which no emphasis falls, comes in at the end of the clause.

ΦΈΡΕΣΘΑΙ] be declared or proved. Wrongly Grotius: the verb to be regarded as equivalent to exspectari (est enim exspectatio onus quoddam); Wittich: it denotes the being endured on the part of the relatives; Carpzov, Chr. Fr. Schmid, Schulz, Kuinoel, Klee, Stein, Stengel, Hofmann (Schriftbew. II. 1, 2 Aufl. p. 428), and others, that it denotes nothing more than ensue or γίνεσθαι, Heb_9:15.

[93] For the author does not reason, as de Wette supposes, from the mere analogy of a will or testament.The course, moreover, pursued by Hofmann (Schriftbew. II. 1, p. 426 ff.), in order to manifest the non-existence of a logical inaccuracy, in that, namely, in the whole section, ver. 15ff., he will have διαθήκη signify neither covenant nor testament, but throughout the whole only disposal (Verfügung), is, as also Delitzsch and Riehm (Lehrbegr. des Hebräerbr. p. 598, Obs.) acknowledge, an utter breakdown. See likewise the observations of Nickel in Reuters Repertor. 1858, März, p. 194 f.Nor will it do, with Kurtz, to set aside the logical inaccuracy, at which he takes so great offence that he thinks himself obliged to designate such inaccuracy, in case it were present, an inexcusable confusion (!), in taking not only at vv. 16, 17, but also in like manner at vv. 15, 18, the διαθήκη in the special sense of establishing as heir. For the connection with that which precedes (comp. Heb_7:22, Heb_8:6 ff., Heb_9:1; Heb_9:4) leads at vv. 15, 18 exclusively to the idea of a covenant.

Meyer — Critical and Exegetical Commentary on the New Testament — English translation by Peter Christie, edited by Frederick Crombie (T&T Clark, 1880) — public domain. Text from a community e-Sword module.

Heb 9:16 . ὅπου γὰρ διαθήκη … The meaning of these words is doubtful. In the LXX διαθήκη occurs about 280 times and in all but four instances translates בְרִית , covenant. In classical and Hellenistic Greek, however, it is the common word for “will” or “testament” (see especially The Oxyrhynchus Papyri , Grenfell and Hunt, Part I., 105, etc., where the normal meaning of the word appears also from the use of ἀδιάθετος for “intestate” and μεταδιατίθεσθαι for “to alter a will”). Accordingly it has been supposed by several interpreters that the writer, taking advantage of the double meaning of διαθήκη , at this point introduces an argument which applies to it in the sense of “will” or “testament,” but not in the sense of “covenant”; as if he said, “where a testamentary disposition of property is made, this comes into force only on the decease of the testator”. θάνατον ἀνάγκη φέρεσθαι τοῦ διαθεμένου “it is necessary that the death of him who made the disposition be adduced”. On the very common omission of the copula in the third singular indicative see Buttmann, p. 136. φέρεσθαι , “necesse est afferri testimonia de morte testatoris” (Wetstein). For passages establishing its use as a term of the courts for the production of evidence, etc., see Field in loc . and especially Appian, De Bell. Civil . ii. 143, διαθῆκαι f1δὲ τοῦ Καίσαρος ὤφθησαν φερόμεναι . (See also Eisner in loc .) φέρειν is apparently even used for “to register” in the Oxy. Papyri , Part II., 244. The reason of this necessity is given in Heb 9:17 . διαθήκη γὰρ ἐπὶ νεκ ροῖς βεβαία … “for a testament is of force with reference to dead people, since it is never of any force when the testator is alive”. On this interpretation the words mean that before the inheritance, alluded to in Heb 9:15 , could become the possession of those to whom it had been promised, Christ must die. He is thus represented as a testator. The illustration from the general law relating to wills or testaments extends only to the one point that Christ’s people could inherit only on condition of Christ’s death. The reason of Christ’s death receives no illustration. He did not die merely to make room for the heir. The objections to this interpretation are (1) the constant Biblical usage by which, with one doubtful exception in Gal 3 , διαθήκη stands for “covenant,” not for “will”. On this point see the strong statement of Hatch, Essays in Bibl. Greek , p. 48. “There can be little doubt that the word must be invariably taken in this sense of “covenant” in the N.T., and especially in a book which is so impregnated with the language of the LXX as the epistle to the Hebrews”. (2) His argument regarding covenants receives no help from usages which obtain in connection with testaments which are not covenants. The fact that both could be spoken of under the same name shows that they were related in some way; but presumably the writer had in view things and not merely words. To adduce the fact that in the case of wills the death of the testator is the condition of validity, is, of course, no proof at all that a death is necessary to make a covenant valid. (3) The argument of Heb 9:18 is destroyed if we understand Heb 9:16-17 of wills; for in this verse it is the first covenant that is referred to.

But is it possible to retain the meaning “covenant”? Westcott, Rendall, Hatch, Moulton and others think it is possible. To support his argument, proving the necessity of Christ’s death, the writer adduces the general law that he who makes a covenant does so at the expense of life. What is meant becomes plain in the 18th verse, for in the covenant there alluded to, the covenanting people were received into covenant through death. That covenant only became valid ἐπὶ νεκροῖς over the dead bodies of the victims slain as representing the people. Whatever this substitutionary death may have meant, it was necessary to the ratification of the covenant. The sacrifices may have been expiatory, indicating that all old debts and obligations were cancelled and that the covenanters entered into this covenant as clean and new men; or they may have meant that the terms of the covenant were immutable; or that the people died to the past and became wholly the people of God. In any case the dead victims were necessary, and without them, χωρὶς αἵματος , the covenant was not inaugurated or ratified. Great light has been thrown on this passage by Dr. Trumbull in his Blood Covenant , in which he shows the universality of that form of compact and the significance of the blood. The rite of interchanging blood or tasting one another’s blood, indicates that the two are bound in one life and must be all in all to one another. On the whole, this interpretation is to be preferred. Certainly it connects much better with what follows. For having shown that by dead victims all covenants are ratified, the writer proceeds ὅθεν οὐδʼ ἡ πρώτη χωρὶς ἅματος ἐνκεκαίνισται , “wherefore not even the first,” although imperfect and temporary “was inaugurated without blood,” i.e. , without death. [The perfect here as elsewhere in Hebrews is scarcely distinguishable from the aorist.] Proof that this statement regarding the first covenant is correct he forthwith gives in Heb 9:19-20 .

Heb 9:19 . λαληθείσης γὰρ πάσης ἐντολῆς .… “For when Moses had spoken to the people every commandment of the law,” this being the needful preliminary, that the people might clearly understand the obligations they assumed on entering the covenant, he then took the blood of the calves and the goats, etc. In Exo 24:3 ff., an account is given of the inauguration of the first covenant. To that narrative certain additions of no importance are here made. In Exodus no mention is made of goats, only of μοσχάρια . (See Westcott on this discrepancy.) Probably this addition is due to an echo of Heb 9:12-13 . Water , which was added to the blood to prevent coagulation or possibly as a symbol of cleansing; ( cf. Joh 19:34 ; 1Jn 5:6 ) scarlet wool , κόκκινος , so called from κόκκος “the grain or berry of the ilex coccifera ” used in dyeing ( cf. Lev 14:4 ) and the hyssop or wild marjoram on which the wool was tied, are all added as associated with sacrifice in general, and all connected with the blood and the sprinkling. ἐράντισεν here takes the place of the κατεσκέδασε of Exodus and the action is not confined to the people as in the original narrative but includes αὐτὸ τὸ βιβλίον , the book itself, that is, even the book in which Moses had written the words of the Lord, the terms of the covenant. Everything connected with the covenant bore the mark of blood, of death. Again, in Heb 9:20 , instead of the ἰδοὺ of the LXX, which literally renders the Hebrew we have τοῦτο τὸ αἶμα κ . τ . λ ., a possible echo of our Lord’s words in instituting the new covenant, and instead of διέθετο of Exo 24:8 we have ἐνετείλατο corresponding with the ἐντολή of Heb 9:19 .

The Expositor's Greek Testament, edited by W. Robertson Nicoll (1897–1910) — public domain. Text from a community e-Sword module.

A reason why the Testament must be established by the death of the Mediator, because this Testament hath the condition of a Testament or gift, which is made effectual by death, and therefore that it might be effectual, it must needs be that he that made the Testament, should die.

Geneva Bible (1599) marginal notes — public domain. Text via Bolls.life.

A general axiomatic truth; it is "a testament"; not the testament. The testator must die before his testament takes effect (Heb 9:17). This is a common meaning of the Greek noun diathece. So in Luk 22:29, "I appoint (by testamentary disposition; the cognate Greek verb diatithemai) unto you a kingdom, as my Father hath appointed unto me." The need of death before the testamentary appointment takes effect, holds good in Christ's relation as MAN to us; Of course not in God's relation to Christ.

be--literally, be borne": "be involved in the case"; be inferred; or else, "be brought forward in court," so as to give effect to the will. This sense (testament) of the Greek "diathece" here does not exclude its other secondary senses in the other passages of the New Testament: (1) a covenant between two parties; (2) an arrangement, or disposition, made by God alone in relation to us. Thus, Mat 26:28 may be translated, "Blood of the covenant"; for a testament does not require blood shedding. Compare Exo 24:8 (covenant), which Christ quotes, though it is probable He included in a sense "testament" also under the Greek word diathece (comprehending both meanings, "covenant" and "testament"), as this designation strictly and properly applies to the new dispensation, and is rightly applicable to the old also, not in itself, but when viewed as typifying the new, which is properly a testament. Moses (Exo 24:8) speaks of the same thing as [Christ and] Paul. Moses, by the term "covenant," does not mean aught save one concerning giving the heavenly inheritance typified by Canaan after the death of the Testator, which he represented by the sprinkling of blood. And Paul, by the term "testament," does not mean aught save one having conditions attached to it, one which is at the same time a covenant [POLI, Synopsis]; the conditions are fulfilled by Christ, not by us, except that we must believe, but even this God works in His people. THOLUCK explains, as elsewhere, "covenant . . . covenant . . . mediating victim"; the masculine is used of the victim personified, and regarded as mediator of the covenant; especially as in the new covenant a MAN (Christ) took the place of the victim. The covenanting parties used to pass between the divided parts of the sacrificed animals; but, without reference to this rite, the need of a sacrifice for establishing a covenant sufficiently explains this verse. Others, also, explaining the Greek as "covenant," consider that the death of the sacrificial victim represented in all covenants the death of both parties as unalterably bound to the covenant. So in the redemption-covenant, the death of Jesus symbolized the death of God (?) in the person of the mediating victim, and the death of man in the same. But the expression is not "there must be the death of both parties making the covenant," but singular, "of Him who made (aorist, past time; not 'of Him making') the testament." Also, it is "death," not "sacrifice" or "slaying." Plainly, the death is supposed to be past (aorist, "made"); and the fact of the death is brought (Greek) before court to give effect to the will. These requisites of a will, or testament, concur here: (1) a testator; (2) heirs; (3) goods; (4) the death of the testator; (5) the fact of the death brought forward in court. In Mat 26:28 two other requisites appear: witnesses, the disciples; and a seal, the sacrament of the Lord's Supper, the sign of His blood wherewith the testament is primarily sealed. It is true the heir is ordinarily the successor of him who dies and so ceases to have the possession. But in this case Christ comes to life again, and is Himself (including all that He hath), in the power of His now endless life, His people's inheritance; in His being Heir (Heb 1:2), they are heirs.

Jamieson, Fausset & Brown — Commentary Critical and Explanatory on the Whole Bible (1871) — public domain (CC PDM 1.0). Text via the HelloAO Bible API.

Verse 16. For where a testament is] A learned and judicious friend furnishes me with the following translation of this and the 17th verse:-

"For where there is a covenant, it is necessary that the death of the appointed victim should be exhibited, because a covenant is confirmed over dead victims, since it is not at all valid while the appointed victim is alive."

He observes, "There is no word signifying testator, or men, in the original. διαθεμενος is not a substantive, but a participle, or a participial adjective, derived from the same root as διατηκη, and must have a substantive understood. I therefore render it the disposed or appointed victim, alluding to the manner of disposing or setting apart the pieces of the victim, when they were going to ratify a covenant; and you know well the old custom of ratifying a covenant, to which the apostle alludes. I refer to your own notes on Ge 6:18, and Ge 15:10.-J. C."

Mr. Wakefield has translated the passage nearly in the same way.

"For where a covenant is, there must be necessarily introduced the death of that which establisheth the covenant; because a covenant is confirmed over dead things, and is of no force at all whilst that which establisheth the covenant is alive." This is undoubtedly the meaning of this passage; and we should endeavour to forget that testament and testator were ever introduced, as they totally change the apostle's meaning. See the observations at the end of this chapter.

Adam Clarke's Commentary on the Bible (1810–1826) — public domain. Text from a community e-Sword/MySword module.

16. For where a testament is, etc. Even this one passage is a sufficient proof, that this Epistle was not written in Hebrew; for ברית means in Hebrew a covenant, but not a testament; but in Greek, διαθήκη, includes both ideas; and the Apostle, alluding to its secondary meaning, holds that the promises should not have been otherwise ratified and valid, had they not been sealed by the death of Christ. And this he proves by referring to what is usually the case as to wills or testaments, the effect of which is suspended until the death of those whose wills they are.

The Apostle may yet seem to rest on too weak an argument, so that what he says may be easily disproved. For it may be said, that God made no testament or will under the Law; but it was a covenant that he made with the ancient people. Thus, neither from the fact nor from the name, can it be concluded that Christ’s death was necessary. For if he infers from the fact, that Christ ought to have died, because a testament is not ratified except by the death of the testator, the answer may be this, that |berit|, the word ever used by Moses, is a covenant made between those who are alive, and we cannot think otherwise of the fact itself. Now, as to the word used, he simply alluded, as I have already said, to the two meanings it has in Greek; he therefore dwells chiefly on the thing in itself. Nor is it any objection to say, that it was a covenant that God made with his people; for that very covenant bore some likeness to a testament, for it was ratified by blood.

We must ever hold this truth, that no symbols have ever been adopted by God unnecessarily or unsuitably. And God in establishing the covenant of the law made use of blood. Then it was not such a contract, as they say, between the living, as did not require death. Besides, what rightly belongs to a testament is, that it begins to take effect after death. If we consider that the Apostle reasons from the thing itself, and not from the word, and if we bear in mind that he avowedly takes as granted what I have already stated, that nothing has been instituted in vain by God, there will be no great difficulty.

If anyone objects and says, that the heathens ratified covenants according to the other meaning by sacrifices; this indeed I admit to be true; but God did not borrow the rite of sacrificing from the practice of the heathens; on the contrary, all the heathen sacrifices were corruptions, which had derived their origin from the institutions of God. We must then return to the same point, that the covenant of God which was made with blood, may be fitly compared to a testament, as it is of the same kind and character.

John Calvin's Commentaries (1540-1563) — public domain. Text from the Calvin Translation Society English edition (1840s-50s) via the Christian Classics Ethereal Library (ccel.org). Calvin's coverage is partial (roughly two-thirds of the Bible); uncommented books and verses are honest gaps, never fabricated. The 19th-century editor's footnotes and remarks are omitted so the notes are faithfully Calvin's own voice.

16. For where a testament is] In these two verses (16, 17), and these only, Diathçkç is used in its Greek and Roman sense of “a will,” and not in its Hebrew sense of “a covenant.” The sudden and momentary change in the significance of the word explains itself, for he has just spoken of an inheritance, and of the necessity for a death. It was therefore quite natural that he should be reminded of the fact that just as the Old Covenant (Diathçkç) required the constant infliction of death upon the sacrificed victims, and therefore (by analogy) necessitated the death of Christ under the New, so the word Diathçkç in its other sense of “Will” or “Testament” (which was by this epoch familiar also to the Jews) involved the necessity of death, because a will assigns the inheritance of a man who is dead. This may be called “a mere play on words;” but such a play on words is perfectly admissible in itself; just as we might speak of the “New Testament” (meaning the Book) as “a testament” (meaning “a will”) sealed by a Redeemer’s blood. An illustration of this kind was peculiarly consonant with the deep mystic significance attached by the Alexandrian thinkers to the sounds and the significance of words. Philo also avails himself of both meanings of Diathçkç (De Nom. Mutat. § 6; De Sacr. Abel, Opp. i. 586. 172). The passing illustration which thus occurs to the writer does not indeed explain or attempt to explain the eternal necessity why Christ must die; he leaves that in all its awful mystery, and merely gives prominence to the fact that the death was necessary, by saying that since under the Old Covenant death was required, so the New Covenant was inaugurated by a better death; and since a Will supposes that some one has died, so this “Will,” by which we inherit, involves the necessity that Christ must die. The Old Covenant could not be called “a Will” in any ordinary sense; but the New Covenant was, by no remote analogy, the Will and Bequest of Christ.

there must also of necessity be the death of the testator] Wherever there is a will, the supposition that the maker of the will has died is implied, or legally involved (φέρεσθαι, constare).

The Cambridge Bible for Schools and Colleges (gen. ed. J. J. S. Perowne; Cambridge University Press, 1878–1918) — public domain. Text from a community e-Sword module.

For where a testament is,.... The covenant of grace, as administered under the Gospel dispensation, is a testament or will. The Jews have adopted the Greek word, here used, into their language, and pronounce it and by it understand a dying man's last will and testament (d). Some of them make it to be of Hebrew derivation; as if it was said, , "this shall be to confirm" (e), or this shall be stable and firm; though others own it to be the same with this Greek word (f). The covenant of grace, is properly a covenant to Christ, and a testament or will to his people: it is his and their Father's will, concerning giving them both grace and glory; it consists of many gifts and legacies; in it Christ is made heir of all things, and his people are made joint heirs with him; they are given to him as his portion; and they have all things pertaining to life and godliness bequeathed to them, even all spiritual blessings; the witnesses of it are Father, Son, and Spirit; and the seals of it are the blood of Christ, and the grace of the Spirit; and this is registered in the Scriptures by holy men as notaries; and is unalterable and immutable: and this being made,

there must also of necessity be the death of the testator; who is Christ; he has various parts in this will or testament; he is the surety and Mediator of it; and he is the executor of it; what is given in it, is first given to him, in order to be given to others; all things are put into his hands, and he has a power to give them to as many as the Father has given him; and here he is called the "testator": Christ, as God, has an equal right to dispose of the inheritance, both of grace and glory; and as Mediator, nothing is given without his consent; and whatever is given, is given with a view to his "death", and comes through it, and by virtue of it: hence there is a "necessity" of that, and that on the account of the divine perfections; particularly for the declaration of God's righteousness, or by reason of his justice; and also because of his purposes and decrees, which have fixed it, and of his promises, which are yea and amen in Christ, and are ratified by his blood, called therefore the blood of the covenant; and likewise on account of the engagements of Christ to suffer and die; as well as for the accomplishment of Scripture prophecies concerning it; and moreover, on account of the blessings which were to come to the saints through it, as a justifying righteousness, pardon of sin, peace and reconciliation, adoption and eternal life.

(d) T. Hieros. Peah, fol. 17. 4. & T. Bab. Bava Bathra, fol. 152. 2. (e) T. Bab. Bava Metzia, fol. 19. 1. Maimon & Bartenora in Misn. Moed Katon, c. 3. sect. 3. & in Bava Metzia, c. 1. sect. 7. & in Bava Bathra, c. 8. sect. 6. (f) Cohen de Lara Ir David, p. 30.

John Gill's Exposition of the Whole Bible (1746–1763) — public domain (CC PDM 1.0). Text via the HelloAO Bible API.

16 For where a testament is, there must also of necessity be the death of the testator.

Ver. 16. For where a testament is] {See Trapp "Heb 8:6"} Here the testator is Christ, heirs the saints, legacies the gifts of the Spirit, executor the Holy Ghost, witnesses apostles, martyrs, &c.

John Trapp, A Commentary or Exposition upon All the Books of the Old and New Testament (1647–1656) — public domain. Text from a community e-Sword module.

For where a testament is - This is the same word - διαθήκη diathēkē - which in Heb 8:6, is rendered “covenant.” For the general signification of the word, see note on that verse. There is so much depending, however, on the meaning of the word, not only in the interpretation of this passage, but also of other parts of the Bible, that it may be proper to explain it here more at length. The word - διαθήκη diathēkē - occurs in the New Testament thirty-three times. It is translated “covenant” in the common version, in Luk 1:72; Act 3:25; Act 7:8; Rom 9:4; Rom 11:27; Gal 3:15, Gal 3:17; Gal 4:24; Eph 2:12; Heb 8:6, Heb 8:9, “twice,” Heb 8:10; Heb 9:4, “twice,” Heb 10:16; Heb 12:24; Heb 13:20. In the remaining places it is rendered “testament;” Mat 26:28; Mar 14:24; Luk 22:20; 1Co 11:25; 2Co 3:6, 2Co 3:14; Heb 7:22; Heb 9:15-17, Heb 9:20; Rev 11:19. In four of those instances (Mat 26:28; Mar 14:24; Luk 22:20, and 1Co 11:25), it is used with reference to the institution or celebration of the Lord’s Supper. In the Septuagint it occurs not far from 300 times, in considerably more than 200 times of which it is the translation of the Hebrew word בּרית beriyt.

In one instance Zec 11:14 it is the translation of the word “brotherhood;” once Deu 9:5, of דּבר daabaar - “word;” once Jer 11:2, of “words of the covenant;” once Lev 26:11), of “tabernacle;” once Exo 31:7, of “testimony;” it occurs once Eze 20:37, where the reading of the Greek and Hebrew text is doubtful; and it occurs three times 1Sa 11:2; 1Sa 20:8; 1Ki 8:9, where there is no corresponding word in the Hebrew text. From this use of the word by the authors of the Septuagint, it is evident that they regarded it as the proper translation of the Hebrew - בּרית beriyt, and as conveying the same sense which that word does. It cannot be reasonably doubted that the writers of the New Testament were led to the use of the word, in part, at least, by the fact that they found it occurring so frequently in the version in common use, but it cannot be doubted also that they regarded it as fairly conveying the sense of the word בּרית beriyt. On no principle can it be supposed that inspired and honest people would use a word in referring to transactions in the Old Testament which did not “fairly” convey the idea which the writers of the Old Testament meant to express. The use being thus regarded as settled, there are some “facts” in reference to it which are of great importance in interpreting the New Testament, and in understanding the nature of the “covenant” which God makes with man. These facts are the following:

(1) The word διαθήκη diathēkē - “diatheke” - is not what properly denotes “compact, agreement,” or “covenant.” That word is συνθήκη sunthēkē - “syntheke” or in other forms σύνθεσις sunthesis and συνθεσίας sunthesias; or if the word “diatheke” is used in that signification it is only remotely, and as a secondary meaning; see “Passow;” compare the Septuagint in Isa 28:15; Isa 30:1; Dan 11:6, and Wisdom Dan 1:16; 1 Macc. 10:26; 2 Macc. 13:25; 14:26. It is not the word which a “Greek” would have employed to denote a “compact” or “covenant.” He would have employed it to denote a “disposition, ordering,” or “arrangement” of things, whether of religious rites, civil customs, or property; or if used with reference to a compact, it would have been with the idea of an “arrangement,” or “ordering” of matters, not with the primary notion of an agreement with another.

(2) The word properly expressive of a “covenant” or “compact” - συνθήκη sunthēkē - is “never” used in the New Testament. In all the allusions to the transactions between God and man, this word never occurs. From some cause, the writers and speakers in the New Testament seem to have supposed that the word would leave an impression which they did not wish to leave. Though it might have been supposed that in speaking of the various transactions between God and man they would have selected this word, yet with entire uniformity they have avoided it. No one of them - though the word διαθήκη diathēkē - “diatheke” - has been used by no less than six of them - has been betrayed in a single instance into the use of the word συνθήκη sunthēkē - “syntheke,” or has differed from the other writers in the language employed. This cannot be supposed to be the result of concert or collusion, but it must have been founded on some reason which operated equally on all their minds.

(3) In like manner, and with like remarkable uniformity, the word συνθήκη sunthēkē - syntheke - is “never” used in the Septuagint with reference to any arrangement or “covenant” between God and man. Once indeed in the Apocrypha, and but once, it is used in that sense. In the three only other instances in which it occurs in the Septuagint, it is with reference to compacts between man and man; Isa 28:15; Isa 30:1; Dan 11:6. This remarkable fact that the authors of that version never use the word to denote any transaction between God and man, shows that there must have been some reason for it which acted on their minds with entire uniformity.

(4) It is no less remarkable that neither in the Septuagint nor the New Testament is the word διαθήκη diathēkē - “diatheke” - “ever” used in the sense of “will” or “testament,” unless it be in the case before us. This is conceded on all hands, and is expressly admitted by Prof. Stuart; (Com. on Heb. p. 439), though he defends this use of the word in this passage. - A very important inquiry presents itself here, which has never received a solution generally regarded as satisfactory. It is, why the word διαθήκη diathēkē - “diatheke” - was selected by the writers of the New Testament to express the nature of the transaction between God and man in the plan of salvation. It might be said indeed that they found this word uniformly used in the Septuagint, and that they employed it as expressing the idea which they wished to convey, with sufficient accuracy. But this is only removing the difficulty one step further back.

Why did the Septuagint adopt this word? Why did they not rather use the common and appropriate Greek word to express the notion of a covenant? A suggestion on this subject has already been made in the notes on Heb 8:6; compare Bib. Repository vol. xx. p. 55. Another reason may, however, be suggested for this remarkable fact which is liable to no objection. It is, that in the apprehension of the authors of the Septuagint, and of the writers of the New Testament, the word διαθήκη diathēkē - “diatheke” - in its original and proper signification “fairly” conveyed the sense of the Hebrew word בּרית beriyt, and that the word συνθήκη sunthēkē - or “compact, agreement,” would “not” express that; and “that they never meant to be understood as conveying the idea either that God entered into a compact or covenant with man, or that he made a will.” They meant to represent; him as making “an arrangement, a disposition, an ordering” of things, by which his service might be kept up among his people, and by which people might be saved; but they were equally remote from representing him as making a “compact,” or a “will.” In support of this there may be alleged.

(1) The remarkable uniformity in which the word διαθήκη diathēkē - “diatheke” - is used, showing that there was some “settled principle” from which they never departed; and,

(2) It is used mainly as the meaning of the word itself. Prof. Stuart has, undoubtedly, given the accurate original sense of the word. “The real, genuine, and original meaning of διαθήκη diathēkē (diatheke) is, “arrangement, disposition,” or “disposal” of a thing.” P. 440. The word from which it is derived - διατίθημι diatithēmi - means to place apart or asunder; and then to set, arrange, dispose in a certain order. “Passow.” From this original signification is derived the use which the word has with singular uniformity in the Scriptures. It denotes the “arrangment, disposition,” or “ordering” of things which God made in relation to mankind, by which he designed to keep up his worship on earth, and to save the soul. It means neither covenant nor will; neither compact nor legacy; neither agreement nor testament. It is an “arrangement” of an entirely different order from either of them, and the sacred writers with an uniformity which could have been secured only by the presiding influence of the One Eternal Spirit, have avoided the suggestion that God made with man either a “compact” or a “will.”

We have no word which precisely expresses this idea, and hence, our conceptions are constantly floating between a “compact” and a “will,” and the views which we have are as unsettled as they are. unscriptural. The simple idea is, that God has made an “arrangement” by which his worship may be celebrated and souls saved. Under the Jewish economy this arrangement assumed one form; under the Christian another. In neither was it a compact or covenant between two parties in such a sense that one party would be at liberty to reject the terms proposed; in neither was it a testament or will, as if God had left a legacy to man, but in both there were some things in regard to the arrangement such as are found in a covenant or compact. One of those things - equally appropriate to a compact between man and man and to this arrangement, the apostle refers to here - that it implied in all cases the death of the victim.

If these remarks are well-founded, they should be allowed materially to shape our views in the interpretation of the Bible. Whole treatises of divinity have been written on a mistaken view of the meaning of this word - understood as meaning “covenant.” Volumes of angry controversy have been published on the nature of the “covenant” with Adam, and on its influence on his posterity. The only literal “covenant” which can he supposed in the plan of redemption is that between the Father and the Son - though even the existence of such a covenant is rather the result of devout and learned imagining than of any distinct statement in the volume of inspiration. The simple statement there is, that God has made an arrangement for salvation, the execution of which he has entrusted to his Son, and has proposed it to man to be accepted as the only arrangement by which man can be saved, and which he is not at liberty to disregard.

There has been much difference of opinion in reference to the meaning of the passage here, and to the design of the illustration introduced. If the word used - διαθήκη diathēkē - means “testament,” in the sense of a “will,” then the sense of that passage is that “a will is of force only when he who made it dies, for it relates to a disposition of his property after his death.” The force of the remark of the apostle then would be, that the fact that the Lord Jesus made or expressed his “will” to mankind, implied that he would die to confirm it; or that since in the ordinary mode of making a will, it was of force only when he who made it was dead, therefore it was necessary that the Redeemer should die, in order to confirm and ratify what he made. But the objections to this, which appears to have been the view of our translators, seem to me to be insuperable. They are these:

(1)The word διαθήκη diathēkē - “diatheke” - is not used in this sense in the New Testament elsewhere; see the remarks above.

(2)The Lord Jesus made no such will. He had no property, and the commandments and instructions which he gave to his disciples were not of the nature of a will or testament.

(3)Such an illustration would not be pertinent to the design of the apostle, or in keeping with his argument.

He is comparing the Jewish and Christian dispensations, and the point of comparison in this chapter relates to the question about the efficacy of sacrifice in the two arrangements. He showed that the arrangement for blood-shedding by sacrifice entered into both; that the high priest of both offered blood as an expiation; that the holy place was entered with blood, and that consequently there was death in both the arrangements, or dispensations. The former arrangement or dispensation was ratified with blood, and it was equally proper that the new arrangement should be also. The point of comparison is not that Moses made a will or testament which could be of force only when he died, and that the same thing was required in the new dispensation, but it is that the former covenant was “ratified by blood,” or “by the death of a victim,” and that it might be expected that the new dispensation would be confirmed, and that it was in fact confirmed in the same manner. In this view of the argument, what pertinency would there be in introducing an illustration respecting a will, and the manner in which it became efficient; compare notes on Heb 9:18. It seems clear, therefore, to me, that the word rendered “testament” here is to be taken in the sense in which it is ordinarily used in the New Testament. The opinion that the word here means such a divine arrangement as is commonly denoted a “covenant,” and not testament, is sanctioned by not a few names of eminence in criticism, such as Pierce, Doddridge, Michaelis, Steudel, and the late Dr. John P. Wilson. Bloomfield says that the connection here demands this. The principal objections to this view are:

(1)That it is not proved that no covenants or compacts were valid except such as were made by the intervention of sacrifices.

(2)That the word rendered “testator” - διαθεμενος diathemenos - cannot refer to the death of an animal slain for the purpose of ratifying a covenant, but must mean either a “testator,” or a “contractor,” that is, one of two contracting parties.

(3)That the word rendered “dead” Heb 9:17 - νεκροῖς nekrois - means only “dead men,” and never is applied to the dead bodies of animals; (see Stuart on the Hebrew, p. 442.)

These objections to the supposition that the passage refers to a covenant or compact, Prof. Stuart says are in his view insuperable, and they are certainly entitled to grave consideration. Whether the view above presented is one which can be sustained, we may be better able to determine after an examination of the words and phrases which the apostle uses. Those objections which depend wholly on the “philological” argument derived from the words used, will be considered of course in such an examination. It is to be remembered at the outset:

(1)That the word διαθήκη diathēkē - “diatheke” - is never used in the New Testament in the sense of “testament,” or “will,” unless in this place;

(2)That it is never used in this sense in the Septuagint; and,

(3)That the Hebrew word בּרית beriyt - “never” has this signification. This is admitted; see Stuart on the Heb. pp. 439, 440. It must require very strong reasons to prove that it has this meaning here, and that Paul has employed the word in a sense differing from its uniform signification elsewhere in the Bible; compare, however, the remarks of Prof. Stuart in Bib. Repos. vol. xx. p. 364.

There must also of necessity be - ἀνάγκη anagkē - That is, it is necessary in order to confirm the covenant, or it would not be binding in cases where this did not occur. The “necessity” in the case is simply to make it valid or obligatory. So we say now there must “necessarily” be a “seal,” or a deed would not be valid. The fair interpretation of this is, that this was the common and established custom in making a “covenant” with God, or confirming the arrangement with him in regard to salvation. To this it is objected (see the first objection above), that “it is yet to be made out that no covenants were valid execpt those by the intervention of sacrifices.” In reply to this, we may observe:

(1) That the point to be made out is not that this was a custom in compacts between “man and man,” but between “man and his Maker.” There is no evidence, as it seems to me, that the apostle alludes to a compact between man and man. The mistake on this subject has arisen partly from the use of the word “testament” by our translators, in the sense of “will” - supposing that it must refer to some transaction relating to man only; and partly from the insertion of the word “men” in Heb 9:17, in the translation of the phrase - ἐπὶ νεκροῖς epi nekrois - “upon the dead,” or” over the dead.” But it is not necessary to suppose that there is a reference here to any transaction between man and man at all, as the whole force of the illustration introduced by the apostle will be retained if we suppose him speaking “only” of a covenant between man and God. Then his assertion will be simply that in the arrangement between God and man there was a “necessity” of the death of something, or of the shedding of blood in order to ratify it. This view will save the necessity of proof that the custom of ratifying compacts between man and man by sacrifice prevailed. Whether that can be made out or not, the assertion of the apostle may be true, that in the arrangement which God makes with man, sacrifice was necessary in order to confirm or ratify it.

(2) The point to be made out is, not that such a custom is or was universal among all nations, but that it was the known and regular opinion among the Hebrews that a sacrifice was necessary in a “covenant” with God, in the same way as if we should say that a deed was not valid without a seal, it would not be necessary to show this in regard to all nations, but only that it is the law or the custom in the nation where the writer lived, and at the time when he lived. Other nations may have very different modes of confirming or ratifying a deed, and the same nation may have different methods at various times. The fact or custom to which I suppose there is allusion here, is that of sacrificing an animal to ratify the arrangement between man and his Maker, commonly called a “covenant.” In regard to the existence of such a custom, particularly among the Hebrews, we may make the following observations.

It was the common mode of ratifying the “covenant” between God and man. That was done over a sacrifice, or by the shedding of blood. So the covenant with Abraham was ratified by slaying an heifer, a she-goat, a ram, a turtle-dove, and a young pigeon. The animals were divided and a burning lamp passed between them; Gen 15:9, Gen 15:18. So the covenant made with the Hebrews in the wilderness was ratified in the same manner; Exo 24:6, seq. Thus, in Jer 34:18, God speaks of the “men that had transgressed his covenant which they had made before him when they cut the calf in twain, and passed between the parts thereof;” see also Zec 9:11. Indeed all the Jewish sacrifices were regarded as a ratification of the covenant. It was never supposed that it was ratified or confirmed in a proper manner without such a sacrifice. Instances occur, indeed, in which there was no sacrifice offered when a covenant was made between man and man (see Gen 23:16; Gen 24:9; Deu 25:7, Deu 25:9; Rth 4:7), but these cases do not establish the point that the custom did not prevail of ratifying a covenant with God by the blood of sacrifice.

Further; the terms used in the Hebrew in regard to making a covenant with God, prove that it was understood to be ratified by sacrifice, or that the death of a victim was necessary כּרת ברית kaarat beriyt, “to cut a covenant” - the word כרת kaarat meaning “to cut; to cut off; to cut down,” and the allusion being to the victims offered in sacrifice, and “cut in pieces” on occasion of entering into a covenant; see Gen 15:10; Jer 34:18-19. The same idea is expressed in the Greek phrases ὅρκια τέμνειν, τέμνειν σπονδάς horkia temnein, temnein spondas, and in the Latin “icere foedus;” compare Virgil, Aeneid viii. 941.

Et caesa jungebant foedera porca.

These considerations show that it was the common sentiment, alike among the Hebrews and the pagan, that a covenant with God was to be ratified or sanctioned by sacrifice; and the statement of Paul here is, that the death of a sacrificial victim was needful to confirm or ratify such a covenant with God. It was not secure, or confirmed, until blood was thus shed. This was well understood among the Hebrews, that all their covenant transactions with God were to be ratified by a sacrifice; and Paul says that the same principle must apply to any arrangement between God and human beings. Hence, he goes on to show that it was “necessary” that a sacrificial victim should die in the new covenant which God established by man through the Mediator; see Heb 9:23. This I understand to be the sum of the argument here. It is not that every contract made between man and man was to be ratified or confirmed by a sacrifice - for the apostle is not discussing that point; but it is that every similar transaction with God must be based on such a sacrifice, and that no covenant with him could be complete without such a sacrifice. This was provided for in the ancient dispensation by the sacrifices which were constantly offered in their worship; in the new, by the one great sacrifice offered on the cross. Hence, all our approaches to God are based on the supposition of such a sacrifice, and are, as it were, ratified over it. We ratify or confirm such a covenant arrangement, not by offering the sacrifice anew, but by recalling it in a proper manner when we celebrate the death of Christ, and when in view of his cross we solemnly pledge ourselves to be the Lord’s.

The death of the testator - According to our common version, “the death of him who makes a will.” But if the views above expressed are correct, this should be rendered the “covenanter,” or “the victim set apart to be slain.” The Greek will admit of the translation of the word διαθέμενος diathemenos, “diathemenos,” by the word “covenanter,” if the word διαθήκη diathēkē - “diatheke” - is rendered “covenant.” To such a translation here as would make the word refer “to a victim slain in order to ratify a covenant,” it is objected that the “word has no such meaning anywhere else. It must either mean a “testator,” or a “contractor,” that is, one of two covenanting parties. But where is the death of a person covenanting made necessary in order to confirm the covenant?” Prof. Stuart, in loc. To this objection I remark respectfully:

(1) That the word is never used in the sense of “testator” either in the New Testament or the Old, unless it be here. It is admitted of the word διαθήκη diathēkē - by Prof. Stuart himself, that it never means “will,” or “testament,” unless it be here, and it is equally true of the word used here that it never means one “who makes a will.” If, therefore, it should be that a meaning quite uncommon, or wholly unknown in the usage of the Scriptures, is to be assigned to the use of the word here, why should it be “assumed” that that unusual meaning should be that of “making a will,” and not that of confirming a covenant?

(2) If the apostle used the word διαθήκη diathēkē - “diatheke” - in the sense of “a covenant” in this passage, nothing is more natural than that he should use the corresponding word διαθέμενος diathemenos - “diathemenos” - in the sense of that by which a covenant was ratified. He wished to express the idea that the covenant was always ratified by the death of a victim - a sacrifice of an animal under the Law, and the sacrifice of the Redeemer under the gospel - and no word would so naturally convey that idea as the one from which the word “covenant” was derived. It is to be remembered also that there was no word to express that thought. Neither the Hebrew nor the Greek furnished such a word; nor have we now any word to express that thought, but are obliged to use circumlocution to convey the idea. The word “covenanter” would not do it; nor the words “victim,” or “sacrifice.” We can express the idea only by some phrase like this - “the victim set apart to be slain to ratify the covenant.” But it was not an unusual thing for the apostle Paul to make use of a word in a sense quite unique to himself; compare 2Co 4:17.

(3) The word διατίθημι diatithēmi - properly means, “to place apart, to set in order, to arrange.” It is rendered “appoint” in Luk 22:29; “made,” and “make,” with reference to a covenant, Act 3:25; Heb 8:10; Heb 10:16. It occurs nowhere else in the New Testament, except in the passage before us. The idea of “placing, laying, disposing, arranging,” etc., enters into the word - as to place wares or merchandise for sale, to arrange a contract, &c. see “Passow.” The fair meaning of the word here may be, whatever goes to arrange, dispose, or settle the covenant, or to make the covenant secure and firm. If the reference be to a compact, it cannot relate to one of the contracting parties, because the death of neither is necessary to confirm it. But it may refer to that which was well-known as an established opinion, that a covenant with God was ratified only by a sacrifice. Still, it must be admitted that this use of the word is not found elsewhere, and the only material question is, whether it is to be presumed that the apostle would employ a word in a single instance in a special signification, where the connection would not render it difficult to be understood. This must be admitted, that he might, whichever view is taken of the meaning of this passage, for on the supposition that he refers here to a will, it is conceded that he uses the word in a sense which does not once occur elsewhere either in the Old Testament or the New. It seems to me, therefore, that the word here may, without impropriety, be regarded as referring to “the victim that was slain in order to ratify a covenant with God,” and that the meaning is, that such a covenant was not regarded as confirmed until the victim was slain. It may be added that the authority of Michaelis, Macknight, Doddridge, Bloomfield, and Dr. JohnP. Wilson, is a proof that such an interpretation cannot be a very serious departure from the proper use of a Greek word.

Albert Barnes' Notes on the Bible (1834–1885) — public domain. Text from a community e-Sword/MySword module.

For where there is a testament, the death of the testator, &c. The same Greek word, corresponding to the Hebrew word Berith, is often used both in the books of the old and new Scriptures. The ancient Latin interpreter puts for it testamentum, a testament: but others would rather have the Hebrew and Greek word to signify any agreement, bargain, alliance, or covenant, which last word is generally put in the English Protestant translations, followed also by Mr. N. We do not deny but the Hebrew and Greek word have this signification, but not exclusively: this place of St. Paul shews evidently that they also signify what both in Latin and English is called a testament or last will, which is only of force by the death of the testator. The Protestants, therefore, here find themselves obliged to translate testament, contrary to their custom, and to apply this word not only to the promises and blessings God made to Christians, of which Christ is the mediator, and which were confirmed by his blood and by his death, but also to the former alliance and promises or blessings God made to the Israelites, when he chose them to be his elect people, and gave them his law and his commandments under Moses. It is true God is immortal in his own nature, cannot die, and therefore cannot make a testament that shall be confirmed by his own death. But as for the new alliance, or New Testament, as here it must be called, it was confirmed by the death of the Son of God; that is, of God made man, by which it is true to say that God died for us, though he did not die, nor could die, as God. And as for the former alliance, or first testament, as it is called here, (ver. 18.) that, says St. Paul, (which was only a figure of the second or new testament) was not made nor ratified without the blood of so many victims as used to be offered and sacrificed. (Witham)

George Leo Haydock (1774–1849), Haydock's Catholic Family Bible and Commentary, 1859 edition — public domain. Excludes Psalms (Douay-Rheims chapter numbering differs from Protestant) and Deuterocanonical books (Catholic canon only).

For where a testament is: for gives the reason of the Mediator’s death, even the putting the called into the possession of the bequeathed inheritance, demonstrated by a common, natural law in all nations of the testament’s effect on the testator’s death; a testament being a disposition by will nuncupative, or written, of either goods or lands, which are the person’s own, to be the right and possession of others after his death, whom he nominateth in it: such in proportion is the new covenant, where God gives freely all spiritual good things with a heavenly inheritance, as legacies to all his called ones in Christ, by this last and best will and testament of his, written in his Scripture instrument, witnessed by the prophets and apostles, sealed by the two sacraments, especially the Lord’s supper, Luk 22:20.

There must also of necessity be the death of the testator; he who maketh a testament by the law of nature, as of nations, must die before the legatees have any profit by the will; the son and heir inherits not but on the father’s death; then is the testament firm and valid, the time being come for the heir’s inheriting, and for the will’s execution, it being now unalterable; the necessity of which is cleared, Heb 9:17.

Matthew Poole's English Annotations on the Holy Bible (1683–1685) — public domain. Text from a community e-Sword/MySword module.

16. For—Assuming this beautiful view of the covenant as a testament, or bequest by will, the death of the testator is required, as by Jesus fulfilled.

Daniel D. Whedon (gen. ed.), Commentary on the Old and New Testaments (1874–1909) — public domain. Text from a community e-Sword module.

I say by means of death; for where such a covenant is, there must be the death of him by whom it is confirmed - Seeing it is by his death that the benefits of it are purchased. It seems beneath the dignity of the apostle to play upon the ambiguity of the Greek word, as the common translation supposes him to do.

John Wesley, Explanatory Notes Upon the Whole Bible (1754–1765) — public domain. Text via the GEBible commentary corpus.

16–17. For where a testament is. An inheritance has just been spoken of (verse 15). That suggests a last will and testament, one meaning of the Greek word diatheekee used in verse 15. A testament has no force until the testator is dead.

B. W. Johnson's The People's New Testament with Notes (1889–1891) — public domain. Electronic text from the Christian Classics Ethereal Library (CCEL) ThML edition.

will

a legal document in which a person states who should receive his possessions when he himself dies

the death of the person who made it must be proven

This can be stated in active form. AT: "someone must prove that the person who made the will has died"

translationWords

die

unfoldingWord translationNotes — © Distant Shores Media and the Door43 World Missions Community, licensed CC BY-SA 4.0. Source: git.door43.org/Door43/en_tn.

16. ὅπου γὰρ διαθήκη. In these two verses (16, 17), and these only, διαθήκη is used in its Greek and Roman sense of “a will,” and not in its Hebrew sense of “a covenant.” The sudden and momentary change in the significance of the word explains itself, for he has just spoken of an inheritance, and of the necessity for a death. It was therefore quite natural that he should be reminded of the fact that just as the Old Covenant (διαθήκη) required the constant infliction of death upon the sacrificed victims, and therefore (by analogy) necessitated the death of Christ under the New, so the word διαθήκη in its other sense of “Will” or “Testament” (which was by this epoch familiar also to the Jews) involved the necessity of death, because a will assigns the inheritance of a man who is dead. This may be called “a mere play on words”; but such a play on words is perfectly admissible in itself; just as we might speak of the “New Testament” (meaning the Book) as “a testament” (meaning “a will”) sealed by a Redeemer’s blood. An illustration of this kind was peculiarly consonant with the deep mystic significance attached by the Alexandrian thinkers to the sounds and the significance of words. Philo also avails himself of both meanings of διαθήκη (De Nom. Mutat. § 6; De Sacr. Abel, Opp. I. 586, 172). The passing illustration which thus occurs to the writer does not indeed explain or attempt to explain the eternal necessity why Christ must die; he leaves that in all its awful mystery, and merely gives prominence to the fact that the death was necessary, by saying that since under the Old Covenant death was required, so the New Covenant was inaugurated by a better death; and since a “Will” supposes that some one has died, so this “Will,” by which we inherit, involves the necessity that Christ must die. The Old Covenant could not be called “a Will” in any ordinary sense; but the New Covenant was, by no remote analogy, the Will and Bequest of Christ.

φέρεσθαι. Wherever there is a will the supposition that the maker of the will has died is implied, or legally involved (φέρεσθαι, constare).

Cambridge Greek Testament for Schools and Colleges (Cambridge University Press, 1896; 21 vols, various authors incl. Carr, Maclear, Plummer, Farrar, Lumby, Moule, M. R. James, Simcox) — public domain. Text from a community e-Sword module.

16.] For (justification of θανάτου γενομένου, by an appeal to common usage) where a testament is (it is quite in vain to attempt to deny the testamentary sense of διαθήκη in this verse. Many have made the attempt: e. g. Codurcus, in a long excursus, which may be seen in Critici Sacri, vol. vii. part 2, fol. 1067 ff.: Whitby in loc., Seb. Schmidt, Michaelis, al., and recently Ebrard and Hofmann. As these recent expositors have written with the others before them, it may be well to give an account of their views of the passage. Ebrard understands it thus: “Wherever sinful man will enter into a covenant with the holy God, the man must first die,—must first atone for his guilt by death (or must put in a substitute for himself).” This he gives as the summary of his argumentation. But, as Hofmann asks, where does he find one word of this in the general assertion of the Writer? The text speaks axiomatically of something which every one knows in common life. Ebrard interprets theologically: by a declaration which it requires a theologian to accept. The Writer speaks in the abstract—of all διαθῆκαι whatever: Ebrard interprets in the concrete—of one particular set of διαθῆκαι. It is true, Eb. attempts to anticipate this objection, by saying that from the context, every one would know what sort of διαθήκη was meant. But this does not meet it in the least degree. Our verse is a perfectly general axiom, extending over all διαθῆκαι, in whatsoever sense the word be taken. Hofmann on the other hand rejects (Schriftb. ii. 1. 302 ff.) both meanings, testament and covenant, and maintains that of ordinance, disposition, understanding that disposition to extend to the whole property. Then, he says (see also Weissagung u. Erfüllung, ii. 165), “This idea of necessity implies that he must die who makes such a disposition of his whole property: because, as long as he lives, he can be always adding to his property, so that this disposition (διαθήκη) cannot be meant to be used of the time while the disposer is alive.” But this, though approaching nearer the true meaning, is just as futile as the other. Why may not a man yet living make such a disposition? And if it cannot be made till death, wherein does it in reality differ from a testament? It would be quite impossible to follow out the various argumentations by which the testamentary sense has been sought to be evaded. It will be far more profitable for us to endeavour to substantiate that which I believe to be the only admissible acceptation. And this I will do by starting from the word itself about which all the question is raised. διαθήκη, from διατιθέναι, ‘disponere,’ διατίθεσθαι, ‘disponere sibi,’ regards, in ordinary Greek usage, that disposition of a man’s property which he makes in prospect of his death, and signifies, 1. a will or testament. So in Plato, Legg. xi. p. 926 b, ὃς ἂν διαθήκην γράφῃ τὰ αὐτοῦ διατιθέμενος, and in reff.: in Demosth. 1136. 12, τὴν διαθήκην, ἣν ἂν γνησίων ὄντων παίδων ὁ πατὴρ διάθηται, ἐᾶν ἀποθάνωσιν οἱ παῖδες πρὶν ἡβῆσαι, κυρίαν εἶναι, and al. On the other hand, the word is by no means tied to this its more usual meaning. The general one, of a disposition of any kind, is sometimes found applied to other circumstances than those at the close of life. So Aristoph. Av. 439, where Peisthetærus says, μὰ τὸν Ἀπόλλω ʼγὼ μὲν οὔ, ἣν μὴ διαθῶνταί γʼ οἵδε διαθήκην ἐμοί, … μήτε δάκνειν τούτους ἐμὲ κ.τ.λ.: where it evidently means a covenant, an agreement. And in this sense, either where there are two distinct parties, or where one only arranges or ordains a ‘dispositio,’ do we find the word most often used in the LXX and N. T. In the former sense, 2. of a covenant, with two agreeing parties, it is not so frequent as in the latter: but we find it Gen 21:27, Gen 21:32, διέθεντο ἀμφότεροι διαθήκην: in Job 40:23 (41:4) of Leviathan, θήσεται δὲ μετὰ σοῦ διαθήκην: 2Ki 3:12: Jos 9:6, Jos 9:11 al. fr. The other sense, 3. that of a disposition or ordinance made by God πρός τινα, or μετά τινος, is the most ordinary one in the LXX. To it may be referred almost all the passages where in a loose sense of the word we in English render ‘covenant:’ e. g. Gen 6:18; Gen 9:9 &c.; 15:18: and a hundred other places. In this latter sense it is that the word has come to be used absolutely and technically as in ἡ κιβωτὸς τῆς διαθήκης, ἡ διαθήκη κυρίου, &c.: and in the quotation in our ch. 8:8 ff.

Now, having these there leading senses of the word before us, we are to enquire, which of them our Writer is likely to have intended when he wrote as a general axiom, ὅπου διαθήκη, θάνατον ἀνάγκη φέρεσθαι τοῦ διαθεμένου. It is obvious that in no general axiomatic sense can it be predicated of a covenant, or of an ordinance. There may be particular instances where a death (setting aside for a moment τοῦ διαθεμένου) might have been the requisite ratification of a covenant, or result of an ordinance: but such particular cases are clearly not here in question. Only when we recur to sense (1), that of a testament, can it be true, that where a διαθήκη is, there must of necessity be death, and that, the death τοῦ διαθεμένου, of him who has made the testament. And if it be objected to this, that a testament may exist many years before the death of the testator, the answer is easy, that the Writer here detines his own meaning of ὅπου διαθήκη, when he says διαθήκη γὰρ ἐπὶ νεκροῖς βεβαία: viz. that the document in question does not in reality become a διαθήκη, a disposition, till it is of force, till things are disposed by it. I believe then it will be found that we must at all hazards accept the meaning testament here, as being the only one which will in any way meet the plain requirements of the verse) there is necessity that the death (θάνατον is prefixed before ἀνάγκη, as carrying the whole weight of emphasis, and is for this reason also anarthrous) of him who made it (the testator, as E. V., but it is important to mark that it is διαθεμένου, not διατιθεμένου, as it ought to be on the interpretation of Ebr. al. In the meaning, Christ is the διαθέμενος: and this agrees wonderfully with St. Luke’s manner of speaking in that text which is in fact the key-text to this: κἀγὼ διατίθεμαι ὑμῖν καθὼς διέθετό μοι ὁ πατήρ μου βασιλείαν, Luk 22:29. There the great and primary διαθέμενος is the Father, who is not here in question, as neither is His διαθήκη with His Son: but as regards us, the διαθέμενος is Christ; to whom alone, as human, the axiom, spoken of human relations, is applicable, and not to the divine Father. And when Ebrard insists on the former of these facts, and altogether omits noticing the second, saying that according to our interpretation God Himself must have died, we can only marvel at this fresh instance of the inconceivable rashness and carelessness which unfortunately characterize his spirited and clever commentary) be implied (it is not easy to express the exact sense of φέρεσθαι here. For we must remember, 1. that we have had θανάτου γενομένου in ver. 15, quite far enough off to prevent it being probable that φέρεσθαι is a mere rhetorical elegance to avoid repeating γενέσθαι, and inducing us to think that some meaning different from γενέσθαι is here intended: even could it be shewn that φέρεσθαι could bear to be rendered = γενέσθαι, which I am not aware that it has been: 2. that in looking for a sense for φέρεσθαι, we must be careful not to give too pregnant or emphatic an one, seeing that it holds a very insignificant and unemphatic place in the sentence. This being premised, I believe the most suitable sense will be found in such phrases as πάσας αἰτίας φέρειν, to allege all grounds, Demosth. p. 1328. 22; παραδείγματα φέρειν, to produce examples, Polyb. xvii. 13. 7; φέρειν τινὶ τοὺς ἀπολογισμούς, to make one’s apologies to, id. i. 32. 4. And of these I would take ‘alleged,’ ‘carried in to the matter,’ in fact, ‘implied,’ which seems the best word: he who speaks of διαθήκη, (ἅμα) φέρει, carries in to, involves in, that assertion, the death of the διαθέμενος. On the logical connexion, see below):

Henry Alford, The Greek Testament (1849–1861) — public domain. Text from a community e-Sword module.

For where a testament is [οπου γαρ διαθηκη] . "The English Version has involved this passage in hopeless obscurity by introducing the idea of a testament and a testator." This statement of Rendall (Epistle to the Hebrews, p. 159) is none too strong. That interpretation, however, is maintained by a very strong array of modern expositors. 212 It is based upon klhronomia inheritance; it being claimed that this word changes the whole current of thought. Hence it is said that the new covenant established by Christ is here represented as a testamentary disposition on his part, which could become operative in putting the heirs in possession of the inheritance only through the death of Christ. See Additional Note at the end of this chapter.

There must also of necessity be the death of the testator [θανατου αναγκη φερεσθαι του διαθεμενου] . Rend. it is necessary that the death of the institutor (of the covenant) should be born. With the rendering testament, feresqai is well - nigh inexplicable. If covenant the meaning is not difficult. If he had meant to say it is necessary that the institutor die, he might better have used genesqai : " it is necessary that the death of the institutor take place "; but he meant to say that it was necessary that the institutor die representatively; that death should be born for him by an animal victim. If we render testament, it follows that the death of the testator himself is referred to, for which qanatou feresqai is a very unusual and awkward expression.

Marvin R. Vincent, Word Studies in the New Testament (1887–1900) — public domain. Text from a community e-Sword/MySword module.

16. ὅπον yap... διαθεμένου] For there there te a corenant the death of him that made it must needs be presented. Vulg. Ubi enim testamentem mors necesse est intercedal tesfatorie. Tho circumstances under which the New Covonant was mado, however unlooked for in man’s anticlpation of the Christ (τοῦτο τὸ ταράσσον αὐτοὺς τὸ τοῦ θανάτου τοῦ Χριστοῦ (Ecum.), are to deeper thought most intelligible, for an unchangeable covo-

nant implics death. It is not said that

he who makes the covenant ‘must die,’ but that his doath must bo ‘bronght forward, ‘presented,’ ‘introduced upon the scene,’ ‘set in evidence,’ so to speak. This sense of φέρεσθαι appears to be perfectly natural, and to be more simple than the sense commonly attributed to the word, either ‘to be alleged’ as a fact, or to be pleaded in the course of an argument, or to be

‘current’ as a matter of common notoriety,

He who makes the covenant (6 d:abdperos) is, for the purposes of the covenant, identified with the victim by whoee representative dcath the covenant is ordinarily ratifiod. In the death of the victim his death is presented symbolically.

In the case of the New Covonant Christ in His Divine-human Person represented God who reveals through and in Him the unfailing greatness of tho divino lovo, and at the samo timo He represented the complete selfsurrender of humanity. A covonant so made could not fail. Tho wonkness and instability of men had no longer any place. The thought expressed by the representative victim had become an eternal fact.

Brooke Foss Westcott (1825–1901), The Epistle to the Hebrews (1889) and The Epistles of St John (1883) — public domain (pre-1929). Text recovered from Internet Archive / Google Books OCR scans. Westcott’s Gospel of John commentary is not included (its OCR lost the chapter running-heads required for reliable verse-keying). Some Greek quoted in the Hebrews volume is imperfectly rendered by the OCR.